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ABSTRACT
The interaction of Community and European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) affairs is a subject which has been 
neglected in the research on European integration. While 
legal scholars have partially taken up the complex task of 
treaty exegesis, there has been a dearth of research from 
the political perspective. This thesis fills a major gap in 
the discussion of EPC from theoretical, analytical and 
empirical aspects. Thus, it explores from a Community 
perspective not only the normative question of whether the 
European Community (EC) requires or even desires an 
institutionalised, external political voice to fulfil its 
role as an international trade alliance; but also, and more 
important, it examines the political linkages implicit in 
and inseparable from economic decisions and actions.
In this context the thesis examines, through a series of 
case studies, the issues and tensions that have come about 
and still exist in the European Community in the interplay 
between forces of integration, external relations, and EPC: 
the aspiration for political integration on one hand, and 
the desire by the member states of the Community to retain 
independence on the other. The resulting tension from these 
forces is best reflected in the relationship between EC 
external economic relations, and European Political 
Cooperation, manifested in the quest for actorness by the 
Community.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION; THE DIVIDING OF ECONOMICS FROM
POLITICS
Introduction
Recovering from the Second World War, the founding fathers 
of the European C o m m u n i t y h a d  one primary goal in mind: 
to prevent the recurrence of another devastating war in 
Europe. To achieve this goal, the objective was to unite 
Europe politically and economically so that a war between 
its composite parts would be "unthinkable."(2)
The term European Community will be used throughout this thesis interchangeably with the term Community and European Economic Community, except where explicitly stated. The terms Commission, Court of Justice and Council, will stand for, respectively. Commission of the European Communities, Court of Justice of the European Communities, and Council of the European Communities,The famous quote from Robert Schuman that a united Europe would "make war not merely unthinkable but materially impossible" succinctly grasps much of the impetus and thinking that surrounded the founding of the Community, See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 13-20, 1950, p. 10701.
Precisely how this new Europe would look and the degree of 
supranationalism which would materialise was less 
discernible.) Yet the transmutation of Europe into a new 
cooperative and interdependent form was foremost in the 
minds of the founding fathers of the Community, who wanted;
"to create, by establishing an economic community, 
the basis for a broader and deeper community among 
peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay 
the foundations for institutions which will give 
direction to a destiny henceforward shared.
Thus, are the initial political aspirations of the Community 
spelled out. These aspirations coupled with the later 
decision to create a two tier system by moving foreward 
first in the economic field, leaving political integration 
until a later date, are crucial to an understanding of the 
resulting history, conflicts and current experiences of the 
EC, EPC and external relations. After successfully building 
a two tier structure, which carefully relegated political 
decisions to the member states, the corollary effects began 
to reveal themselves. The consequences for the Community's 
position in the world, its actor capability, and its
3 See for example, Pierre Gerbet, "The Origins: EarlyAttempts and the Emergence of the Six (1945-52)," in Roy Pryce, ed., The Dynamics of European Union, (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 35-48; Walter Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 1945-47, vol. I (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1982); Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 1 (1962- 3) pp. 203-211.4 Preamble, Treaty establishing the European Coal and SteelCommunity, signed in Paris, 18 April 1951.
perception by the international Community were apparent in a 
number of ways. The Community was developing a tremendous 
economic reach but was thwarted by conflicting, vague or 
nonexistent competences which prevented it from adopting the 
appropriate, consequent political postures or relationships. 
In short, its actor potential was diminished. This theme of 
actorness, which occupies a central part of the thesis, is a 
crucial one because although the economic strength of the 
Community is indisputed its political strength is less 
certain.
The system created to cope with the split between economics 
and politics, the parallel structures of EEC and EPC, and 
the leaving of political decisions to the member states, 
leaves many areas undefined and therefore unclear. In spite 
of the apparent neat theoretical division the practical 
aspects present difficulties. Important political, legal and 
theoretical questions emerge from the ambiguities and 
contradictions in the interaction of EC and EPC. The 
mechanisms discussed in this thesis, which have evolved for 
external political relations, point out these contradictions 
and tensions.
The interaction of Community and European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) affairs and their relationship to the 
actor capability of the Community is a subject which has 
been neglected in the research on European integration.
While legal scholars have partially taken up the complex 
task of treaty exegesis, there has been a dearth of research
from the political perspective. This thesis fills a major 
gap in the discussion of EPC from theoretical, analytical 
and empirical aspects. It analyses a system which existed 
for over twenty years between the development of early 
political cooperation machinery in the early 1970s and the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Therefore it is a worthwhile 
subject not only as an historical analysis of Community 
structures, but also as an important indicator and guide for 
the future development and maturation of political 
cooperation, under whichever name this cooperation comes.
The work explores not only the institutionalised, external 
political voice with which the Community fulfils its mission 
to have a voice and impact in world affairs, but also its 
role as an international trade alliance; also, and more 
importantly, it examines the political linkages implicit in 
and inseparable from these economic decisions and actions, 
which serve to strengthen the Community's actor capability.
In this context the thesis examines, from a Community 
perspective, the tensions that have come about and are still 
unresolved in the European Community in the interplay 
between forces of integration, external relations, and EPC: 
the aspiration for political integration on one hand, and 
the desire by the member states of the Community to retain 
independence on the other. The resulting tension from these 
forces is best reflected in the relationship between EC 
external economic relations, and European Political
Cooperation, manifested in the quest for actorness by the 
Community.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to lay the
foundations for an analysis of the conflicting forces of EC
and EPC. First, a brief historical overview of the
( 5 )development of EPC is necessary to note specifically its 
separation from the EC machinery. Before going on to 
describe the interactive evolution of the two spheres and 
the difficulties and absurdities resulting from the split
This thesis will deal with European Political Cooperation in the context of its interaction with the European Community, and the implications of that interaction or lack of it. For an analysis of the institutions and mechanism of EPC see, inter alia, European Political Cooperation, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988); D. Murphy, "System of European Political Cooperation: a brief explanation," North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (1985) pp. 383-396; D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessels, eds. , European Political Cooperation : Toward a Foreign Policy for Western Europe (London : Butterworths, 1982); A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger, W. Wessels and G. Edwards, eds., European Political Cooperation in the 1980's: a Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of 
Supranational Diplomacy? (Avebury: Aldershot, 1987); Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, eds., European Foreign Policy: the European Community and changing perspectives in Europe (London: Sage, 1994); P. de Schoutheete, "Political cooperation and national foreign policies," 
European Affairs, no. 4 (Winter, 1987) pp. 62-67;William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the New European Community (London: Wheatsheaf, 1994); G. Bonvincini, "Mechanisms and Procedures of EPC: More than Traditional Diplomacy" in A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger,W. Wessels and G. Edwards, op. cit., pp. 49-70; S.Bulmer and W. Wessels, The European Council. Decision­making in European Politics (London : Macmillan, 1987);D. Murphy, "European Political Cooperation after the Single European Act: The future of Foreign Affairs in the EC," Boston College International and Comparative 
Law Review (Summer, 1989) pp. 335-355.
between external economic relations and political relations, 
it is necessary to provide the backdrop: an understanding of 
just how the Community's political and economic spheres 
became theoretically and legally separated from each other, 
and the resulting division of competences which emerged.
Second, an explanation of the thesis itself is provided, 
analysing the criteria against which case-studies were 
tested as feasible, the structure of the work, and a summary 
of the particular chapters and cases.
I. The Grand Design
1. The failure of the European Defence Community
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome states that the European 
Community shall promote not only "a harmonious development 
of economic activities" but also "closer relations between 
the states belonging to it. " Regarding the establishment 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the French 
Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman said in 1950:
"the pooling of coal and steel production will 
immediately provide for the establishment of common
6 Article 2, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957. Hereafter called the Rome Treaty or Treaty of Rome.
bases for economic development as a first step in
{7 )the federation of Europe."
Thus, the European Coal and Steel Community, officially 
formed in 1951, was the first European institution set up 
with a supranational framework. The six European states of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany had voluntarily placed limits on 
their national sovereignty with the political aim of 
proceeding toward a united Europe. A common higher authority 
would remove decisionmaking capacity from the states 
themselves and place it within a central authority : a 
crucial step toward supranationalism, and a symbol of the 
determination of the states involved to follow a path of 
integration.
Yet, the destruction of World War II also provided both a 
focus and a determination by the founding fathers of the EC 
to set themselves an agenda for political union.^^  ^ The
7 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 13-20, 1950, pt.10701.
8 For a review of the negotiations, motivations, and set­backs in the early attempts at constructing "Europe", see Pierre Gerbet, "The Origins: Early Attempts and the Emergence of the Six (1945-52)," in Roy Pryce, The 
Dynamics of European Union (London; Croom Helm, 1987);A, S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London: Methuen, 1987); R. Morgan, West European Politics since 1945: the shaping of the European Community (London: Batsford, 1972) ; Miriam Camps, European Unification in the Sixties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); D. Urwin, The Community of Europe: a history of European integration since 1945 (Harlow: Longman, 1991); D. Urwin, Western Europe since 1945: a political history (Harlow: Longman, 1989); Hans A. Schmitt, European Union From Hitler to de Gaulle (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969)
European Defence Community treaty which had been signed in 
May 1952 (EDC) was the first attempt at political and 
security consolidation. Intended to be a military 
organisation, it was also seen as a step toward political
/ 9 )integration. Article 38 of the EDC treaty undertook to
establish a Political Community whose powers would include
autonomous and supranational power in foreign policy and the
signing of treaties(10) j^s failure, resulting from the
defeat on August 30, 1954 of the EDC treaty in the French
National Assembly, was one of the elements involved in the
decision by the original Six to make progress first in the 
( 11 )economic field. The failure of the EDC scheme was also a
precursor of the difficulties which would face the European 
Community throughout all of its future moves towards 
integration and towards developing a common foreign policy
9 See D. Urwin, Western Europe since 1945: a politicalhistory (Harlow: Longman, 1989) p. 126; Edward Fursdon. The European Defence Community: A History ( London ; Macmillan, 1980); A. H. Robertson, European 
Institutions : Cooperation, Integration, Unification (London: Steven & Sons, 1973).10 See A. H Robertson, ibid., pp. 290-291; Frans Alting vonGeusau, "European Political Integration: A record of confusion and failure," European Yearbook (1963) pp. 148-149; Susanne Bodenheimer, Political Union; A Microcosm of European Politics 1960-1966 (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1967) passim.11 For a detailed account of the voting in the FrenchAssembly, see Hans Schmitt, The Path to European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962). For an alternative view regarding the consequences of the failure of the EDC to the process of economic integration, see Hanns Jürgen Küsters, "The Treaties of Rome (1955-57)," in Roy Pryce, The Dynamics of European 
Union, op. cit. pp. 7 8-104.
( 12 )of any type. Further, the collapse of the EDC was a
harbinger of the tension which was to come, and which still 
exists, between the member states and the Community 
"especially in any decisions regarding the development a 
common foreign policy.(13)
The European Defence Community had been a far-reaching 
attempt at supranationalism, but one which failed. Economic 
integration had made a vast move forward with the signing of 
the treaty establishing the ECSC, but the failure of the EDC 
shifted the forces of integration onto two very distinct and 
different levels. A two-tier process had begun which 
required the separation of the political Europe and the 
economic one: the repercussions of this division and the 
insupportable structures, contradictions, and frictions 
which have resulted from the division are the primary 
content of this thesis. The forces of independence and 
autonomy, coupled with the opposing logic of integration and 
the reality of interdependence creates a friction in the 
calculation of priorities and interests. This friction is 
manifested not only in the Community's political 
relationships, but also in the definition of competences 
within the legal framework of the Community.
12 See Carol Twitchett and Kenneth Twitchett, "The EEC as aframework for diplomacy," in Building Europe: Britain's partners in the EEC (Europa Press: London, 1981) p. 16.13 For further analyses of the EDC, see Clarence Walton,"Background for the European Defense Community," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 68 (March 1953) pp. 42-69; Hamilton F. Armstrong, "Postscript to the EDC," Foreign Affairs, vol. 33 (October, 1954) pp. 11-21,
2. The splitting of economics and politics
After the failure of EDC, it was the Benelux states which 
were first to re-ignite the process of integration. In 1955 
the Benelux governments proposed the convening of an 
intergovernmental conference-in cooperation with the 
institutions of the Coal and Steel Community-to elaborate 
plans for the next steps in European integration. The
conference took place in the Sicilian town of Messina in 
1955 and resulted in the Messina Resolution, which declared 
that the Six "believe that the moment has come to go a step 
further towards the building of E u r o p e . "(15) The failure of 
the European Defence Community had increased the awareness 
and sensitivity of the Six to supranational institutions, so 
the Messina Resolution concentrated on areas such as atomic 
energy, transport, and a common market, while evading the 
vexed language of supranationalism.The demarcation 
between political union and economic utility had begun, but
14 Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 23.15 See Resolution adopted by the Ministers of ForeignAffairs of the Member States of the ECSC at their meeting at Messina on June 1 and 2, 1955. European Parliament, Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1983) p. 95.16 According to Camps, the most important achievement atMessina was the agreement reached on the method to be followed in preparing the next stages in integration. Although the original Benelux proposal was somewhat modified, the essential idea that the intergovernmental conference should prepare the texts of treaties to carry out the agreed upon objectives was retained (p. 25). For a thorough evaluation of the Messina Conference see Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955- 1963, op. cit.
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the political objective was still regarded as "indispensable
/17 \if Europe is to maintain her position in the world." ' The
Messina Conference made a "fresh advance toward the building 
of Europe, " bu.t the Six agreed, crucially, "that this step
/ IP \should first of all be taken in the economic field."
Thus, the split between economics and politics was born even
/1 9 \before the Treaty of Rome established the EEC.
This splitting up of the economic and political mechanisms 
for European integration has led to certain institutional 
difficulties which have caused uncertainties and tensions 
for the definition of competences of the various actors 
involved in the EC. Further, the way forward which was 
chosen, the economic path to integration, creates a 
distinction between economics and politics which proved 
difficult to sustain. It therefore creates some interesting 
ambiguities and questions, both for academics and 
practitioners, in the process of reconciling the two 
spheres. One of the interesting questions, therefore, 
relates to how the Community's role as an international
17 See European Parliament, Selection of texts, op. cit.(The Messina Resolution is also reprinted in Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, op. cit., pp. 520-522).18 ibid., p. 95.
19 The Bonn Declaration of 1961 was a further indicator ofthe political ambitions of the Community, which had been relegated to a slower track. It gave yet another voice to the aims of the Community: "to give shape to the will for political union already implicit in the Treaties." But as with previous proposals, the political aspirations of the opening paragraphs were followed rather anticlimactically by more careful words and "practical measures."
11
actor has been effected by the deliberate distinction 
between economics and politics.
The ideal of a political community may have begun the 
process of integration; but the logic of integration was 
reversed. Transforming a cohesive group of states, which 
possessed internal economic strength, into a community 
capable of executing a common European foreign posture was 
the direction chosen. Historically it may have been foreign 
affairs which were the principal factor behind creating an 
"ever closer union." Yet, as the mold set and as trade 
relationships progressed within the ambit of the EC 
treaties, the political aim through European Political 
Cooperation took a parallel but slower path. As Walter 
Scheel noted, "in the course of time, mere external effects 
led to external relations.Further,  as Lord Carrington, 
the former British Foreign Secretary, observed as late as 
1981:
Over the years, the realization has grown that 
economic policy and foreign policy are Siamese 
twins. In politics as in economics, the countries 
that make up Western Europe, are too small today to 
operate successfully on their own. They have to find
20 Walter Scheel, "Europe at the Crossroads," Aussenpolitik, 
vol. 25 (1974) p. 129.
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a unified response to modern problems, if they are
(21)to control their own destinies.
3. The development of EPC
At the Hague Summit of 22-23 July, 1969 it was argued that a 
"united Europe" must assume "its responsibilities in the 
world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate 
with its traditions and its m i s s i o n . T h e  Hague Summit 
was pivotal because it set in motion a series of reports 
which created the blueprint for European Political 
Cooperation. The leaders of the original Six decided to set 
up a committee made up of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
"to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter 
of political unification."  ^ While the Hague Summit itself 
is considered by some to have been less than successful at 
its attempts to create a political union, it did achieve 
significant first s t e p s . T h e  result of that mandate was 
the Luxembourg Report of 1970, the "birth certificate" of
21 Lord Carrington, "European Political Cooperation: Americashould welcome it," International Affairs, vol. 58, (Winter, 1981-82) p. 3.22 Bull. EC: 1-1970, p. 8.23 Bull. EC: 1-1970, p. 16.24 See, for the argument that the results of the Hague
Summit were "reductio ad absurdum of the lowest common denominator," W. Wallace and David Allen, "Political Cooperation: procedure as substitute for policy," in W. Wallace H. Wallace and C. Webb, Policy-making in the 
European Communities (Saxon House: Farnborough, 1977).
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(25 )EPC. The Luxembourg Report outlined as its objectives
"the greater mutual understanding with respect to the major 
issues of international politics." While a complete history 
of all the reports, conferences, declarations and proposals 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Table 1.1 outlines the 
major reports and conferences and their innovations in the
attempt to evolve a common foreign policy. (26)
TABLE 1.1
Major developments in Political Cooperation(27 )1. Luxembourg Report October 1970
title objectives innovations procedures
Report by the 
Foreignministers of the 
member states on 
the problems of political 
unification.
to ensure 
greater mutual 
understanding 
with respect to the major issues of international 
politics by 
exchanging information and 
consulting regularly.
political 
cooperation 
should be 
launched as an inter­governmental 
operation.
Meetings every 
six months; special meetings 
arranged in 
times of crisis 
or emergency.
25 Otto von der Gablentz, "Luxembourg revisited or TheImportance of European Political Cooperation," Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 16 (1979) p. 685.2 6 For a complete evaluation of these reports, see, for example, Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation : Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy? (Avebury: Aldershot, 1987) passim.27 Bull. EC: 11-1970.
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2. Copenhagen Report, July 1973.^^^^
title objectives innovations procedures
Report on European 
Political Cooperation in 
the field of 
foreign policy.
better mutual 
understanding, harmonisation of 
points of view, 
common action 
when possible.
EPC distinct 
from and additional fee 
the activities 
of the
institutions of the Community.
Foreign 
Ministers 
meetings 
increased to 
four times a 
year; Group of 
Corre spondent s 
established,; CORED est.; creation of 
working parties; 
four discussions a year with EP.
3. Paris Summit, (2 9 )December 1974
title objectives innovations procedures
Communiqué issued by the 
heads of 
Government of 
the Nine 
establishing a 
European Council
to adopt common 
positions and 
coordinate their 
diplomatic 
action in all areas of 
international 
affairs which 
affect the interests of the 
EC.
coordination of 
Community issues 
and issues of 
political 
cooperation
Heads of states and governments 
to meet three 
times per year 
accompanied by 
Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs.
4. London Report, October 1981^^^^
title objectives innovations procedures
Report on 
European 
Political 
Cooperation
to improve 
procedures of 
EPC.; greater 
consultation 
with the 
Commission and 
the European 
Parliament; 
confirms established 
structures.
longer term 
approach to 
political 
problems ; political aspects of 
security to be 
discussed; 
commitment to consult partners before adopting 
positions.
ministerial 
meetings to be 
convened in 
times of crisis within 48 hours 
at the request of three member 
states; 
formalised Commission's 
involvement with EPC.
28 Bull. EC: 9-1973,29 Bull. EC: 12-1974.3 0 Bull. EC: Supplement, 3-1981
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5. Title III, Single European Act, 1987(31)
title objectives innovations procedures
Provisions on 
European 
cooperation in 
the sphere of 
foreign policy.
to endeavour 
jointly to 
formulate and 
implement a 
European foreign 
policy (Article 
30.1).
legal framework 
provided for EPC, Commission 
is fully 
associated with 
the work of EPC; EPC Secretariat 
established; 
Political Committee est.; CORED
communications 
system codified.
Treaty base 
given to EPC 
procedures ; 
European Council 
to meet twice a year; Foreign 
Ministers to meet in EPC; 
Presidency of EPC rotated on a 
six month basis.
6. Treaty on European Dnion, November 1993 (32)
title objectives innovations procedures
Title V, 
Provisions on a 
Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.
to define and 
implement a common foreign 
and security 
policy, to 
safeguard the common values 
and interests of 
the Dnion, to 
preserve peace, 
to promote 
international 
cooperation, to enhance 
democracy.
replaces 
European 
Political Cooperation with 
Common Foreign 
and Security 
Policy; mentions 
all questions of 
security, including the 
political aspects; refers 
to prospect for 
common defence.
Council decides 
whether a matter should be the subject of joint 
action, although 
unanimity 
prevails in decisionmaking; 
a system of 
qualified majority voting 
on procedural 
matters.
II. Explanation of Cases
Conceptually and organisationally, the thesis is divided 
into two major parts. Part I provides the foundations, 
first, by firmly grounding the thesis in international
31 Bull. EC: Supplement, 2-1986.32 Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy can befound in Title V, Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg; Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992).
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relations theory; second, by providing the legal framework 
necessary to an understanding of the Treaty intricacies and 
contradictions; and finally, by giving full explanation to 
the concept of sanctions, which is such a primary example of 
the interaction between political and economic decisions, 
and an important tool with which to establish actor 
behaviour.
The first part of the thesis is the theoretical section; the 
purpose of this Part is to:
- establish a theoretical framework
- reveal the interaction of EC/EPC
- describe what is feasible for EPC
Part II provides the most concrete examples of how the 
Community has projected its actorness and tried to reconcile 
the decision in 1955 at the Messina Conference to make 
progress first in the economic field. This part centres on 
the maturation of EPC, and the effect of the interaction of 
EC/EPC on third states.
As is the case with any thesis, criteria had to be 
established which provided a benchmark against which 
potential areas of study could be evaluated. Establishing 
these prescriptions aided the attempt at assessing the value 
of certain cases. It also eliminated the formidable task of 
deciding, based on some arbitrary method, which case-studies 
to choose, and which to leave out.
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The criteria for Part II had to:
-show the maturation and development of EPC
-reveal the interaction of EC/EPC
-fill a gap in the previous work on EPC
The cases chosen for this thesis were considered as the most 
representative of the themes under discussion, covering a 
variety of issues and situations. It was considered optimal 
to focus on states or groups of states, as in the case of 
Eastern Europe, to illustrate most coherently and 
systematically the types of issues involved, and the methods 
chosen to contend with them. Situations of war were 
eliminated because of their chaotic and often short-term 
nature. This study has focused on the development of 
external relationships which have time to evolve, or, in the 
case of Eastern Europe, which will evolve further in the 
future. The chapters are also organised internally to show 
evolution and development, and to demonstrate how the 
Community's relationship or behaviour has progressed over 
the years.
The extent to which the Community can act in the external 
environment depends on its ability to reconcile the division 
between its external economic relations and its external 
political relations in light of the theoretical and treaty- 
based division. EPC itself, which aims to address only 
political issues, assumes that these can indeed be separated
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out. The intergovernmental nature of Community foreign 
relations leaves the EC with fundamental limitations in its 
dealings with third states and international organisations. 
The conclusion of the work will, therefore, assess the 
maturation of the development process and the extent to 
which the Community has developed its international actor 
capability over time.
Chapter two begins with an endeavour to bind the discussion 
of EC/EPC interaction to international relations theory. The 
limitations of the pre-eminent theories are evaluated with 
regard to their inability to explain the tension between the 
Community and the member states in light of EPC. To 
illustrate not only the foundations of the relationship 
between the Community and its member states (and hence the 
relationship between EC and EPC), but also to show how the 
state-centric model has provided an incomplete framework for 
evaluating the European Community's external relations, the 
analysis begins with an evaluation of the state. The ability 
to act is a central force behind the development and 
evolution of EPC, and chapter two outlines the progress that 
the Community has made, and the constraints that it faces, 
as an international actor.
Chapter 3 builds upon this theme by analysing the 
relationship between foreign and commercial policy in a 
legal sense, with particular focus on international 
agreements. To develop itself as an international actor, the 
Community requires a legal foundation of precedents and
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opinions by the Court of Justice with regard to the complex 
interaction of foreign relations and commercial agreements. 
The legal structures of the Community have been used in 
rather confusing and awkward ways to deal with the 
deliberate exclusion in the Treaty of the EC's political 
nature. The competences of the Community have been defined 
and clarified by the European Court of Justice with 
important ramifications for the interaction of EC and EPC. 
The European Court has been instrumental not only in 
delineating the potential foreign policy competences of the 
Community, but also in defining the common commercial 
policy, in which much of the uncertainty lies.
The case of sanctions discussed in Chapter four provides 
evidence with which to analyse the methods used by the 
Community to pursue foreign policy goals. The foreign policy 
nature of economic decisions is in its most obvious form 
when economic sanctions are implemented. With the use of 
sanctions the Community can take advantage of its economic 
identity while pursuing political goals. The examination of 
sanctions highlights two fundamental areas: first the 
inextricable connection between economic and political 
decisions, and second the competences available to the 
Community for sanctions implementation. The evolution of the 
competences used shows an interesting development in 
Community foreign and economic policy, and demonstrates the 
developing coherence of Community action.
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The following three chapters (part II) on Rhodesia, Israel 
and Eastern Europe, were chosen because they fit the 
requirements based on the criteria established. They 
highlight most effectively the different stages and aspects 
of the relationship between the competences of the EC and 
those of EPC. These particular cases show how the Community 
has been able to act and legitimise itself not only in the 
face of the tension between the Community and its member 
states, but also in light of its limited competences in the 
field of foreign policy.
Studying the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia (so-called before 
it became Zimbabwe in 1979) is important for a variety of 
reasons. First, the situation in Rhodesia occurred before 
the establishment of the political cooperation machinery so 
it provides a useful control in studying the coherence of 
Community action. It also provides a thorough example of the 
difficulty in reconciling the "Community" and the "member 
states" in terms of compliance to Community measures and 
sifting through the legal intricacies of forcing the member 
states to comply with agreed measures. Finally, it 
demonstrates the fledgling attempts at actorness by the 
Community by showing the maturation of EPC.
The chapter on Israel's relationship with the Community 
analyses, through an historical overview of the various 
declarations, summits and statements issued in the framework 
of political cooperation, how the Community has responded to 
Israel. The case of Israel is crucial to an understanding of
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the linkages involved in EC/EPC because the Arab-Israeli 
conflict was the first foreign policy issue in which the EC 
became involved. It was, therefore, the first real test of 
the explicit division of political cooperation mechanisms 
from those of EC, and thus demonstrates the subsequent 
implications of the hoped for separation of economics and 
politics.
The chapter on Eastern Europe provides a more current look 
at the Community's involvement in a situation of 
international significance. Eastern Europe is a case which 
clearly shows the linkages of EPC and EC mechanisms, and is 
the best case to date of actorness by the Community. The 
rigid strictures of political conditionality which the 
Community attached to all forms of aid and association 
agreements are a considerable marker of this linkage. 
Further, Eastern Europe was a case in which the Community 
was expected to involve itself by the international 
community. There could be no other actor. Thus, this case 
provides ample evidence to support the thesis that the 
Community is capable of significant action, and has the 
means to legitimise itself in the international environment 
despite the uncertain relationship between EC and EPC.
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Conclusion
In examining these cases and issues, the prevailing question 
will be; What precisely is the relationship between EC 
external relations and European Political Cooperation in the 
development of the Community's role as an international 
actor? Moreover, what are the legal and political 
ramifications of the attempt on the part of the Member 
States to keep autonomy in foreign relations. How is the 
Community's role as an international actor affected by the 
tension between the Community and its member states? What 
are the implications of using the Common Commercial Policy 
in conjunction with EPC to construct a Community based 
foreign policy?
The crucial factor in these cases is the question of 
actorness, and the extent to which the Community's 
relationships with these third states has strengthened or 
diminished the Community's image as an international actor. 
Attempts to project the EC's collective identity were often 
thwarted by the concerted effort to separate the political 
and foreign policy issues from those of developing trade and 
economic association. The implications of economic acts are 
full of foreign policy consequences. Keeping economic 
decisions separate, or attempting to keep them separate, 
from politics is virtually impossible. The concept of 
actorness, therefore, is centred to a large degree on the 
binding of economic to political instruments, and the 
institutional mechanisms for implementing these instruments.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EC AS AN INTERNATIONAL ACTOR
Introduction
( 1 )The concept of an actor in international relations is
applied usually to the foreign policy actions of states. The
unilateral action of a sovereign state, by its very
definition as "sovereign" implies that any action taken is
(2 )legitimate, or contains an element of legitimacy. To
See, for example, Kjell Goldman, "The International Power Structure: Traditional Theory and new Reality," in Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjostedt, eds,, Power, Capabilities and Interdependence: Problems in the Study of 
International Influence^ for Gunnar Sjostedt, The External Role of the European Community (Farnborough: Teakfield, 1977).The concept of sovereignty has produced a wide literature. See, for example, Alan James, "The equality of states: contemporary manifestations of an ancient doctrine," Review of International Studies, vol. 18 (1992) pp. 377-391; Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London, 1986); Alan James, "Sovereignty: ground rule or gibberish?," Review of International Studies, vol. 10 (1984) pp. 1-18; J. D.
B. Miller, "Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state," Review of International Studies, vol. 12 (1986) pp. 79-89.
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classify the European Community as a legitimate 
international actor is not quite so straight forward; as the 
following chapter will show, the competences to act in 
matters of foreign policy are not always clear and must 
often rely on interpretations of the Treaty rather than on 
clear lines of authority.
The question of how the Community as an organization is able 
to act, depends on the coherence between the member states 
and the Community. The attempted development of a common 
foreign policy through European Political Cooperation (EPC), 
perhaps the most important element of actorness, rests 
entirely on the tension between the Community and its twelve 
states. The desire of the member states to retain national 
sovereignty in the field of foreign policy, and the pressure 
on the Community--and possibly of non-member states--to 
propel the Community into state-like behaviour signifies the 
fundamental strain between the member states and the 
Community.
According to Wolfgang Wessels, "the Community cannot be 
easily classified, analysed and assessed by using 
traditional categories and notions of political and legal 
science,Therefore, criteria for measuring actorness 
must be established for the Community which take into
Wolfgang Wessels, "The EC Council: The Community's Decision-making Center," in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: decision-making and institutional change (Boulder, Co Westview Press, 1991) p. 133.
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consideration not only the tensions between the centre and 
periphery, ie. the Community and the member states, but also 
the Community's position as an international organisation. 
This assessment consists of analysing, first, the 
Community's actions and, second, its ability to cause 
reactions in the international environment.
To analyse these two parts requires looking at both 
legitimate and legitimised actions. Legitimate action, 
according to Mitchell, is that which is merely legally 
p e r m i t t e d . I n  contrast, legitimised actions are those 
which third states regard as within the acceptable realm of 
conduct of the acting party. In the case of the Community, 
both forms of action are crucial.
Legitimate actions of the EC would seem at first sight to be 
the easier of the two to assess;
1) the legally permissible action as allowed by the 
internal decision-making structure of the Community 
and as laid down by the Treaties,
2) the capacity to act as a legal person in the 
context of international law.
However, analysing and evaluating the precise nature of 
legitimate authority, power and competence often requires an
C. R. Mitchell notes that legitimised action are those "which the target party accepts as being the right of the acting party to undertake." Mitchell, The Structure of International Conflict (London; Macmillan, 1981) p. 34,
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element of legal gymnastics, as will be discussed in chapter 
three. The EC is a non-state actor and, although possessing 
legal personality, its establishment in the international 
system is dependent upon its actions in that system. For 
example, the sheer number of actions it has taken externally 
can be measured. Ginsberg, for example has counted 480 joint
EC actions between 1958 and 1985 in his study of EC foreign
T • +. • ( 5 )policy actions.
Whether the Community's behaviour is legitimised is also 
difficult to assess. It can, however, be established by 
analysing its action in a number of ways, which include not 
only the level of acceptance of the Community in the 
international arena, but also its impact. What is the 
influence of EC action on the actions of third states? To 
what degree do third states take into consideration the 
existence of the Community? As will be shown below, 
measuring the effects of the presence of the Community on 
policy development by non-member states, is often either 
arbitrary, or merely assumed.
Yet, despite the difficulties of measurement, the concept of 
legitimised behaviour is crucial to the EC for two reasons. 
First, because the Community is a non-state actor, and 
cannot depend on the status of statehood for its legitimacy. 
Second, because the relationship between the EC's political 
actions (EPC) and its commercial actions (EC treaty-based)
5 Roy Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European 
Community (London; Adamantine Press, 1989) .
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is not clearly delineated. Therefore, in terms of 
legitimation, it is important not to separate these actions, 
but to analyse them as a whole; rather than being political 
or economic, action can be analysed as a means of attaining 
goals. The goals envisaged are;
1) changing the behaviour of another state or actor
using either diplomatic or economic means or
2) establishing the EC as a legitimate international
actor.
After looking at the above measurements and indicators of EC 
action, coupled with additional "actor criteria," it is the 
purpose of this chapter to assess the extent to which the EC 
is a new type of "interdependent" actor within the 
international system. Most important, however, is the 
question; how has the Community been able to act and 
legitimise itself in the face of its limited competences, 
and in the face of the tension between the Community and the 
member states--centre and periphery--as reflected in the 
division between European Political Cooperation and EC 
external relations? Further, how have traditional theories 
of international relations explained the actorness of 
international organisations such as the EC?
This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent 
chapters. As such it points to the elements necessary for a 
thorough analysis by first grounding what is to come in the 
ensuing chapters within an international relations
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environment, and second directing the analysis to the 
entirety of the thesis, where the bulk of the evidence lies. 
Therefore, before analysing the "actorness" of the European 
Community, it is important first to review why international 
relations theorists have viewed the state as such a vigorous 
and incontrovertible entity, and why international 
organisations are often marginalized in their capacity to 
accomplish significant goals in areas of vital interest.
This chapter will not, however, argue for the 
"circumvention, reduction, or abolition of the sovereign 
power of modern nation-statesRather, it will analyse 
why, in their capacity as actors, states provide the 
paradigm by which all other international actors are 
measured, and why a new model for measurement is necessary. 
In international relations the concept of actorness, as will 
be shown below, is associated with power, and power is 
associated with Realism. For this chapter, the argument put 
forward will be that actorness still requires power, but a 
new definition of power is required that rests on revised 
realist assumptions.
First, one step back is necessary to look at the reasons why
f 7 )the state has dominated international relations theory.
It is argued here that the realist framework of traditional
6 Charles Pentland, International Theory and EuropeanIntegration (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) p. 29.7 For some interesting observations regarding states inEurope see, Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.21 (1982-83) pp. 21-37.
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international relations theory, and its central role for the 
state, explains to a large degree the tension between the 
Community itself and the member states. But realist 
assumptions do not incorporate the "structural contradiction 
between the logic of international industrial and economic 
integration and the national framework of popular loyalty 
and legitimacy."
The Dominance of the State-as-Actor Model
1. The classical state-centric model.
( 9 )From the realist perspective, the state is the basic unit 
of analysis, and it is assumed that, although other groups 
can operate in international relations, the state 
dominates. Groups, organisations, multi-national
8 C. Tugendhat and W. Wallace, Options for British Foreign
Policy in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1988) p. 45.9 The major literature in the realist paradigm includesinter alia: E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919- 1939, (London; Macmillan, 1939); G. Schwarzenberger, 
Power Politics (London: Stevens, 1941); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1948); R. Niebuhr, Nations and Empires (London: Faber and Faber, 1959); M. Wight, Power Politics, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 197 8).10 R. B. J. Walker calls the domination of the state ininternational relations an essentially uncontested concept. Writing of sovereign statehood Walker notes: "Its meaning might be marginally contestable by constitutional lawyers and other connoisseurs of fine lines, but for the most part state sovereignty expresses
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corporations, free trade regimes, all operate in the
international system, but they are important only to the
extent to which they can effect the policies of states. The
state-centricity of realism and its tenets such as interest
(11)defined as power and international anarchy, present an
immutable picture of world politics in which accord and 
cooperation among states is not possible, except for the 
short term.
According to Wagner, the assumptions about the primary 
actors in world politics derived from the view that states 
were not only the most important objects of study (state- 
centrism), but also that their behaviour could be analysed 
and evaluated like that of a unitary, purposeful actor 
(state-as-actor).
The state-centric paradigm has, according to Mansbach at. 
al., seven essential elements:
a commanding silence." See, R. B. J. Walker, "Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations," in V. S. Peterson, ed., Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory (Lynne Rienner, 1992).
11 See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, op. cit.12 See, R. Harrison Wagner, "Dissolving the State: Threerecent perspectives," International Organization, vol.28 (Summer, 1974), For similar distinctions, using different terminology see, A. M. Wolfers Discord and 
Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Joseph Nye, "Transnational and transgovernmental relations," in G. L. Goodwin and A. Linklater, eds., New Dimensions of World Politics (London: Groom Helm, 1975).
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1. global politics are based on the interaction of 
states. States are viewed as both actors and targets.
2. Each state is the sovereign equal of any other state.
3. States are viewed as homogeneous political entities 
in which a central government controls the legitimate 
use of force.
4. States are independent and distinguishable from one 
another.
5. Statehood itself is the recognised form of dividing 
the world into geographic compartments.
6. States are the secular repositories of the highest 
human loyalties.
7. Governments of states are the only participants in
world politics. All other groups interact in
international relations through a recognised national 
(13 )government.
1.1 The legal definition of the state
The political definitions of the state signal its importance 
in the conduct of international relations. However, the 
state-centrism of realism is buttressed by the definition of
13 Adapted from R. W. Mansbach, Y. H. Ferguson and D. E.Lampet, The Web of World Politics : Non-State actors in 
the global system (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
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a state in international law, wherein states must
satisfy at least three conditions. First, a state must have
a territory--although absolute certainty about frontiers is
not essential. Second, a state must have a population; and
third, a state must have a government capable of maintaining
effective control over its territory and of conducting
(15 )international relations with other states. Akehurst
makes the point that recognition may be a fourth requirement 
of statehood, but he continues "that recognition is usually 
no more than evidence that the three requirements... are 
satisfied,"
Hans Kelsen, clarifying the concept of recognition, divides 
it into two parts, legal and political. Legal recognition is 
achieved when a recognised community is a state in the sense 
of international law. Political recognition comes when a 
state "is willing to enter into political and other 
relations with the recognised state... Since a state, 
according to general international law, is not obliged to
( 17 \entertain such relations with other states...."
14 The Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights andDuties of States asserts in Article 1: "The state as a person of international law, should possess the following qualifications: (i) a permanent population:(ii) a defined territory; (iii) a government; (iv) a capacity to enter into relations with other states."15 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International
Law, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 53.16 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to InternationalLaw, op, cit., p. 54.17 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967) p. 390. Kelsen adds: "...legal recognition is usually combined with
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1.2 The legal definition of the European Community^
Within the terms of Article 52 of the United Nations (UN)
Charter, the EC is considered a regional organisation of
sovereign states. As such, the Community does not derive
powers in the same way as does a state. A state is
considered to possess inherently a legal personality which
implies total competence over its external relations.
Conversely, the Community as a creation of its member states
"must depend on its purposes and functions as expressed or
implied by its constituent instruments and as developed in 
( 19 )practise." States have unlimited capacity in
international law whereas non-states, such as the Community, 
must have their legal capacity bestowed upon them by express 
attribution, or by the attribution of functions. Thus
Article 6 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty 
states that in international relations "the Community shall 
enjoy the legal capacity necessary to exercise its functions
political recognition in one and the same act. This is the reason why the two fundamentally different functions which this act called 'recognition' has are not clearly distinguished in the traditional theory of international law and why this theory is entangled in most undesirable contradictions with respect to the nature of recognition." p. 3 91. See also D. J.Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law (London: Macmillan,1983); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the 
International Community (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1933) .18 This will be expanded upon in chapter 3 of this thesis onthe legal competences of the Community.19 See, International Court of Justice Reports, (1949) p.180.
20 See Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Subject of the Law ofNations," LQR, vol. 63 (1947) pp. 444-450.
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and to achieve its purposes." The European Community,
however, does possess the status of a legal person: it is a
separate and autonomous entity subject to international law,
with the capacity to enter into legal relations and its
( 21 )incumbent rights and duties. As an international legal
person the Community must be regarded as a third party,
legally separate from its member states within the limited
( 22 )domain of the Treaties. However, all the discussion and
analysis of the exact extent of legal standing does not
bring a better understanding of the capacity of states and
non-states to act in the international environment. Legal
personality is not an absolute concept. According to
Akehurst: "One cannot ask whether an international
organisation has legal personality in the abstract; one
should ask, 'what specific rights, duties and powers is it
/23 )capable of exercising?'"
1.3 Criticisms of state-centrism
The legal requirements for statehood overlap to some extent 
with the basic assumptions underlying the state-centric 
paradigm. International relations theorists have generally
21 See D. Lasok and P. A. Stone, Conflict of Laws in the
European Community (Abingdon: Professional Books, 1987)p. 8.22 Each founding Treaty of the Community attributes it withlegal personality by declaring simply that "The Community shall have a legal personality." See Article 210 European Economic Community; Article 6 European Coal and Steel Community; Article 184 Euratom.23 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to InternationalLaw, op. cit., p. 70.
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laid emphasis on the normative aspect of statehood, that 
which sets the accepted pattern of behaviour. Realists 
insistence that the state is the incontrovertible and 
fundamental actor in international relations gives weight to 
Francis Fukuyama's thesis that realism "does not take 
account of history" and "portrays international relations as 
isolated in a timeless vacuum, immune from the evolutionary 
processes taking place around it."^^^)
This failure to account for evolutionary forces is outlined 
by Philip Taylor. As Taylor notes, there are five serious 
areas which have been overlooked or at least underestimated 
by the predomination of state-centrism;
1. The existence of regional international 
organisations changes national decision making 
habits and requires consultation and cooperation.
2. Incidents in international relations since World 
War II have been predominated by non-state actors. 
Multinational corporations, stateless groups (eg. the 
PLO, Basques and Kurds), terrorist organizations, 
regional international organizations (eg. Organisation 
of African States and EC), and of course the United 
Nations.
24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) p. 258.
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3. The potential political power of multi-national 
corporations (best represented by dependency theory 
literature).
4. the importance of economic integration.
5. The perceived importance that states have given
to international organizations, often outweighing
(25)their actual importance.
2. New perspectives on the state
These shortcomings of the realist, state-centric model are
the aspects that later theories of international relations
incorporate, presenting the world as a more "multi-centric"
system of relationships. These perspectives are crucial
to an understanding of EPC. As Simon Bulmer points out,
while the realist school can draw evidence from the
competing national interests within the Community, and
specifically EPC, it cannot account satisfactorily for
cooperation, unless "this is undertaken to supplement
(27)national policy instruments."
2 5 Philip Taylor, Nonstate Actors in International Politics : 
From Transregional to Substate Organizations, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) p. 5-6.26 James Rosenau in R. Maghroori and B. Ramberg, eds.,Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations Third 
Debate (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) p. 3.27 Simon Bulmer, "Analysing European Political Cooperation,"in Martin Holland, The Future of European Political Cooperation (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 72.
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Perhaps the first break from the realist framework came from 
R. C. Snyder's decision-making analysis.  ^ It emphasised 
the role of the decision-maker within the state: "State X as 
actor is translated into its decision-makers as a<Jtors. "  ^
Decision-making analysis played a crucial role in 
questioning the state-as-actor approach and turning the 
focus of attention to sub-units within the state. Snyder's 
evaluation of international relations, as Rosenau notes:
served to...provide guidance--or at least 
legitimacy--for those who had become disenchanted 
with a world composed of abstract states.
As B. P. White points out, "this first systematic
application of a decision-making framework to International
Relations at least constituted a serious challenge to
( 31 )traditional assumptions." He continues that the
publication of Snyder's work on decision-making "was a
( 32 )crucial turning-point in the study of foreign policy."
Yet, Snyder, while observing that the state could not be 
viewed abstractly, adhered in an important way to the state- 
as-actor postulate:
28 R. C. Snyder, "Decision-Making as an Approach to theStudy of International Politics," in R. C. Snyder, H. W, Bruck, and B. Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision- Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962).29 R. C. Snyder, ibid, p. 65.3 0 James Rosenau, Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967) p. 202.31 B. P. White, "Decision-making analysis," in T. Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London: Longman, 197 8) p. 143.
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It is one of our basic methodological choices to 
define the state as its official decision-makers-- 
those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents 
and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is 
the action taken by those acting in the name of
state.<33)
Drawing upon Snyder's decision-making analysis, Allison
evaluated international relations from three distinct frames
of reference, two of which analyse units other than the
s t a t e . A l l i s o n ' s  "rational actor" model is a
characterisation of the state-as-actor approach in which,
"Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions
(35)chosen by the nation or national government." Allison
continues by noting the organising concept of the rational 
actor model: the national actor. "The nation or government, 
conceived as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the 
agent."  ^^ ^ ^
Allison criticises the realist, state-as-actor approach, 
noting that:
In spite of significant differences in interest and 
focus, most analysts and ordinary laymen attempt to 
understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more
32 B. P. White, ibid, p. 143.33 R. C. Snyder, op. cit., p. 65.34 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the CubanMissile Crisis (Boston: Little,Brown, 1971).35 Graham Allison, ibid, p. 32.3 6 Graham Allison, ibid, p. 32.
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or less purposive acts of unified national 
governments. Laymen personify rational actors and 
speak of their aims and choices. Theorists of 
international relations focus on problems between 
nations in accounting for the choices of unitary
/ 37 )rational actors.
Allison continues that "there is powerful evidence that [the
state] must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of
reference that focus on...the organizations and political
actors involved in the policy p r o c e s s . A s  Rosenau
avers, to speak of states as actors "is to run the risk of
oversimplifying, of ascribing human characteristics to
nonhuman, abstract e n t i t i e s . W h i l e  it may be a
convenient abbreviation to talk of, "Germany wanting this or
France avoiding that," it not the states themselves which 
(40)are acting.
2.1 Interdependence and the state
While Allison and Snyder attempted to analyse the forces in 
the decision-making process that came from within the state, 
Keohane and Nye based their analysis on transnational
37 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, ibid, p. 5.3 8 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, ibid, p. 5.39 James Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy,(Glencoe, Illinois, 1961) p. 78.40 James Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy,op. cit., p . 7 8.
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relationships.The development of complex 
interdependence comes from a dissatisfaction with the basic 
assumption of state-centrism, that states are the only units 
which can act effectively in international relations. As 
Roger Coate notes:
The term nation-state is nothing more than an 
analytical construct, a conceptual device used to 
supply order to our perceptions of the world around 
us. To attribute action to such entities can be very 
misleading, depending on the nature of the question 
being asked.
Interdependence theory thus broke from the realist framework 
as decision-making analysis had done, but from a new frame 
of reference. Instead of looking at actors within the state, 
or simply states-as-actors, interdependence recognises the 
importance of transnational, subnational, and supranational 
actors and relationships. An interdependent system is 
characterised by a continuum of relationships rather than a 
hierarchical structure. The advantage of this approach to an 
analysis of EPC and its relationship to the EC's external 
relations is that it recognises the influential role of a 
quasi-institutional institution on its constituent members.
41 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence:
World Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
42 Roger A. Coate, Global Issue Regimes, (New York: Praeger,1982) p. 35.
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Keohane and Nye developed the concept of "complex 
interdependence," which cut across state boundaries. It has 
three main characteristics:
1. Multiple channels summarized as interstate, 
transgovernmental, and transnational relations.
2. Non-hierarchical issue agenda enables the 
distinction between domestic and foreign issues to 
be lessened and removes military security from a 
consistently dominant position in the policy agenda.
3. Military force is not used when complex 
interdependence prevails. ^
In complex interdependence, states play only one part in the 
system. The principle tenet of the state-centric paradigm 
is that states are the most important actors to analyse, in 
order to account for behaviour in international 
p o l i t i c s . T h i s  principle is questioned in 
interdependence theory. Complex interdependence relaxes the 
rigid boundaries of state-centrism and takes a holistic 
view, including within the cast of actors such entities as
43 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence,op. cit., pp. 24-25. Keohane and Nye remind their readers that both realism and interdependence represent ideal types as representations of world politics, and that reality comes somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Keohane and Nye also acknowledge importance of the state, but encourage theorists to place less emphasis on its significance.44 See for example, R. W. Mansbach and J. A. Vasquez, In
Search of Theory : A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) .
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international and regional organisations and multinational 
corporations.
2.2 Criticisms of interdependence. _
However, although some scholars of international relations 
have questioned the state-centricity of realism and its 
basis of conflictual relations, most still retain, to a
large degree, a belief that the state has demonstrated a 
formidable capacity to withstand challenges from other types 
of actors.
Hedley Bull, for example, argues that the regional 
integration of states such as that in the European Community 
is not a move away from the supremacy of the state, but 
rather is the reaffirmation of it:
...if the process of integration of European states 
were to lead to the creation of a single European 
state (and if similar processes, sparked off by this 
example, were to have the same result in other 
regions), the upshot would be to reduce the number 
of sovereign states but to leave the institution of
45 See for example Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1958); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); R. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968.46 F. Northedge, "Transnationalism: the American Illusion",
Millennium, 197 6, vol. 5 no. 1.; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977).
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the sovereign state precisely where it was 
before.
To go back to Fukuyama, international relations does not 
operate in a vacuum, and relationships do evolve. However, 
interdependence is not necessarily evolutionary. The 
increase in the number of actors, units, mutual decisions, 
agreements, transactions, communications does not mean that 
there will be a corresponding decrease in the authority of 
the state. There may not be a negative correlation.  ^
According to Calleo:
The EC has not made the traditional states fade 
away. On the contrary, they have grown more viable. 
Grouped together in their confederal structures, 
they have had more real control over their 
respective national economic environments than they 
would have had without such organisation.
47 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order inWorld Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) p. 2 65. Later, Bull wrote that "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one." H. Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 21 (1982-83) p. 152.48 This could be related to Philippe Schmitter's refinementof the "spill-over" of Ernst Haas. Schmitter discusses "spill-around", which is an increase in the range of functions performed by an international organization, without a corresponding increase in authority of that organization. Phillips C Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", International Organization, 1970, vol. 24, no. 4, p. 846.
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Cooperation has increased rather than 
diminished.
Interdependent relationships can be interpreted as a non- 
zero-sum game in which there are:
...several different payoffs...[which] depend upon 
whether the players cooperate with each other, cut 
each other's throats, or mix their strategies of 
conflict and cooperation in varying 
combinations.
The arguments concerning the supremacy of interdependence 
versus the state system go back and forth. This chapter will 
argue that interdependence plays a crucial role in the 
relationships, actions and issue agendas of states, EPC and 
also of the European Community. Realism does not explain 
fully the degree of cooperation between the member states, 
or the significant competences assigned to the Community. 
Interdependence does not explain the tenacity of the member 
states in their determination to hold on to authority, in 
areas of foreign and security policy. Thus, it is the 
traction reflected in the state-as-actor paradigm and that 
of interdependence, which helps to explain the European 
Community's state of tension.
49 D. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: the Future of theWestern Alliance (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988) p. 174.50 James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending
Theories of International Relations, (New York: Harper Collins, 1990) p. 511.
45
Interdependence, may have to be seen as an important subset 
of realism rather than as a replacement for it; yet one that 
influences, shapes, and even alters relationships between 
states. It changes the agendas of states and diminishes 
conflictual relations between them.
Interdependence speaks of "multiple channels" and
transnational relationships, but not how these translate
into actorness. Christopher Hill argues that actorness does
not "derive neatly from any of the major schools of thought
about integration," and further that actorness "is something
which most non-theoretical observers automatically assume
that the European Community possesses, but which on closer
( 51 )examination might be seriously doubted..."
The next section will analyse, in the framework of a non 
state-centric perspective, the European Community as a non­
state actor, and the criteria for actorness in light of both 
the relevancy and inadequacy of both realism and 
interdependence as theoretical frameworks.
51 Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, orConceptualizing Europe's International Role," Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 31 (September, 1993) p. 308.
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II. The European Community as an International Actor
1. The traditional definition of actorness
It is because of the dominant position of the state-as-actor 
in international relations, that the definition of an actor 
has been neglected: the state possessed the necessary 
substance to act, and the very definition of a state, as has 
been seen above, includes the capacity to act. Within the 
context of a realist perspective, the Community's action, 
especially reflected in the framework of foreign policy 
formulation, requires closer examination.
To consider the European Community as an international
actor, especially as it operates within a system of states,
requires first defining some terms. Two related concepts
must be defined in order to define actorness: action and
actor. According to Ginsberg action can be defined as a
specific, conscious, goal oriented undertaking putting forth
a unified membership position toward non members,
international bodies, and international events and 
( 52 )issues. Action in this sense implies intervention or
influence. K. J. Holsti defines action as "the things 
governments do to others in order to effect certain 
orientations, fulfil roles, or achieve and defend
52 Roy Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, op. cit., p. 2.
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/ 53 )objectives." Ginsberg distinguishes between joint action
and joint foreign policy action. The former is concerned
with a unified position, the latter with turning the
position into predetermined objectives and outcomes.
However, as Stanley Hoffmann notes, "in the widest sense...
every act of a state constitutes intervention...even non-
acts..." Action leads to expectations. This action may
not necessarily be concrete or directly perceivable. Rather,
action may be inaction, it may be passive or active,
explicit or implicit. But whatever the nature of the
action, its objective is the attainment of status and rank
internationally. For example, in the case of European
involvement in Yugoslavia in 1991-92, not only did the EC
become involved, but it was expected to become involved.
Action itself establishes customary patterns of behaviour
for the EC that are then expected by the international
system. That Yugoslavia was a European problem was
understood by the United States which was willing, even
adamant, about staying in the background; the Europeans were
( 55 )considered the relevant actors.
53 K. J. Holsti, International Politics, fourth edition(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall International, 1983) p. 144.54 Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention", inIntervention in World Politics, Hedley Bull (ed. )(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) p. 8. Hoffmann uses the example of West Germany in its decision not to impose sanctions against the Soviet Union over Poland.55 Robert Jervis views action as a collections oforientations and images which signal the receiver of the act and develop the image of the sender. Robert Jervis,
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The definition of an international actor is often associated 
with its capacity to make decisions in terms of structure. 
Gunnar Sjostedt describes an actor as a body capable of 
unitary external behaviour to the same extent as a state. He 
describes "actor capability" as the ability both to make 
common decisions, and to carry out these decisions.
According to Sjôstedt, an actor must be, 1) discernible from 
the external environment and 2) possess internal cohesion.
If an entity possesses these preceding elements, then the 
third crucial part, autonomy, necessarily follows. But the 
capacity of an international actor is not fixed. As Sjostedt 
notes :
... the capacity of being an actor is most
appropriately conceived of as a variable property
which the Community may possess to a greater or 
( 57 )lesser extent.
However, this structural definition may not be a reliable 
indicator of actorness. According to Kjell Goldman an actor 
must possess a minimum amount of power, "otherwise the 
question of the existence of non-state actors may degenerate 
into a dispute about t r i v i a l i t i e s ^  Goldman views power
The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 197 0) .56 See Gunnar Sjostedt The External Role of the EuropeanCommunity (Farnborough; Teakfield, 1977).57 ibid., p. 14,
58 Kjell Goldman, "The International Power Structure:Traditional Theory and New Reality", in Kjell Goldman and Gunnar Sjostedt, eds.. Power, Capabilities and Interdependence : Problems in the Study of International Influence (London: Sage, 1979) p. 26. Hedley Bull wrote
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as an essential element of actorness; actors must be 
significant and comparable to states in terms of their power 
in international matters.
Cosgrove and Twitchett see three points necessary for 
considering an organisation as incontestable actors in the 
international system:
1. the degree of autonomous decision-making power 
embodied in its institutions.
2. the extent to which it performs significant and 
continuing functions having an impact on inter-state 
relations.
3. the significance attached to it in the formation 
of the foreign policies of third states.
Cosgrove and Twitchett apply their analysis to the United 
Nations and the European Community to demonstrate the 
qualities of actorness held by regional organisations in the 
international community. They state that "the UN is an actor 
more by virtue of its pervading global influence whereas the
along similar lines that the European Community would need to develop a military capability ever to be considered, or even to behave, as an international actor. See, H. Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 21 (1982-83) pp. 149-64.59 Kjell Goldman, op. cit., p. 26.60 Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth Twitchett (eds.),The New
International Actors: The UN and the EEC, (London: Macmillan, 1970). p. 12.
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EEC has had a direct impact on many aspects of European and 
international affairs."
Allen and Smith, questioning the concept of actor and 
preferring to use the term presence, note that Europe is a 
"variable and multi-dimensional presence, which plays an 
active role in some areas of international interaction and a 
less active one in o t h e r s . T h e  notion of "presence" is 
defined by them as "a feature or a quality of arenas, of 
issue-areas or of networks of a c t i v i t y ^ ^  Crucial in this 
evaluation is the place which international presence 
"occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy 
m a k e r s . T h e  concept of presence corresponds to the 
definition of legitimised action defined in the beginning of 
this chapter as that deemed by third states to be within the 
acceptable realm of action.
However, it is worth noting that the degree of 
"significance" attached to an actor in the formation of 
another actor's foreign policy formation is not only
61 Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth Twitchett (eds.),The New
International Actors: The UN and the EEC, p. 12.62 David Allen and Michael Smith, "Western Europe's presencein the contemporary international arena," Review of 
International Studies, vol. 16 (1990). p. 20. For an important contribution to the concept of presence see also, Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and Regional Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 10 (1971-72) pp. 267-84. See also, Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation-State in WesternEurope Today," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 21(1982-83) pp. 21-37; Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation state and the case of Western Europe," Daedalus, vol. 95, (Summer 1966);63 David Allen and Michael Smith, ibid, p. 21.64 David Allen and Michael Smith, ibid, p. 21.
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difficult to judge, but virtually impossible to measure. 
Similarly, Allen and Smith's notion of outside "perceptions 
and expectations" and its effects on the operation and 
implementation of foreign policy of third parties is a vague
one.(65)
2. New elements of actorness
The focus of this section will be to consider elements 
necessary for international actorness, building on and 
adding to previous definitions. The intention is not to 
prove that the European Community is an actor along the 
lines of a state, but rather to develop criteria for 
measuring its development and actor capability by using some 
of the categories that have been elaborated.
To be defined as an international actor, an organisation 
must possess the characteristics of:
1) unity
2) independence (autonomous decision-making structure)
65 Christopher Hill writes of the potential of the Community to fulfil an international role--its capabilities, and of the expectations of third parties in that role. However, while demonstrating that a significant gap lies between the actual capabilities and the perceived capabilities, he does not attempt to explain exactly how the "presence of the Community is certainly felt...wherever mediated solutions to international conflicts are sought." C. Hill, "The Capability- Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," op. cit., pp. 3 06 and 3 09.
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3} impact on the international system 
4) power
These four elements are not an exhaustive list, but they 
suffice as a test for the European Community's level of 
achievement as an international actor. The first two 
elements of actorness, unity and autonomous decision-making 
structure, are concerned with the Community's internal 
strength: the effectiveness of the Community resulting from 
internal structures. The third element, impact, is concerned 
with the manifestations of that strength in the external 
environment. The final two features of actorness, power and 
impact, are perhaps the most crucial test of the Community's 
level of actorness: how an international actor's internal 
strength and its external impact are reflected back onto the 
actor. An actor can have internal strength and economic 
impact, but its ability to manipulate the response of third 
states and thus operationalize its actorness is vital. In 
other words what instruments does the actor have available 
for the pursuit of goals.
Boundaries for these categories are difficult to delineate, 
and they are not always mutually exclusive. However, they 
are a useful starting point for an evaluation of the 
Community's actorness.
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2.1 Unity
The development of the European Community from the Paris 
Treaty of 1951, which formed the European Coal and Steel 
Community, followed by the EEC and Euratom Treaties of 1957, 
the Merger Treaty of 1967, the Single European Act of 1986, 
and the Treaty on European Union of 1992, makes clear that 
there is some degree of internal cohesion. The fact that the 
Community has been able to work together to formulate the 
idea of a European Community, and then develop that idea 
into a series of legally enforceable treaties and working 
institutions shows a certain amount of cohesion. The 
question is how much is present in the EC and how can it be 
measured. The presence of treaties, trade agreements, summit 
meetings, missions etc. are one measure.However, beyond 
making lists, and counting the numbers, it is more
66 G. Sjostedt claims that another measure of actorness inthe European Community is reflected in delimitation, its boundaries. This, according to Sjostedt, makes the whole process more difficult. Measuring the EC's territory, the sum of its constituent member states, has the advantage of quantification, but the disadvantage of 
ambiguity. The potential expansion or even contraction of the Community makes a territorial boundary a vague measurement. Gunnar Sjostedt The External Role of the European Community {Farnborough: Teakfield, 1977) p.156. Defining the limits of the Community was made somewhat easier by Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which states that "any European state may apply to become a member of the Community". The addition of the word "democratic" in the Treaty on European Union in Article O begins to make the process somewhat more difficult. However, looking for a physical, geographical border seems unnecessary for the purposes of defining the EC's identity.67 One cogent example is given by the work of Roy Ginsbergin his study of the foreign policy actions of the European Community. Ginsberg tabulated the number of joint foreign policy actions taken, and under which
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instructive to look at unity from a perspective which 
confronts the issue of the tension between the Community and 
the member states and the tension between EC and EPC. There 
are two- forms of unity that the international actor can 
possess: internal and external. Both are concerned with 
consistency and accord, but in different forms. The former 
is the degree to which the actor actually operates as a 
unit, its coordinative structures and mechanisms. As 
Sjostedt claims, "The EEC's capability for the performance of 
actor-behaviour is strongly conditioned by the internal 
state of structural integration within the Community."(68)
The latter, external unity, follows-on from these 
coordinative structures and concerns the mechanisms 
available to the Community, to manifest internal unity to 
the outside world. 6^9) while external unity and impact are
Treaty article they were mandated. Between the years 1958 and 1985, his study measured 480 joint EC actions. See Roy Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, op. cit., passim.
68 G. Sjostedt, op. cit., p. 56. This type of unity will bediscussed in detail in the following chapter on the legal competences of the Community's external relations, which analyses the Community's legal status, and the definition of competences between the member states and the Community. See also, Paul Taylor, "The European Communities as an Actor in International Society," 
Journal of European Integration, vol. 6, VI (19 82) pp.7- 41.69 Another way of measuring the internal unity of theCommunity, is to look at attitudes of membership. In terms of the population of the European Community, there is a generally positive attitude toward membership in the EC. A significant majority of the public feels that their state’s membership in the Community is a positive factor. When asked in 1987: "Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor
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similar to a certain extent, they do differ. External unity 
gauges coordination, and the ability, whether in legal or 
simply in practical terms, to act. To impact measures the 
results of that coordination; it is the projection of unity 
into concrete results.
Both types of unity do not fit well into theories of 
integration.Certainly as Ernst Haas formulated the
bad", 65% responded that it was a good thing, 8% a bad thing 20% neither good nor bad, and 7% gave no reply. By 1991, the figures were more positive: 69% said it was a good thing, 8% a bad thing, 17% neither good nor bad, and 6% gave no reply, see Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Conmunity, "Trends 1974-1991", (Luxembourg, 1992). When EC citizens were asked how they felt about belonging to the Community, an average of 69% responded that membership was a good thing and 7% responded negatively {Eurobarometer, No. 34, 1990). A common defence organization is also widely supported by the citizens of the Community: fully 61% of the respondents felt that the Community should have some sort of European defence identity, and just over half favour a joint foreign policy, see Europe: World Partner. The external relations of the European Community (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Community, 1991). Support for the Community by its citizens is an important indicator of the internal unity of the Community because it shows to some extent how "European" the citizenry of the EC feels. In 1988 the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, urged that the Union should rest on a "European consciousness"(Bull. EC: Supplement 1, 1988, p. 34). Membership in traditional international organisations does not inspire feelings of a similar nature. The Treaty on European Union refers not to a European population, but rather to "the peoples of the States brought together in the Community" (Art. 137, Treaty on European Union, 1992) .70 The literature on integration theory is vast. Among the classics are: Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964); Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," International Organization, vol. 12 (Autumn, 1958); Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Karl Deutsch, "Communication theory and political
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concept of political integration, the Community has not seen
"a process whereby political actors are persuaded to shift
their loyalties, expectations and political activities
(71)toward a new center..-" As Keohane and Hoffmann point
out; "The EC is best characterized as neither an
international regime nor an emerging state but as a network
(72 )involving the pooling of sovereignty." Yet, although
Keohane and Hoffmann do not magnify the role of the EC as an
actor, they are "struck by the distinctiveness of the
Community among contemporary international 
(73 ) .organizations." Their analysis of the Community in terms
of institutional change does not aid in the examination of 
the Community's actorness because it emphasises how the 
Community reached its current level of integration rather 
than its level of impact.
2.2 Autonomous and independent decision-making structure
To act requires decisions. Decision-making structures are an 
important aspect of actorness in an organisation as they 
indicate the degree to which the actor has independent
integration," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds.. The Integration of Political Communities (Philadephia; Lippincott, 1954); Joseph Nye,"Comparative regional integration: Concept and measurement," International Organization, vol. 22 (1968); Carl J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York; Harper and Row, 1969); R. Keohane and J. Nye, Transnational Relations and World Politics, op. cit.71 E . Haas, The Uniting of Europe, op. cit., p. 16.72 R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, The New European Community,op. cit., p. 10.73 R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, The New European Community,ibid, p. 11.
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control over the constituent member states. When compared to 
other international and regional organisations, the 
Commission is unique in terms of decision-making authority.
An autonomous organisation is defined as one which possesses 
a large degree of self-government, and one which is 
independent of others. To an extent this definition 
corresponds to the Community in terms of its decision-making 
capacity. An organisation which has well developed 
institutions and which is capable of taking some decisions 
independently of its constituent member states, defies the 
characteristics of a typical international organisation. 
Unusually for an international organisation, the Community 
is directly responsible for implementation of some of its 
policies. The most notable is in competition policy;
In this area the Community itself has dealt directly 
with individual market participants, examining their 
practices, carrying out investigations, handing down 
individual decisions of approval or condemnation 
and, in a minority of cases, applying sanctions.^ ^
Decision-making in the European Community is laid out by the 
Treaties which assigns to the Commission wide ranging powers 
conferring on it executive powers, the role of guardian of
74 See, for a discussion of the Commission's powers over competition policy and the resulting tension between national and supranational legal authority, Christopher Harding, European Community Investigations and 
Sanctions : the supranational control of business delinquency, (London: Leicester University Press, 1993) p. 4.
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the Treaties, and initiator of policy. Its activities 
include formulating proposals which it then sends to the 
Council, ensuring that existing Community policies are 
carried out effectively and acting as executive arm of the
(75 )Community. The Commission is composed of nationals of
the member states, but they are not representatives of their 
state. Commission members are required by the Treaty to be 
independent of national loyalties and interests. To this end 
Article 9(2) Treaty on European Union states:
The members of the Commission shall, in the general 
interest of the Community, be completely independent 
in the performance of their duties.
In the performance of these duties, they shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any 
government or from any other body. They shall 
refrain from any action incompatible with their 
duties. Each Member State undertakes to respect this 
principle and not to seek to influence the members 
of the Commission in the performance of their tasks.
The unique aspect of the Commission's role in the Community, 
and that which sets it apart from other organisations, is 
that in certain limited and defined areas the Community has 
removed from the competence of member states authority to
75 See Peter Ludlow, "The European Commission," in Keohane and Hoffmann, The New European Community, op. cit. pp. 85-132. A thorough analysis of the Commission which emphasises "the close interdependence of the Commission and its partner institutions." p. 113.
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act. Most notably this includes the Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP) which gives the Commission authority to negotiate and 
conclude, within the mandate of the Council, agreements in 
international trade, export aids, credit and finance. The 
Commercial policy covered under Article 113 gives exclusive 
power to the Community; the member states are precluded from 
entering into agreements covered by the CCP. (However, the 
Council must give permission to open negotiations.)
As noted above, the Commission is called the guardian of the 
Treaties, and in support of this title it is responsible for 
ensuring that treaty provisions are properly carried out. 
Article 155 EEC states that the Commission "shall ensure 
that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by 
the institutions pursuant thereto are applied". Alleged 
infringements of the Treaty are investigated by the 
Commission which may be made aware of such a breach by a 
government, firm or private individual. If a member state 
fails to modify its practice, the Commission may refer the 
matter the European Court of Justice, whose judgement is 
binding.
76 The European Community's legal system is the truesupranational institution of the Community, and provides the EC with a court which is completely independent of its member states. As Chapter two of this thesis states, the decisions of the Court are directly effective in the member states, and all Community Court decisions preclude national law. The Court stated: "The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail," Case 6/64, Costa v.
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The Commission, apart from being the watch-dog of the 
Treaties, is also the executive arm of the Community. The 
executive capacity of the Commission can be divided into 
three general categories.
First, the EEC Treaty gives the Commission direct 
legislative powers under Article 189 which lists the various 
acts that the Commission may adopt.
1. Regulations - binding at Community and national 
level "in their entirety".
2. Directives - binding on the Member State to which 
they are addressed. They require a certain "result 
to be achieved" but leave to the member state "the 
choice of form and method".
3. Decisions - binding on the Member State or person 
to which they are addressed. No choice as to method 
of implementation.
4. Recommendations - suggestions, not binding at 
all.
ENEL (1964) ECR 585; CMLR 425. For more on the European Court of Justice in general, see: European Commission, 
The Court of Justice of the European Community (Luxembourg, 1986); T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988); D. Lasok and J. W. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Communities, (London: Butterworths, 1991); D. Freestone, "The European Court of Justice", in J. Lodge(ed.) Institutions and Policies of the European Community (London: Pinter, 1983)77 Art, 189(2) EEC.78 Art. 189 (3) EEC.79 Art. 189(4) EEC.
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5. Opinions - not binding.
Second, the Commission is invested by the Treaty with 
applying the rules of the Treaty to specific cases. This 
includes powers to ensure the completion of the single 
market and to ensure that competition in the internal market 
is not hindered by unfair trade practices, and various 
powers in connection with the Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP), Common Fisheries Policy, and Common Commercial 
Policy.
Third, the Commission has the right to administer 
derogations from the Treaty in exceptional cases. Here the 
Commission is invested with the authority to decide whether, 
under extenuating circumstances, a member state may be 
eligible for a waiver from a Treaty requirement.
Another role assigned to the Commission was as the sole 
initiator of policy. This gave the Commission several 
advantages. It could decide on the timing of a proposal, its 
content, and its publicity. Control on proposals has been 
described as a series of "taps" influencing the "flow of 
business through the decision-making machinery of the 
EC."
The formulation and initiation of policy is undeniably a 
political act. The Commission's role "in the shaping of
80 See Stanley Henig, "The European Community's Bicephalous Political Authority", in Juliet Lodge(ed.),op. cit. p. 16.
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measures taken by the Council", plays a significant part
in the Community's policy direction. Specialists and 
interested parties are consulted, including academics, trade 
union officials and politicians, before the proposal is 
amended by the Commission with the assistance of the 
appropriate Directorate and finally submitted to the 
Council.
The above section on the power of the Commission has perhaps 
emphasised the potential power of that institution at the 
risk of making it sound like the dominating force in the 
Community. The intention has been to highlight those areas 
that make such an institution substantially different from 
other international organisations, and not to make claims 
for its predominance within the Community structure. It is 
far from the dominant force. As Jacques Delors succinctly 
stated:
The Commission has a right of initiative. But a 
distinction needs to be made according to whether we 
exercise it within a specific institutional 
framework or in a more general political context.
Within a specific institutional framework, our 
duties are to give effect to what has formally been
81 Article 155 EEC.
82 For more on the power of initiating proposals in thedecision-making process of the Commission see Stanley Henig, op. cit.; D. Lasok and J. W. Bridge, op. cit. pp 218-224; N. Noel, "The Commission's Power of Initiative", Common Market Law Review, vol. 10, (1973).
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decided by the European Council or by an amendment 
to the Treaty.... We might well dream of a 
Commission that had more powers, but we have to 
operate within our actual terms of reference.
The Community's label as an autonomous organisation is the 
result of its ability to formulate and execute policy in 
certain defined areas which are traditionally the domain of 
states. That the Community has removed crucial areas of 
policy from the competence of its members is a vital measure 
of autonomy and independence.
2.3 Impact on the international system
2.3.1 The impact of external trade
A Community of 345 million inhabitants, with a gross 
domestic product of $5,800 billion, and which is the world's 
biggest trading bloc is bound to have a significant economic 
impact on the international s y s t e m . T h e  following trade 
figures for the European Community show its strength as a 
trading bloc:
83 Bull. EC: 2-1989, Supplement, p. 50.84 Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community",(Luxembourg, 1992).
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TABLE 2.1
Exports as a percentage of world total
1982 1990
EC 33.5 40.5
Japan 07.5 08.4
USA 11.6 11.6
Source; Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 29th edition (Luxembourg, 1992).
TABLE 2.2
Imports as a percentage of world total
1982 1990
EC 34.6 40.7
Japan 06.9 06.6
USA 12.8 14.0
Source: Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 29th edition (Luxembourg, 1992).
65
The European Community receives 24.9% of the United States' 
total exports and 18.8% of J a p a n ' s . (85) The association 
between economic interdependence and political influence is 
hard to measure, but looking at the trade figures for 
certain areas of the world where the EC may wish to exert 
political influence, one can draw some tentative 
conclusions. Newly democratised states such as the Central 
and East European States (CEES) send 27.7% of their exports 
to the Community. The former Yugoslavia exported 46.5% 
of its goods to the EC in 1 9 9 0 . While these trade 
figures do not imply that CEES will necessarily change their 
behaviour because of trade with the EC, they do show the 
increasing interdependence between the two groups of states, 
which may have implications for policy-making.
The powers which the member states have surrendered to the 
Community have made it a unique organization capable of 
interacting and participating in the works of international 
and regional organisations. Article 229 of the EEC Treaty 
makes the Commission responsible for relations with 
international organisations; the Commission must maintain 
relations with organisations whose work is of interest to
85 Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 29th edition (Luxembourg, 1992).86 The CEES include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,Poland, Romania. The value of imports from the CEES into the Community is Ecu 13.6 billion, Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 29th edition (Luxembourg, 1992).
87 Figures are for the year 199 0. Eurostat, "BasicStatistics of the Community", 29th edition (Luxembourg, 1992) .
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the Community. To make this involvement more structured and 
formal, the Commission often establishes working 
arrangements: exchanges of letters and documents, 
participation in meetings, joint working parties. To 
facilitate cooperation the Community is often granted 
observer status-granting the Community the right to 
participate but not to vote. The Community has observer 
status in 57 regional and international organisations, not 
including the United Nations Organization and its subsidiary 
bodies and specialised agencies.^ ^
An organisation linked with the UN system is the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Community's 
involvement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is 
another indicator of impact on the international system. 
Under Article XXIV GATT, the Community may conclude 
preferential or non-preferential trade agreements with a 
third state. Preferential agreements usually reduce the 
Common External Tariff (CET) by 50 to 70 percent for a 
period of years with the beneficiary offering limited 
reciprocity. Non-preferential agreements offer reduction of 
the CET on a limited range of goods and also require some 
measure of reciprocity. The Commission represents the 
Community collectively in the GATT and negotiates in the 
various rounds of trade discussions. Using its collective 
strength causes some contention. Non EC member states
88 Commission of the European Communities, Relations Between the European Communities and International 
Organisations, (Luxembourg, 1989) .
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consider reciprocity-the principle of mutual tariff 
concessions-to be a violation of the most favoured nation 
(MFN) clause (Article I GATT) which states :
any advantage...granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.
However, Article XXIV GATT permits exceptions from the MFN 
clause in cases where states enter into a customs union 
and/or free trade areas, or participate in interim 
agreements necessary for the attainment of a customs 
u n i o n . A l t h o u g h  the Community did not require strict 
reciprocity from developing states, the GATT was amended to 
allow developing states preferences for their exports with 
reciprocity for developed member states of GATT (and 
therefore of the Community) within the MFN clause.
The important aspect of the Community's relationship with 
GATT is that it is the Community which acts, and not the 
individual member states. The Commission has the 
responsibility to negotiate (within the framework laid down 
by the Council of Ministers). The United States and Japan
89 See Report on the Geneva Tariff Negotiations, Geneva,October 30, 1947 (London: HMSG, 1947).90 Art XXIV, para. 2(b) General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade.91 Art. XXXVI, GATT.
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have to look to the Community as the European actor in 
international trade. The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
provides the legal basis by which the Commission gains 
international presence.
Although never formally decided that the Community 
superseded its member states in GATT, "practice shows that 
the European Community is generally accepted not only as a 
spokesman negotiating on behalf of its member states, but 
also as a party to various GATT agreements^^
2.3.2 The Impact of Enlargement
Enlargement is one key area where the Community holds a 
reward that is not only demonstrably sought after, but also 
can influence states to act in a particular way. Article 237 
of the Rome Treaty and Article O of the Maastricht Treaty 
say that "any European State may apply to become a member". 
However, this prerequisite for membership is not as clear as 
it first appears. According to the Commission:
The term 'European' has not been officially defined.
It combines geographical, historical and cultural 
elements which all contribute to the European
92 J. Steenbergen, "The Status of GATT in Community Law," Journal of World Trade Law, vol. 15, (1981) p. 337. Seealso. Commission of the EC, Eighteenth Report on Competition Policy (Luxembourg, 1989); Anna Murphy, The European Community and the International Trading System, i and ii. (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1990); R. C. Hine, The Political Economy of International Trade (Brighton: Harvester, 1985); L. Tsoukalis, The New European Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, 
values, and historical interaction cannot be 
condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to 
review by each succeeding generation. The Commission 
believes that it is neither possible nor opportune 
to establish now the frontiers of the European 
Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years
(93)to come.
The Community can impact significantly the direction not 
only of economic reform, but also of political development 
and stability. According to the Commission;
the Community will provide encouragement to those 
pursuing reform and make the short term economic and 
social upheaval easier to bear. This perspective 
will also provide a stimulus to investment and 
discourage excessive nationalism. ^
That states have wished to join the European Community is 
obvious from the number of applications pending: Turkey, 
Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Finland and Norway. The four 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states will 
strengthen the free trade aspect of the EC, but since
93 Bull- EC: Supplement, 3-1992, p. 11. See also, L.Tsoukalis, The New European Economy, op. cit., p. 324;A. Michalski and H. Wallace, The European Community: The 
Challenge of Enlargement (London: Chatham House Discussion Paper, 1992).The cases of Central and Eastern Europe will be discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis.94 Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Closer
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Background Report, 17th February, 1993.
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Austria, Sweden and Finland have been neutral, their 
contribution to European foreign policy is less certain. 
Norway, as a NATO member, and a supporter of the CFSP, is 
for majority voting in foreign policy in order to strengthen 
the EC's position "as an organisation that can act".^^^^
A cogent example of the Community's potential impact comes 
from the opening up of Eastern Europe, which brings with it 
economic and political problems lying right on Europe's 
doorstep. These problems are associated with the switch from 
centrally planned to market economies, the weak and 
uncertain nature of new political institutions, and ethnic 
tensions. The ability of Europe to act-to offer aid, 
association and even the possibility of membership in the 
EC-is an indication of its impact on the international 
system, and will be fully discussed in chapter seven.
2.4 Power
The notion of power encapsulates the above three categories, 
not only taking meaning from them, but also giving them 
meaning: if the Community was not a unified body capable of 
decision-making, it could not possess power, and the 
category of impact could not be fully defined without 
defining power.
95 Ms. Helga Hernes, Norway's minister for Europe. Quoted in the Financial Times, 11 June, 1993.
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Power includes not only the economic power that comes with
the Community's strength as a trading alliance, but also
comprises the perception of the EC as a recognised performer
in world affairs; that is, power derived from something the
Community is rather than something the Community has.
This relates to much assumed, but not measured, perceptions
and expectations of non-member states, and about the
influence of the Community on their decision-making 
(97)process.
It has already been shown above that the EC has economic 
impact which is measurable. The more intangible aspects of 
power, its ability to influence the behaviour of third 
states, are less identifiable, difficult to measure, and in 
the case of the Community cannot be based on military 
strength. Therefore, a definition of power is required that 
considers impact and influence without the military 
requirement. Also, since power is defined most often in 
terms of states' influence, definitions do not consider the
96 See Johan Galtung, The European Community: a Superpowerin the Making, (London; Allen & Unwin, 1973), p. 36. Galtung makes a distinction between three sources of power; power deriving from something one is; power deriving from something one has; power deriving from position in a structure,97 See for example C. Hill, "The Capability-ExpectationsGap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," op. cit.; David Allen and Michael Smith, "Western Europe's presence in the contemporary international arena," op. cit.
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tension between central and peripheral units within an 
international organisation.
K. J. Holsti gives perhaps the most straightforward 
definition of power, describing it as "the general capacity 
of a state to control the behavior of o t h e r s . H e  breaks 
down the concept of power into three distinct elements; (1) 
the acts required to influence other states; (2) the 
resources used to make the process of influence 
successful;(3) the responses to the acts.^^^^^
Attempts have been made to enumerate those elements which 
make up a check-list for the definition of power, but a 
list, however much it tries to quantify and m e a s u r e t h e
98 K. J. Holsti distinguishes influence from power, notingthat influence is an element of power. International Politics, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall International, 1983) p. 145. See also Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations (New York; Basic Books,1975). David Baldwin uses the term interchangeably with influence, noting that the "usage is not intended to deny the validity or the utility of distinguishing among such terms..." D. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," World Politics : New Trends versus Old Tendencies, vol. 31 (January, 1979) p. 162.99 K.J. Holsti, ibid,, p. 145. Though David Baldwin'sdefinition is also to the point: "situations in which A gets B to do something he would not otherwise do." See D. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," op. cit., p. 163.100 K.J. Holsti, International Politics, ibid, p. 146.101 An interesting example of an attempt at measuring powercomes from Ray Cline. Cline's framework consists in theformula Pp = (C + E + M) X (S + W), where Pp =perceived power, C = critical mass (population and territory), E = economic capability, M = military capability, S = strategic purpose, W = will to pursue national strategy. Ray S. Cline, World Power 
Assessment : A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 197 5) p. 11.
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necessary components of power, does not provide the ultimate 
answer to the question: can A influence the behaviour of B?
Hans Morgenthau called power a means to a state's ends. 
According to Morgenthau, political power derives from three 
sources :
1. the expectation of benefits
2. the fear of disadvantages
3. the respect... for institutions. ^
Most researchers place military power at the apex of all 
other measurements. ^ ^^ 4) This exalted status of military 
power neglects other forms of p o w e r . A c c o r d i n g  to the 
neorealism of Arthur Stein, for example, other issues are 
considered as equally i m p o r t a n t . (106)
102 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations : The Struggle forPower and Peace, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1966) p. 25.103 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, ibid, p. 27.104 See W. H. Ferris, The Power Capabilities of Nation-States: International Conflict and War (Lexington:
D.C.Heath. 1973); H. Morgenthau states: "what gives the factors of geography, natural resources and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness," Politics Among Nations, op. cit., p. 114.105 See K. Knorr, The Power of Nations : The PoliticalEconomy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
106 Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithica, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1990).
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III. The EC as a Quasi-Interdependent Foreign Policy 
Actor
Analysing power in terms of the European Community requires 
a definition which recognises the value of a less realist 
approach. Survival and the ultimate use of force may be a 
primary goal for states, but not necessarily for 
international organisations. Therefore the usual components 
of power do not apply.
A move away from the realist assumption of military strength 
as the primary factor of power is the interdependence view 
of international politics. Interdependence looks at not only 
at new issues in the international setting such as the 
environment, but also considers economic, rather than 
military statecraft as a considerable foreign policy 
instrument. Because, as has been shown above, the 
interdependence school looks beyond the state and considers 
the implications of non-state, transnational actors, it also 
diminishes the realist's distinct separation of foreign and 
domestic policies and the distinction between external 
economic relations and foreign policy. In its efforts to 
look at the complex inputs and relationships in the process 
of foreign policy, interdependence also incorporates such 
theories as decision-making analysis and governmental and
(107)bureaucratic politics models.
107 See, for example M. P. Sullivan, Power in Contemporary 
International Politics (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1990) p. 9-11; Karl
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Yet, these influences, which serve to diminish existing 
hierarchies and point out important auxiliary relationships, 
do not explain the strict adherence to an intergovernmental 
structure for EPC foreign policy. The intergovernmental 
structure of EPC and its required unanimity is contrary to 
the interdependence theorist's view that a multiplicity of 
relationships would erode the predominance of the state. 
While interdependence does help to explain why it has been 
so difficult for the artificial separation between economic 
and political decisions to be eradicated, it does not 
explain the endurance of national interest.
A concept to define the relationship between the EC and its 
members, to take into consideration interdependent notions 
of "multiple channels," and to place military security 
somewhere further down the power scale, must be placed 
somewhere within a modified realist framework. This
(108)framework would account for cooperation between states
( 109 )and also for the tenacity of national interest. It
would therefore loosen rigid state-as-actor convictions, not
Kaiser calls the increase in foreign policy inputs "multibureaucratic decision-making." Karl Kaiser, "Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process." In Keohane and Nye's, Transnational 
Relations and World Politics, op. cit. p. 34.108 See for example Arthur Stein, Why Nations Cooperate(Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).109 According to one account: "That national interest is anecessary criterion of policy is obvious and unilluminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of, the national interest. Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos,"The American Idea of International Interest," American Political Science Review (March, 1953) p. 28.
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only taking into consideration the various transnational 
relationships, but also newly emerging transnational 
competences.
A definition of power along these lines would therefore 
include:
1. The ability to formulate cohesive action.
2. The possession of economic strength.
3. The ability to exploit the foreign policy
implications of economic strength through 
cohesive action.
Eastern Europe, which will be discussed in chapter seven of 
this thesis, is a prime example of the Community's role in a 
crucial international episode which, though involving 
initially the coordination of economic aid, evolved into an 
agenda-setting, foreign policy relationship.
Conclusion
The four categories discussed above do not present the 
European Community as an ideal unitary actor, capable of 
completely coherent action. There is little debate that the 
Community has evolved into an actor capable of state-like
110 An interesting comparison can be made to the concept developed by Schmitter. P. C. Schmitter, "Three Neo- Functional Hypotheses about International Integration," International Organization, vol. 23 (1969) p. 165.
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behaviour on very many issues. As indicated above, the 
establishment of new criteria for actorness must incorporate 
economic power, and the improved control over the effects of 
its wielding. Further it must also acknowledge that the 
implications of economic acts are full of political and 
foreign policy consequences. As Keohane and Hoffmann point 
out, keeping negotiations on economic issues separate from 
the definition of a common foreign policy is impossible. 
International politics, including both economic and foreign 
policy, "will increasingly be played on the chessboard of 
economic interdependence."
The revealing factor of the intricate relationship between 
the economic and political sphere is the often vexed 
relationship between EC external relations and that of EPC. 
This is manifestly reflected in the relationship between the 
Community and its member states. The tension springs from 
the three attracting forces of 1) Community institutions; 2) 
the formation of EPC; 3) the perceptions of the outside 
world. The counter forces include primarily issues of high 
politics, the fear of giving up national sovereignty in the 
field of foreign policy and the tenacity of the member 
states. The European Community derives its ability to act 
cohesively and with a singularity of purpose toward third 
states when the friction between these opposing forces can 
be minimised.
Ill Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, The New European Community, op. cit., p. 27.
As the next chapter will show, the European Court of Justice 
has been instrumental in defining the competences of the 
Community, and pointing out the relationship between foreign 
and economic policy in international agreements. Thus, the 
Court has helped not only to define the relationship between 
the Community and the member states, but further has given 
the Community tools by which to turn economic competences 
into instruments of foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 3
LEGAL COMPETENCES OP EXTERNAL RELATIONS : THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN AND COMMERCIAL
POLICY.
Introduction
The evolution of mechanisms through which the European 
Community has presented its common foreign policy posture 
has occurred, on one hand through a process of careful 
planning by the member states, and on the other through the 
unanticipated involvement of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). The planned process can be found in the form of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), and the unplanned 
logic in the form of interpretations of the Common 
Commercial Policy and other Treaty based provisions, making 
up a "Community method." The introduction to this thesis has 
shown the development of EPC and its aims, one of which was
1 Hereafter referred as the Court or the ECJ.
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to increase the influence of the EC in international
affairs. While the early basis of Political Cooperation
relegated it resolutely, until its incorporation by the
(2 )Single European Act (SEA), to the perimeters of the
Community system, the legal foundations of EC external
( 3 )relations are spelled out in the Treaty.
This chapter will discuss the relationship between EPC and 
the Common Commercial Policy and show how the "uniting of 
E u r o p e " i n  foreign policy has been a process of bridge- 
gapping between Community competences and those of the 
member states.(5) The vexed relationship between the 
Community and its member states in the context of the split 
between the external (economic) relations and the enterprise 
of foreign policymaking was established in the early days of 
EPC. Yet the European Court has been instrumental in
2 Single European Act, Bulletin of the EuropeanCommunities, Supplement 2/86; OJ L 169, 29.6.87. Hereafter referred to as SEA.3 External relations can be defined as the legally bindingunilateral economic action (taking the Community as a unit) and/or relationships of the Community toward non­member states through the conclusion of treaties. Using such agreements for the attainment of political goals is one part of Community foreign policy, which may or may not coincide with the political objectives of the Member States individually.4 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford; StanfordUniversity Press, 1958).5 Foreign policy is defined here as the predetermined andcoordinated political objectives of the Community. It is argued throughout this thesis that the coordinated (external) economic objectives of the Community are difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the political objectives. In fact often they are one and the same. Foreign policy is more than common action taken over one issue, for this constitutes a reactive approach. It is instead a plan of action, the elements of which make up a policy with discernible objectives.
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developing the external relations competence of the EC,
widening it so that some of the political aspects of the
Community's trade policies can be included in the competence
of Community treaties with third states. Freestone and
Davidson have called this an "organic" theory of external
relations power. The penetration by the Court, and its
precipitance in adopting a pro-Community stance "has not
been readily accepted by the member states who see the
accretion of powers to the Community as entailing a
( 7 )corresponding diminution in their own powers."
To demonstrate the evolution of external relations and
foreign policy competences, this chapter is divided into
three parts: the establishment of the Court as the
constitutional authority, the relationship between external
economic relations and foreign policymaking, and
interpretations and division of powers. These three parts
analyse the European Court of Justice and its instrumental
( 8 )role and "judicial creativeness" in defining Community 
competences, and turning those competences into potential 
instruments of positive foreign policymaking. The sections 
also show how the involvement of the Court has worked toward 
system legitimization, giving the Community not only tools, 
but also a focal point for the definition of competences.
David Freestone and Scott Davidson, "Community Competence and Part III of the Single European Act," Common Market Law Review, vol. 23 (1986) p. 799. idem.
See, G. Federico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," Common Market Law Review, vol. 26 (1989) p. 599.
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Demarcation lines between competences of the member states 
and the Community are difficult: the centre-periphery 
relations involve issues of sovereignty and supremacy.
I. A New Legal Order: The Twin Pillars of Community
Law
1. Direct effect of Community law.
With the ECJ's landmark decision in the Van Gend en Loos 
case, the European Community established "a new legal order 
in international law comprising both the Member States and 
their nationals". For the benefit of this new legal
order the member states of the Community :
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise 
not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of the Member 
States, Community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but it also intended to
9 See Mary L. Volcansek, "The European Court of Justice:Supranational Policy-Making," West European Politics, Vol. 15, no. 3 (July, 1993) p. 111.10 ECJ Case 2 6/62, Algemene Transport & Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen (1962) ECR 1 at 29, (1962) 
CMLR 105 at 129. The content of the case concerned a Dutch importer who invoked the provisions of the Treaty of Rome directly against the government of the Netherlands, which wanted to impose an 8% tax.
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confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage. These rights arise not only where 
they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also 
by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in 
a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as 
upon the Member States and upon the institutions of 
the Community.
Thus the Court enunciated for the first time that the
Community had established a new legal order which would
limit sovereignty, impose obligations on individuals, yet
also offer rights. And these rights would flow not from
{12 )national governments, but directly from the Treaty.
2. Supremacy of Community law,
f 13 \Once the pillar of direct effect had been established
through the Van Gend en Loos case, the European Court of
11 Van Gend en Loos, op. cit. p. 12.12 For a discussion of individual rights which have evolved and been clarified by the Court see, Dierdre Curtin, "Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights," Common Market Law Review, vol. 27 (1990) pp. 709-39.13 The concept of direct effect is defined as a legalprovision which grants individuals rights which must be upheld by the member states national courts. See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) pp. 183. For a detailed analysis of the doctrine of direct effect see, E. Stein, "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution," American Journal of International Law, vol. 75 (January, 1981) pp. 1-27. For a discussion of the effect on Community national legal systems of an international agreement which is part of Community law see, T.C. Hartley, "International Agreements and the
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Justice elaborated and refined its decision the following 
year in the landmark decision of Costa v. ENEL. This
decision held that the Community "has created its own legal 
system which...became an integral part of the legal systems 
of the Member States and which their Courts are bound to
( 15 )apply...". The Court went on to say that:
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal 
system to the Community legal system of the rights 
and obligations arising under the Treaty carries 
with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign 
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act 
incompatible with the concept of the Community 
cannot prevail.
The case of Costa v. ENEL thus established the second pillar
/ 1 7  \of Community law, that of supremacy. The Court of
Community Legal System: Some Recent Developments," European Law Review, vol. 8 (1983). pp. 383-92,14 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964) ECR 585. This case dealtwith a customer of an Italian electric company who refused to pay his electric bill, claiming that Article 37 of the EEC Treaty had been violated by Italy's nationalisation of electric companies.15 Costa V. ENEL, op. cit., p. 585.16 idem.
11 For an evaluation of the Costa v. ENEL case with special reference to the Italian Constitutional Court see, M. L. Volcansek, "Impact of Judicial Policies in the European Community: The Italian Constitutional Court and European Community Law," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 42 (December, 1989) pp. 569-85. For an analysis of how Van Gend en Loos and Costa V. ENEL have provided the groundwork for the constitutionalization of the Community see, Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change," in W. Wallace, ed., The Dynamics of European Integration (London: Pinter, 1990) pp. 280-81; See also, Eric Stein "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a
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Justice stated that Community law takes precedence over
national law and cannot "be overridden by domestic legal
provisions, however f r a m e d " . T h e  Court argued that
without this fundamental principle of Community law
supremacy "a State could unilaterally nullify its effects by
( 19 )means of a legislative measure." Finally, the principle
of supremacy of Community law was perhaps most succinctly 
put in the 1969 Walt Wilhelm case in which the Court stated 
that "the EEC Treaty has established its own system of law, 
integrated into the legal system of the Member States," 
however, despite this integration, "Community law takes 
precedence."
Thus, the Community submits to an internal judicial
settlement when disputes arise from the interpretation of
the Treaty, and the member states undertake not to seek any
(2 1 )other method of settlement. The ECJ is the final arbiter
in cases involving the interpretation of the Treaty and, 
should a conflict occur between Community law and national 
law. Community laws prevail. This prevalence is in 
accordance with both the Van Gend en Loos case and Costa v.
Transnational Constitution," op. cit.; Federico Mancini, "The Making of a Constitution for Europe," op. cit.18 Costa V. ENEL, p. 585.19 Costa V. ENEL, p. 585.2 0 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68(1969) ECR 1.21 Article 219 EEC Treaty of Rome.
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ENEL, together establishing the twin doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect.
3. Criticisms of the new legal order
These doctrines sound impressive as mechanisms for
increasing the legitimacy of the Community. However, they
(23)have not been without their critics. Rasmussen notes,
with reference to the Court's pro-integration activism, that
"even firm believers in a federal Europe occasionally are
baffled by the Court's strong and bold pro-Community policy
p r e f e r e n c e . P a u l  Taylor, conversely, saw the policy
making effect of the Court as a less threatening phenomenon
than Rasmussen precisely because of his pessimism regarding
the Community becoming anything more than a strictly
intergovernmental organisation. He maintained that, "if a
national legislature decided to limit the effect of a
Communities' regulation, or to nullify it,...the national
(25 )courts would not apply the Communities' law." Taylor's
22 See, generally, D. Lasok and P. A. Stone, Conflict of
Laws in the European Community, (Abingdon: Professional Books Ltd., 1987).23 See for example, Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy inthe European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986). As Mary Volcansek notes: "The actions of the [Court] undoubtedly violated the line between interpretation (in even the loosest sense) and legislation." See, "The European Court of Justice: Supranational Policy-Making," op. cit., p. 113.24 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Courtof Justice, op. cit, p. 3.25 Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1983) p. 280.
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study of the European Community and its institutions is 
altogether doubtful of its ability at decision making or 
effective integration. It concludes that states would impose 
limits on any "challenges to sovereignty... and the central 
institutions [would fail] to obtain the qualities of 
supranationalism."
Stuart Scheingold views the Court's role as "consensual,"
and notes that by repeatedly upholding the supremacy of
Community law, the Court contributes to the process of
integration by "generally blurring the lines which divide
(21 )one set of structure from the other." He claims that the
Court of Justice has operated as a validator... rather than 
as a policymaker.
Whether viewed positively or negatively, the Courts twin 
pillars have acted as a cohesive force in both the process 
of integration and the establishment of Community 
legitimacy. Without the supremacy of Community law as an 
established principle, a certain ad hoc approach could have 
resulted. Member states could choose to accept or reject 
various elements of Community decisions as they saw fit.^^^^
26 ibid., p. 56.27 Stuart Scheingold, The Law in Political Integration : TheEvolution and Integrative Implications of Regional Legal 
Processes in the European Community, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, no. 27 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971) p. 3.2 8 i dem.29 For a discussion of this point see, Andrew Wilson-Green, Political Integration by Jurisprudence (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1969) p. 64.
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II. External Relations and Foreign Policy.
1. European Political Cooperation and Community law
EPC and Community external relations operated in separate 
spheres initially. EPC was conducted along side the Treaty 
rather than within it. The idea of unity and separateness 
are apparent in the introductory common provision of Title I 
of the Single European Act (SEA): "The European Community 
and European Political Cooperation shall have as their 
objective to contribute together to making concrete progress 
towards European unity, " (30) i2)ut each is to continue to 
operate under separate regimes. For the Community this 
regime is the Community Treaties as modestly amended in 
Title II of the SEA; for EPC it is Title III confirming and 
supplementing the procedures agreed in specified reports and 
practices gradually established since 1970. Article 1 of 
Title III specifically mentions the reports of Luxembourg
(1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), and the Solemn 
Declaration on European Union (1983). The SEA offers 
primarily affirmation of evolved practices, and rules to 
govern EPC. It has been argued that SEA provided little 
innovation, but simply transformed and legalised an existing 
process,(31)
30 Single European Act, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/1986; OJ L 169, 29.6.87. Hereafter referred to as SEA.
31 See, for example, Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weller,"EPC and the Single Act; from Soft Law to Hard Law?" In
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The SEA attempted to link EPC and EC, giving EPC a treaty 
basis and associating the Commission with EPC in Title III. 
The SEA also affirmed that the "external policies of the 
European Community and the policies agreed in European
/32 \Political Cooperation must be consistent." The careful
wording continues: "the Presidency and the Commission, each 
within its own sphere of competence, shall have special 
responsibility for ensuring that such consistency is sought 
and maintained".
1.1. The nature of EPC commitment
The primary commitment of the member states under EPC is one 
of consultation. Under the Single European Act, the 
procedures of EPC were codified and the processes of EPC, 
which had been established and refined since the Luxembourg 
Report of 1969, were confirmed. However, the SEA did not lay 
down a legal, formally binding framework for EPC, and Title 
III calls for the member states solely to "endeavour jointly 
to formulate and implement a European foreign policy". 
Mechanisms are clearly those of cooperation and consultation 
and the level of 'commitment to endeavour' is difficult to 
measure. The insubstantial legal resources of EPC in
Martin Holland, ed., The Future of European Political 
Cooperation (London: Macmillan, 1991) pp. 121-14232 Article 30(5), SEA.33 Article 30(5), SEA.34 Article 30(1), SEA.
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relation to commitment are compounded by the vague wording 
of Title III. The sphere of competency of the member states 
is protected by conditional clauses and indistinct 
injunctions. Article 30(3)(c), for example, politely 
requests member states to refrain "as far as possible... 
from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint 
actions this might produce." This wording does not sound 
like a traditional legal document. On the other hand. Title 
III is unsurprising in its care to protect the foreign 
policy competences of the member states: even the most pro­
integration states are disinclined to relinquish foreign 
policy competences.
In judging and evaluating the Title, it is therefore 
important not to overestimate the legal commitments simply 
because it is part of a legal document. It is equally 
important to look at the unique system which EPC created: in 
depth exchange of information, the production of common 
viewpoints, collective commitment by the Twelve to an EC 
position.(35)
Yet, another view can be taken regarding the commitment of 
the member states. Non-binding agreements, or those which at 
first sight appear to be non-binding, have precedents in
See Elfriede Regelsberger, "European Political Co­operation after the Single European Act: Balance Sheet and Perspectives of a European Foreign Policy," in Armand Clesse and Raymond Vernon, eds.. The European Community after 1992: A New Role in World Politics? {Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) pp. 123 129.
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international law which cannot be underestimated.(36) 
Dehousse and Weiler point out four socio-legal reasons why 
Title III can be regarded as a binding document.
1. precedents from other international documents 
(North Atlantic Treaty, Warsaw Pact, Helsinki Final 
Act) ;
2. sincerity of the treaty negotiating phase;
3. length of treaty negotiating phase;
4. opposition to changes contained in the proposed 
treaty.(37)
Agreements must create obligations in order to be legally 
binding; if Title III does not create obligations, then, 
Dehousse and Weiler ask, why were certain clauses of the 
Title opposed for so long? Further, "to state that parties 
'shall endeavour' to formulate a European foreign policy may 
seem an oxymoron, but in reality it creates an obligation to 
act in good faith, which is a recognised concept of 
international law."(38) Although Title III and the 
obligation it entails are not altogether specific, it is 
clear that under international law the legal duty to 
cooperate does exist.
38 For an elaboration of this view see, Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weiler, "EPC and the Single Act: from Soft Law to Hard Law?", op. cit., pp. 129-131.
^7 ibid., pp. 129-130.^8 ibid., p.130.
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This legality of Title III was the subject of Irish Supreme 
Court ruling in 1987. The argument put forward was that 
Title III infringed on the neutrality provisions of the 
Irish constitution. The Irish Court found that Title III was 
a legal document whose provisions were not a mere 
confirmation of extant practices within the Community. 
Rather, the new provisions imposed legal obligations which 
were in fact incompatible with the Irish constitution and 
its neutrality clauses. The Irish Court found that states 
may arrange to confer and consult with other states 
regarding the conduct of foreign policy. However;
It is quite a different matter when, as here, it is 
proposed that the State be bound by an international 
treaty which requires the State to act in the sphere 
of foreign relations in a manner which would be 
inconsistent with constitutional requirements.(39)
Justice Henchy, arguing for the majority, maintained that 
with the ratification of Title III each state was "bound to 
surrender part of its sovereignty in the conduct of foreign
39 Crotty v. An Taoiseach and others. Common Market LawReports, vol. 49 (1987) p. 666. For a discussion of the Irish decision see, J. Temple-Lang, "The Irish Court which delayed the Single European Act; Crotty v. An Taoiseach and others. Common Market Law Review, vol. 24(1987); T. C. Salmon, Unneutral Ireland: an ambivalent and unique security policy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) pp 286-97; J.P. McCutcheon, "The Irish Supreme Court, European Political Cooperation and the Single European Act," Legal Issues in European Integration, vol. 10(1988).
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r e l a t i o n s . "(40) The Irish Supreme Court thus found that, 
"without the appropriate constitutional amendment, the 
ratification of the Single European Act (insofar as it 
contains Title III) would be impermissible under the 
Constitution."(41) The ratification of the SEA therefore 
required a constitutional amendment.
1.2 Delineating the boundaries
As the Tindemans Report first enunciated, EPC and the 
Community are two distinct pillars. The European Union 
would one day rest, or be built around, these two 
pillars. However, delineating the boundaries of these 
columns proved difficult from the start. The oft cited 
example of the Foreign Ministers meeting in Copenhagen 
in the morning within the framework of political 
cooperation, and then flying to Brussels to meet as the 
Council of Ministers, demonstrates the absurdity of the 
initially strict delineation. The Preamble of the SEA 
continues along the lines of separation, clearly stating 
that the EC shall be founded on the Treaties, while EPC 
shall be governed by Title III, confirming and 
supplementing the procedures and practices "gradually
4(^ ibid., p. 668, emphasis added, 
41 ibid., p. 667.
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established among the Member S t a t e s . "(42) Article 1 
specifically refers to the reports of Luxembourg(1970), 
Copenhagen{1973), London(1981), and the Solemn 
Delcaration on European Union(1983). Article 3 of the 
SEA further spells out the "powers and jurisdiction" of 
each system and the conditions and purposes for which 
they operate.(43)
The protection of the member states sovereignty in Title 
III presents further difficulties in delineating the 
boundaries of EC and EPC activity. Member states 
certainly preserve their autonomous capacity to act in 
foreign relations under Title III. They are encouraged, 
but not obliged to coordinate their efforts. (44)
42 Title I, Article 1, SEA.
43 Article 3, SEA: 1. The institutions of the EuropeanCommunities, henceforth designated as referred to hereafter, shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the conditions and for the purposes provided for by the Treaties establishing the Communities and the subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them and by the provisions of Title II.2. The institutions and bodies responsible for European Political Cooperation shall exercise their powers and jurisdiction under the conditions and for the purposes laid down in Title III and in the documents referred to in the third paragraph of Article 1.
44 Further, the member states' ability to act unilaterallyin external relations is not undermined by the rest of the SEA. For example, according to Article 13OR(5): "Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and with the relevant international organizations. The arrangements for Community co­operation may be the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with Article 228." It continues: "The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies and to conclude
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The cautious text of Title III provides some interesting 
ambiguities concerning the division of competences in 
practice. As one observer notes;
The problem of contradiction between the EC policy 
on the one hand and the policies of the Member 
States on the other is, for instance, important in 
the areas of human rights and relations with the 
Third World. How can the responsibilities of the 
Presidency and of the Commission which are mentioned 
in Article 30, paragraph 5, in fact be implemented?
Are there legal ways and means to implement that 
responsibility?(45)
The duality of EPC and EC, one having a legal Treaty base, 
the other based on a codified process of consensus and 
consultation, is reflected in the Single European Act in a 
variety of other ways. First, in the wording of the Title 
itself which refers only in the EPC section to the High 
Contracting Parties, and not to the member states of the 
Community. Second, in the exclusion of the ECJ from any 
authority over EPC. The role of the European Court of
international agreements." Articles 130R(5) and 130R(5)(2), SEA.
48 Jochen A. Frowein, "The competences of the EuropeanCommunity in the field of external relations," in Jürgen Schwarze, ed., The External Relations of the European 
Community, in particular EC-US Relations. Contributions to an international colloquium organized by the European Policy Unit of the European University Institute held in Florence on 26-27 May 1988 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1989) pp. 34-35.
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Justice regarding EPC is spelled out in Article 31 of the 
Single European Act, which states:
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community and the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community concerning the powers of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities and the exercise 
of those powers shall apply only to the provisions 
of Title II and to Article 32; they shall apply to 
those provisions under the same conditions as for 
the provisions of the said Treaties,
This Article excludes the ECJ from action regarding EPC, 
which is placed under Title III, and is therefore not 
subject to any form of review by the ECJ. The Court's 
judicial activism as discussed above was, according to some 
observers, the main reason for EPC's exclusion from Title 
III of the Single European Act.^^^^ Another reason that has 
been put forward concerns the legalisation of the diplomatic 
process. The process of diplomacy and political negotiation
46 Article 31, SEA.
47 See David Freestone and Scott Davidson, "CommunityCompetence and Part III of the Single European Act," op. cit, p. 7 99.
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should remain as flexible and tractable as possible, and 
therefore does not submit well to "j u d i c i a l i s a t i o n . " (48)
The legal status of EPC is reflected in the wording of Title 
III, which lays out the general obligations of the member 
states. The High Contracting Parties under EPC are, as 
previously noted, to endeavour to formulate and implement a 
European foreign Policy, to inform and consult each other on 
any foreign policy matters of general interest, to take full 
account of the positions of the other partners and, perhaps 
most important, to avoid any action or position which would 
impair the member states' effectiveness as a cohesive force 
in international relations. Yet breaches of these provisions 
have no judicial redress. As Dehousse and Weiler point out, 
the main criticism of EPC "is not so much the absence of 
legal obligations as such, but rather the absence of 
effective enforcement mechanisms."(49)
The extra-Treaty origins of EPC, before the SEA formalized 
the procedures, and the contrasting Treaty provisions for 
commercial and external relations policy have led to a 
fracture which has proved difficult to mend. The vagaries of 
EPC have also meant that it has been difficult to define. As 
Holland notes, "a clear operational definition of EPC is
48 See E. Stein, "European Foreign Affairs System and theSingle European Act of 1986." International Lawyer, vol. 23 (1989) pp. 977-94.
49 See, Renaud Dehousse and Joseph H.H. Weiler, "EPC and theSingle Act: from Soft Law to Hard Law?", op. cit., p. 131.
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required." gpQ may not have been envisioned as "a 
legalistic exercise," and rather as an "enterprise to 
establish common positions and common actions in foreign
( 51 )policy," but the apparent neat theoretical division
which keeps EPC and EC external economic relations in 
separate categories has proved untenable.
Yet, the dual system of dealing with foreign policy actions 
evolved. An operational distinction between the two spheres 
of international action emerged and has persisted, with 
Community competence resting only in matters of 
international trade. The Community has founded its actor 
capability in foreign policy on a variety of competences and 
two overarching spheres: the EPC method and the Community 
method.
2. The Community method.
The Treaty based, legally binding Community method covers 
areas of economic policy while the non Treaty based work of 
political cooperation works in parallel to that of the 
Community and contains no elements of supranationalism. The 
Community method involves the Commission. Actions are based
50 Martin Holland, "Sanctions as an EPC Instrument," inMartin Holland, ed., The Future of European Political Cooperation, op. cit., p. 182.51 E. Regelsberger, P. de Schoutheete, S. Nuttall and G.Edwards, eds.. The External Relations of European Political Cooperation and the Future of EPC (Florence: European University Institute Working Paper no. 172, 1985) .
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on the Treaty and can be, depending on the Article in 
question, legally binding on the member states. This section 
will analyse how the decisions and opinions of the Court 
have contributed to the clarification of the potential of 
commercial relations.
In the absence of express provisions for foreign policy the 
task of identifying and interpreting those areas of the 
Treaty that bridge external relations and foreign policy 
make up two distinct domains: explicit powers of the Treaty 
and implied powers interpreted from the Treaty. The first, 
explicit powers, are spelled out in Articles 113 and 238.
The second, implied powers, derives from interpretations of 
the Treaty developed by the European Court of Justice. Power 
can be attributed implicitly from a provision in the treaty 
which is not specifically directed at the agreement in 
question. This is known as the concept of implied powers of 
the Community and has been developed by the Court in case 
22/70 (more commonly known as the ERTA case), the joined 
Kramer cases, and Opinion 1/76 {Laying up Fund). In ERTA, 
the power to regulate the maximum driving hours of lorry 
drivers was attributed to the Community, but because treaty- 
making power had not been expressly conferred to the 
Community for this subject matter the States claimed that 
they retained the treaty-making power. In view of the Kramer 
cases the ability of the Community to conclude international 
treaties depends upon whether the Member States still have
100
/ 52 )powers "to enter into international commitments." If the
member states do not have the power to do so then Community 
power is termed exclusive. However, exclusive Community 
power does not necessarily exclude the member states from 
involvement in a prospective treaty. Mixed agreements cover 
a far greater majority of international treaties concluded 
by the Community and involve both the Community and the 
member states.
The Common Commercial Policy and the power of the Community 
to conclude association agreements will be evaluated in the 
next section as methods of external foreign relations power. 
Further the role of the case law of the ECJ with regard to 
external relations will be analysed to see how the Court of 
Justice has had a role in providing the Community with 
powers of foreign policy. In this context the Common 
Commercial policy and the Court's interpretation of explicit 
and implied powers play a role in clarifying the concept of 
commercial policy. Mixed agreements, which have emerged as 
the solution for the member states to retain sovereignty, 
will then be discussed.
52 Officier van Justitie v. Kramer and others; Joined cased 3,4 and 6/16; Preliminary ruling of 14 July 1976; ECR 1279 at 1305, Para.17/18.
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2.1. Association Agreements.
An explicit basis for Community external relations is 
through the various association relationships provided for 
under Article 238 and Articles 131-136. Treaty-making power 
is thus attributed to the Community by association 
agreements provided for by the Treaty, which states in 
Article 238;
The Community may conclude with a third State, a 
union of States or an international organisation 
agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and 
special procedures.
Association can be a transition or preparatory phase for
European states who have Treaty based eligibility for
( 53 )membership in the Community. These transition phase
states may be kept waiting for administrative or political 
reasons, or because they are unable to fulfil the economic 
conditions necessary for membership. For example Greece was 
an associate for six years between application in 1975 and 
accession in 1 9 8 1 . The Commission's Opinion on Greek 
accession placed considerable emphasis on the economic
53 See Article 237.54 Greece had also been an associate since 1961 before itmade an official application for membership to the EC. The Greek association agreement was placed in suspension between the 1967 military coup and the return of a civil government in 1974. See Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981) pp. 28-49.
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problems that Greece's membership would place on the 
existing Community.
Another aspect of association was set up under Part IV of
the Rome T r e a t y t o  take into account the colonial
legacies of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and France.
Through Part IV association the territories and colonies of
these member would benefit from trade and aid because of
their special relations. The aim of association under
Part IV was to "promote the economic and social development
of the countries and territories and to establish close
economic relations between them and the Community as a 
( 59 )whole." Thus associates received development aid, trade
55 Bull. EC: Supplement 1-1976.56 Articles 131-136, Treaty of Rome.57 France even threatened abandonment of Treaty negotiationsunless provisions were made for its former colonial empire. See Roger Morgan, West European Politics Since 1945 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1972) p. 147.58 Close economic, historical and cultural links between themember states and their overseas dependencies made Part IV association a necessary insertion into the Rome Treaty. For example France in 1957 had special relations with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria and still maintained a colonial empire in Africa: Belgium was installed in the Congo and Ruanda; Italy had ties with Libya and Somalia; the Netherlands had Dutch New Guinea, Surinam and Curaçao. See Werner Feld, The European Community in World Affairs (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983) p. 105. When Britain joined the Community in 1973 and had to make arrangements for the Commonwealth states, all UK dependent territories became eligible for association except Gibraltar and Hong Kong. See, British Membership 
of the European Community (London: HMSO, 1973) pp. 29- 47. See also Bull. EC: Supplement 1-1972 p. 45. For an account of the new relationship of the Community with these Part IV states after gaining independence in the 1960s see, for example, C. Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: the EEC and the ACP (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).59 Article 131, Treaty of Rome.
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concessions and the right to "levy customs duties which meet 
the needs of their development and industrialisation or 
product revenue."
The language of the Treaty for association agreements is 
wide, referring to "reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedures...." However, as Weiler 
notes, despite the wide language the first Association 
Agreements were based on mixed agreements : the member states 
insisted on joint participation, preventing the Community 
from concluding such agreements a l o n e . W i t h  association 
agreements the Community was once again faced with an 
untenable split between its economic and political 
relationships.
2.2. Common Commercial Policy
Another realm of Community-method external relations which 
have foreign policy implications, is the Common Commercial 
Policy (CCP). While foreign policy decisions are, as noted, 
outside the legal sphere of the Treaty, the basis for 
international trade decisions. Article 113, can be 
interpreted broadly. This broad interpretation has 
implications for foreign policy. The European Court of 
Justice, claiming its authority from the precedent of the
60 Article 133, Treaty of Rome.61 J. H. H. Weiler, "The Evolution of the Mechanisms andInstitutions for a European Foreign Policy (Florence, European University Institute Working Paper, no. 202) pp. 7-8.
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Van Gend en Loos case has played a significant role in 
defining and clarifying the foreign policy potential of 
commercial relations, and in giving the Common Commercial 
Policy foreign policy potency. This foreign policy power is 
given explicitly and implicitly for trade under Article 113
Nearly all international agreements of the Community are 
expressly based on Article 113. Paragraph one of the
Article states:
the common commercial policy shall be based on 
uniformly established principles, particularly in 
regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation export 
policy and measures to protect trade such as those 
to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.
The Commission acts under the direction and within the 
framework issued by the Council, who also appoint a special 
committee to consult and assist the Commission with their 
task. ^ 4^) rp]^g external relations of the Community, based as
62 See Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the
European Community (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1989) pp. 90-105.63 Article 113, Treaty of Rome.
64 Article 113, paragraph 3. The Article 113 Committee,which has the task of ensuring that the interests of the Member States are fully considered, is composed of national officials of the member states from the ministry relevant to the negotiations. Although the Commission does not need the consent of the Committee itmust consult with it and establish a relationshipconducive to the performance of its task. The Committee's role is supervisory but can be an
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they are on the Treaty, are also subject to the Court as the 
final and exclusive arbiter of international treaties and 
agreements.
The supremacy of Community law is an important doctrine in 
the context of the Community's external relations. The Court 
has developed, through the accumulation of case law, what 
could be called a doctrine of external relations whereby the 
competences of the Community and the member states have been 
established. When there is uncertainty about the 
compatibility of a proposed agreement with the Treaty the 
Court may be asked by the Council, Commission or a member 
state to give an opinion under Article 228(1)(b) EEC which 
states :
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may 
obtain beforehand the opinion of the Court of 
Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is 
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty.
The external relations powers of the European Communities 
involve the ability to conclude international treaties on 
specific subject matters, notably tariff and trade 
agreements. This power to conclude international treaties 
must be derived either implicitly or explicitly from the 
treaty - for example Art. 113 states in paragraph 3;
influential one as its members are often bound by specific instructions from their national governments Thus the Commission's role and authority are somewhat lessened.
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Where agreements with third countries need to be 
negotiated, the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council, which shall 
authorise the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations.
The Court's judgements and opinions regarding the 
interpretation of the Treaty will be discussed below to show 
how the competences of the Community and the member states 
have evolved through the development of implied and explicit 
powers. It is important to consider the difference between 
the "Community" and its individual "member states" in a 
legal sense. For the Community it is the Treaty which 
provides the basis of its legal order. Yet the Treaty is 
more than a contractual agreement; it is "an institutional 
stage of European u n i t y . P o w e r  is both attributed and 
circumscribed by the founding and subsequent Treaties of the 
EC and the relationship between the Community and the member 
states is based upon the delegation of this power and the 
division of functions. Powers given to the Community by
the member states can be used for conducting external 
relations as well as for intra-EC activity. However, powers 
not specifically ascribed, the residue of powers, remain 
with the member states. As stated in an early case by the 
Court :
65 D. Lasok and J. W. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the 
European Communities (London: Butterworths, 1991) p. 31.
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within the specific domain of the Community, i.e.
for everything which relates to the pursuit of the
common objectives within the common market the
institutions [of the Community] are provided with
exclusive authority....Outside the domain of the
Community, the governments of the Member States
retain their responsibilities in all sectors of
(67)economic policy....
III. Division of Powers; Interpretations by the 
Court.
1. Implied powers
The European Road Transport Authority judgement of 1970 was 
a landmark case regarding Community and member state 
c o m p e t e n c e s . I t  was the first instance of legal action 
between the Council and the Commission, and concerned the 
treaty-making power of the Community : did the Community or 
the member states have the power to enter into an 
international agreement. Since no provisions in the Treaty 
expressly allowed for a Community competence, the Court had 
to decide whether there was an implied power in the Treaty. 
By deciding that "regard must be had to the whole scheme of
66 D. Lasok and P. A. Stone, Conflict of Laws in the
European Community (Abingdon: Profession Books Ltd., 1987) pp. 6-8.67 Case 30/59 De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in LimburgHigh Authority of the ECSC (1961) ECR 1, p. 23.68 Commission v. Council, case 22/70, (1971) ECR 272 et seq.
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the Treaty no less than to its substantive provisions 
the European Court of Justice set a precedent in the 
development of the common commercial policy recognizing, 
through the ERTA judgement, the existence of implied 
Community powers.
Since the Treaty explicitly allows for only a few types of
agreements to be concluded with third parties, the question
came up as to whether the Community might conclude
agreements in the absence of an express provision in the
Treaty. Two alternative arguments emerged. The Commission
held to the principle of parallel powers, taking the view
that competence in external relations should be coextensive
with competence derived from the Treaty for internal
purposes. Internal powers "must apply to external relations
just as much as to domestic measures in the sphere
envisaged".  ^ Conversely, the Council drew inspiration
from the principe d 'attribution contending that the
Community only has "such powers as have been conferred upon
it, authority to enter into agreements with third countries
cannot be assumed in the absence of an express provision in 
( 71 )the Treaty". The Court was not convinced by the
69 Para. 15, ERTA. Emphasis added.70 Para. 6, ERTA.71 Para. 9, ERTA. The Community, as an internationalorganisation, does not derive legal powers in the same way as does a state. This is a key point. A state considered to possess inherently a legal personality which implies total competence over its external relations. The Community, as a creation of its member states, "must depend on its purposes and functions as 
expressed or implied by its constituent instruments and
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Council's arguments and noted that "in the absence of 
specific provisions of the Treaty relating to the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in 
the sphere of transport policy...one must turn_to the 
general system of Community law in the sphere of relations
/ 72 )with third countries". Thus, the Court upheld the
principle of parallel powers. The member states claimed that 
treaty-making power is more than an extension to third 
parties of an internal Community competence. In their view 
treaty-making establishes political bonds and relationships
/ 73 \well beyond the subject-matter of an agreement. The
Court's Opinion, however, strongly limited the external to 
the internal powers.
In the ERTA case the Court held that, because the European 
Community has legal personality, "in its external
relations the Community enjoys the capacity to establish 
contractual links over the whole field of objectives defined
/ 7 R )in Part One of the Treaty". So the Court added the
principle of parallel powers to its body of external 
relations case law, empowering the Community "to assume and 
carry out contractual obligations towards third countries
as developed in practise" {International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, p. 180). States have unlimited power whereas the Community has only those powers bestowed upon it by the Treaty.72 Para. 12, ERTA.73 Para. 31, ERTA. See Jürgen Schwarze, "Towards a EuropeanForeign Policy-Legal Aspects." In J. K. De Vree et al., eds. Towards a European Foreign Policy (The Hague; Nijhoff, 1987) pp. 70-75.74 Para. 13, ERTA.7 5 Para. 14, ERTA.
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affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community 
legal system".According to Hartley, "there is little 
doubt that the doctrine of parallelism applies not only with 
reference to internal powers granted by the Treaty for 
specific objectives, but also with regard to such general 
powers as that contained in Article 235....The result is 
that the Community now possesses wide treaty-making powers
(77 )covering virtually the whole area of the EEC Treaty."
The ERTA decision is a landmark decision for the external 
relations of the Community although it does seem to limit 
external powers to those which stem from the prior use of an 
internal competence. According to later decisions of the 
Court however, prior use is "not limited to that 
eventuality".Opinion 1/76, known as the Laying Up Fund 
c a s e , a n d  Kramer et a l . , clarify and define the ERTA 
decision, declaring that an external competence "flows by 
i m p l i c a t i o n " i n  cases where the Community has not yet 
used an internal power.
Whenever the EC institutions have the power to pursue an 
objective - those defined in Part One of the Treaty - the 
Community, as a supra-national entity, may enter into
7 6 Para. 18, ERTA.77 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) p. 167.7 8 Opinion of the Court 1/7 6 (Laying Up Fund for inland waterway vessels), 26 April 1977, ECR 741 at 754.7 9 Para. 4, Laying Up Fund.80 Officier van Justitie v. Kramer and others; Joined cased3,4 and 6/76; Preliminary ruling of 14 July 197 6; ECR 1279 at 1305.81 Para. 4, Laying Up Fund.
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international agreements in order to obtain that objective. 
The Court averred "that authority to enter into 
international commitments may not only arise from an express 
attribution by the Trea ty" Fur the r, the Court stated;
...whenever Community law has created for the
institutions of the Community powers within its
internal system for the purpose of attaining a
specific objective, the Community has authority to
enter into the international commitments necessary
for the attainment of that objective even in the
absence of an express provision in that 
(83)connexion.
According to the Laying Up Fund opinion, once an internal 
power has been used the respective external power stays with
the Community. Thus the member states may be deprived of
their power to enter into unilateral agreements. They are 
exempted, on the basis of the ERTA decision, of their 
external powers. So the Council is reluctant to make use of 
the implied-powers theory of the Court for two reasons: 1) 
the practical difficulties of forging potential foreign 
policy decisions on the basis of a qualified majority vote 
and 2) the pre-emptive nature of Community power under the 
ERTA decision.
82 Para. 3, Laying Up Fund.83 Para. 3, Laying Up Fund.84 See Jürgen Schwarze, "Towards a European Foreign Policy-Legal Aspects," op. cit.j pp. 73-74.
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2. Explicit powers
The explicit external relations powers of the European 
Community are concerned primarily with Arts. 110-116 EEC 
dealing with the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and Article 
238 concerning association agreements. The concept of 
explicit powers has been developed primarily by the Court 
through Opinion 1/75 {Local Cost Standard) and Opinion
1/78 {International Agreement on Natural Rubber). The
Opinion on the International Agreement on Natural Rubber 
deals with the scope of Art. 113, establishing that the CCP 
is not restricted to those elements explicitly mentioned in 
the article but also to "any other process intended to 
regulate external t r a d e " . I n  the Natural Rubber opinion, 
the Commission requested that the ECJ give an opinion as to 
whether or not the Agreement was compatible with the Treaty 
and, if so, whether the Community possessed the necessary 
competence to conclude that agreement. The Commission held 
that the Agreement came entirely within the framework of 
Art. 113 thus placing it within the Community's exclusive 
powers. However according to the Council, whose 
interpretation of the scope of the CCP was more restrictive, 
the subject matter of the agreement fell outside the CCP's 
framework, thus calling for a mixed agreement; a division of
85 Opinion of the Court 1/75 (Understanding on Local CostStandard); (1975) ECR 1355 at 1356; (1976) CMLR 85; CCH8365.86 Opinion of the Court 1/78 (International Agreement onNatural Rubber); (1979) ECR 2871; (1979) 3 CMLR 639; CCH8600.87 Para. 45, Natural Rubber.
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powers between the Community and the member states whereby 
an agreement is concluded jointly.
The central question then related to the subject-matter of 
the Agreement and whether it came within the framework of 
the CCP as set out in Article 113 of the Treaty. If it did, 
then the question remained as to whether the member states 
involvement was necessary. According to the Commission, 
Commercial policy includes any measure regulating 
international t r a d e . T h e  Council interprets the CCP less 
broadly, or at least from a different perspective, looking 
to the motivation of a measure for its decisive 
qualification as an act of commercial policy.
The Court was hesitant to limit the CCP to include "the use
of instruments intended to have an effect only on the
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of
more highly developed mechanisms". Moreover the Court
held that Art. 113 must be "governed from a wide point of
view and not only having regard to the administration of
precise systems such as customs and quantitative 
(91 )restrictions." The Court also deduced that the list of
subjects covered under Art 113 (changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of trade and tariff agreements, the achievement 
of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy 
and measures to protect trade) is not exhaustive and is
88 Para. 38, Natural Rubber.89 Para. 39, Natural Rubber.9 0 Para. 44, Natural Rubber.91 Para. 45, Natural Rubber, emphasis added.
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therefore an enumeration of possible subjects rather than a 
complete and decisive list.
The conclusion of the Court as to the International
Agreement on Natural Rubber was that it was within the scope
of Art 113 of the EEC Treaty but because the financial
arrangements dealing with the Agreement were not within the
exclusive power of the Community budget and the whole
question of budgetary competence had not been settled "the
Member States must be allowed to participate in the
( 93 )negotiations of the agreement".
This Opinion points to the reluctance of the Court to assign 
exclusive competence to the Community and to the uncertainty 
of the whole question of how to handle Article 113. It also 
shows how in the field of external relations the member 
states are reluctant to give up their carefully guarded 
sovereignty and be replaced by the supranational 
institutions of the Community.
The Natural Rubber Opinion was somewhat of a step back for 
the Community with respect to strengthening Community 
competence in relation to an earlier Opinion of the Court. 
Opinion 1/75 (Understanding on Local Cost Standard) stated 
that the Understanding fell within the exclusive external 
competence of the Community to the exclusion of the member 
states despite a similar budgetary arrangement to that of
92 Para. 45, Natural Rubber.93 Para. 63, Natural Rubber.
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the Natural Rubber Opinion. It was in the Local Cost 
Standard Opinion that the Court has expressed the 
obligations of the member states vis-a-vis the Community in 
the field of international relations most vehemently. 
According to the Court, on the subject of the CCP prescribed 
by Article 113 of the Treaty;
Such a policy is conceived in that article in the 
context of the operation of the Common Market, for 
the defence of the common interests of the 
Community, within which the particular interests of 
the Member States must endeavour to adapt to each 
other.
Quite clearly, however, this conception is 
incompatible with the freedom to which the Member 
States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent 
power, so as to ensure their own interests were 
separately satisfied in external relations, at the 
risk of compromising the effective defence of the 
common interests of the Community.
94 See Pierre Pescatore, "External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities," Common Market Law Review, vol. 16 (1979) p. 643.
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The exercise of concurrent powers by the Member
states and the Community is impossible [and]...would
amount to recognising that, in relations with third
countries Member States may adopt positions which
differ from those which the Community intends to
adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional
framework...and prevent the latter from fulfilling
(95 )its task in defence of the common interest.
In the Natural Rubber Opinion the Court held that 
participation in the negotiations by the member states was 
acceptable because they financed the Agreement's fund 
directly rather than through the Community budget. However, 
in the earlier Local Cost Standard Opinion the Community was 
given competence even through the member states financed the 
aid involved. Therefore it would seem that these Opinions 
are inconsistent with each other. In a sense they contradict 
each other, the later Natural Rubber Opinion calling for a 
mixed agreement, the earlier Local Cost Standard case 
assigning exclusive Community competence even though in both 
cases national budgets were involved.
This inconsistency by the Court is a reflection of the 
general difficulty within the Community of assigning 
exclusive competence to EC institutions. The Council is 
continually looking for characteristics which would 
necessitate a mixed agreement. For example in the
95 Local Cost Standard, Part B, 2
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International Agreement on Natural Rubber, the Council 
suggested that the interpretation of Article 113 should not 
detract from the general economic policy which remains 
within the powers of the member states. The Council 
recognised the interrelation between the Community and the 
member states, noting the difficulty in separating 
international economic relations and international political 
relations. The Council, in the text of its submission on 
the Natural Rubber opinion, referred to the exclusive nature 
of Community power under the CCP, but averred that "the 
common commercial policy nevertheless fulfils a functions of 
its own in the context of the structure of the Treaty 
inasmuch as it applies to 'any measure the aim of which is 
to influence the volume or flow of trade.' Thus Article 113 
should be interpreted so as not to render meaningless other
provisions of the Treaty, in particular those dealing with
1 „(97)general economic policy...."
Two courses were used by the Council to show that the 
Agreement did not constitute commercial policy and therefore 
should not be negotiated exclusively by the Community. The 
first was to aver that natural rubber is a strategic product 
and therefore the agreement impinges directly on the 
question of member states control over their defence 
policies. Because of this the Council took the view that 
the Agreement did not fall only within Article 113 but also
9 6 Para. 39, Natural Rubber.97 Para. 39, Natural Rubber.98 Para. 39, Natural Rubber.
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under Article 116 relating to common action by member states 
within the framework of international organisations of an 
economic character to which they belong.
The second course used by the Council to point out the non­
commercial elements of the Agreement was the question of the 
political nature of the Agreement, which in the Council's 
view contains elements of development aid. The Agreement, 
according the Council, must be seen against "the general 
political background of North-South relations between the 
industrialised world and the developing countries". 
Development aid does not come within the framework of 
commercial policy. So it would appear that the Council went 
to some lengths to ensure their right to participate in the 
negotiations of the agreement and that their sphere of 
competence was not restricted in external relations and, 
potentially, foreign policy.
The question of explicit external relations powers of the 
Community then are decided by a careful examination of the 
subject-matter of a proposed agreement. The Commission will 
look for a broad reading of the CCP, not wishing to separate 
out political considerations when determining a measure's 
acceptability as a piece of commercial policy. The Council, 
taking the sovereign interests of the member states to 
heart, will adhere to a restrictive interpretation of 
commercial policy.
99 Para. 40, Natural Rubber.
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The European Court of Justice has in most respects been 
willing to interpret Article 113 broadly, and the evolving 
case law and Opinions of the Court demonstrate empirical 
evidence of this. For example in 1973 the Court noted that 
"the proper functioning of the customs union justifies a 
wide interpretation of Articles...113 of the Treaty. In
1975: "The common commercial policy is above all the outcome 
of a progressive development.. . . In 1978: "...the
question of external trade must be governed from a wide 
point of view".
3. Mixed agreements
When both the EEC and its member states appear on one side 
of an international agreement as the contracting parties, 
the agreement is known as m i x e d . A f t e r  analysing the 
relevant Court cases and opinions regarding the splitting up 
of competences, the tension between the member states and
100 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey Ferguson, Case 8/73 (1973) ECR 897 et seq. at 908.101 Local Cost Standard, p. 1363.102 Para. 45, Natural Rubber. Emphasis added.103 Among those to have written on the phenomenon of themixed agreement are: J. Weiler, "The External LegalRelations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle", in D. O'Keefe and H. Schermers (eds.) Mixed Agreements, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1983); Henry G.Schermers, "The Internal Effect of Community Treaty- Making", in D. O'Keefe and H. Schermers (eds.). Essays in European Law and Integration, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1982); Jürgen Schwarze, "Towards a European Foreign Policy-Legal Aspects," op. cit.; N. A. Neuwahl, "Joint Participation in International Treaties and the Exercise of Power by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements, Common Market Law Review vol. 28 (1991) .
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the institutions of the Community regarding their competence 
in external relations is clear. The demarcation line is 
blurred as to the fields belonging to the p o w e r s o f  the 
member states and those belonging to the Community. 
International agreements do not always lend themselves to 
neat compartments dividing Community and member states' 
powers. Therefore, whenever the subject-matter of an 
agreement enters simultaneously into the spheres of 
jurisdiction of both the Community and member states 
problems obviously arise. According to Pescatore, two 
questions must be asked and resolved if a jurisdictional 
dispute is to be s o l v e d . F i r s t ,  it must be asked 
whether the subject-matter of a proposed agreement comes 
under the jurisdiction of the Community. Answering this 
question by itself is often an impossible task and assumes 
that an answer may indeed be found. Second, if the first 
question can be answered then the question remains as to the 
exclusivity of Community power as developed by the Court: is 
the existence of a Community power exclusive or is it 
parallel to a power of the member states? It is precisely 
because of this problem of defining the boundaries of
104 Competence refers to the legal authority to act in a field of policy; power to the instrument by which competence is exercised. According to Neuwahl, there are three distinct types of power in this context: norm- setting power (legislative and treaty-making power) executive power (representation, administrative execution) and judicial power. N. A. Neuwahl, "Joint Participation in international Treaties and the Exercise of Power by the EEC and Its Member States: Mixed Agreements," op. cit. p. 718.105 Pierre Pescatore, "External Relations in Case Law," op. cit., p. 622.
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competences that the Community and member states often 
resort to mixed agreements in which both parties appear 
jointly on one side as contracting parties.
However, if it is agreed that defining the boundaries is a 
difficult task, then it follows logically that there are 
indeed boundaries capable of definition. The mixed agreement 
allows the member states to leave the division of power 
undefined, while at the same time allowing them to "to 
maintain a sphere of action in which they can display 
a u t h o r i t y . M i x e d  agreements highlight the difficulty 
faced in trying to maintain a distinction between 
commercial, economic, and foreign policy measures. A 
determination can be extremely difficult as to what 
constitutes the province restricted exclusively to the 
Community, and the margins of autonomy reserved for the 
member states.
Another crucial element of mixity is the opportunity it 
affords in leaving undefined, in the light of the principle 
of parallel powers, the scope of Article 235 of the Treaty. 
The potential exists for the Community to extend its legal 
capacity in external (including foreign) relations through 
the Treaty. Article 235 states:
if action by the Community should prove necessary to
attain, in the course of the operation of the common
106 N. A. Neuwahl, "Joint Participation in International Treaties," op. cit. p. 726.
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market, one of the objectives of the Community and 
this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the 
Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
The Article is noteworthy because of its wording which 
explicitly refers to the Community rather than the member 
states. The action referred to in Article 235 must, however, 
remain strictly within the limits of the objectives defined 
in Part One of the Treaty, specifically those outlined in 
Article 3,(10^) mixed agreement makes it possible to
avoid taking on the exact interpretation of "appropriate 
measures", and defining the "necessary powers" needed to 
attain the objectives of the Community.
Mixed agreements are often used when, according to the ERTA 
doctrine of parallel powers, the Community could have acted 
alone. As mentioned above however, if the Community acts its 
powers are exclusive leaving no room for concurrent powers 
of the member states, Mixed agreements therefore
107 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome states the objectives of the Community as follows: the elimination of customs duties; the establishment of a common tariff and of a common commercial policy towards third countries; the abolition of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons services and capital; the adoption of a common policy in agriculture, transport and competition; the approximation of national laws to EC laws; the creation of a European Social Fund; the establishment of a European Investment Bank, and the association of the overseas countries and territories.108 Jürgen Schwarze, "Towards a European Foreign Policy- Legal Aspects," op. cit. p. 73.
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provide a means for the member states to avoid Community 
pre-emption and may result in a compromise between the 
two.(109)
Mixity seems to solve many of the practical problems 
resulting from the difficulty in dividing spheres of 
competence,However, looked at from another point of 
view, it also provides a method of circumvention for the 
member states from the Community method, and risks 
"compromising the effective defence of the common interests 
of the C o m m u n i t y " . M i x e d  agreements also leave open the 
question of liability as it may not be clear whether the 
Community or the member state is liable if difficulties 
arise in enforcement.
The Court, in its Laying Up  ^ opinion was critical
of the mixed agreement, noting that a special problem arose 
because of the participation in the draft agreement not only 
of the Community and Switzerland (the third party) but also 
of certain member states whose involvement aimed at removing
109 See J. Weiler, "The External Legal Relations of Non- Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle", in D. O'Keefe and H. Schermers (eds.) Mixed Agreements, (1983) p. 35.110 See Henry G. Schermers, "The Internal Effect of Community Treaty-Making", in D. O'Keefe and H. Schermers (eds.). Essays in European Law and Integration,(Deventer: Kluwer, 1982) p. 17 0.111 Local Cost Standard, Part B, 2.112 For a discussion of the Laying Up Fund case in its relation to the treaty-making power of the Community, see M. Hardy, "Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice: The Rhine Case and the Treaty-Making Powers of the 
Community," Common Market Law Review, vol. 14 (1977) pp. 561-600.
124
certain legal obstacles arising from prior conventions.
"The participation of these states in the Agreement must be 
considered as being solely for this purpose and not 
necessary for features of the system." The Opinion 
goes on to say that "the participation of these Member 
States, though justified for the above-mentioned purpose, 
has however produced results extending beyond that objective 
which are incompatible with the requirements implied by the 
very concepts of the Community and its common policy."
Similarly, in the ERTA judgement the Court, after placing 
the competence to conclude the agreement squarely with the 
Community, went on to say that, "Community powers exclude 
the possibility of concurrent powers on the part of Member 
States, since any step taken outside the framework of the 
Community institutions would be incompatible with the unity 
of the Common Market and the uniform application of 
Community law."
A similar argument was raised in the Local Cost Standard 
judgement where the Court succinctly pointed out that: "the 
provisions of Articles 113 and 114 concerning the conditions 
under which, according to the Treaty, agreements on 
commercial policy must be concluded show clearly that the
113 Para. 6, Laying Up Fund.114 Para. 7, Laying Up Fund.115 Para. 8, Laying Up Fund.116 Para. 31, ERTA.
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exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States and the 
Community in this matter is impossible.
Conclusion
Opinions of the Court 1/76 {Laying Up Fund) and 1/78 
{International Agreement on Natural Rubber) allow for only 
limited participation by the member states in the 
negotiation and conclusion of international treaties. These 
opinions are important because they deal with the concept of 
the Common Commercial Policy and its scope in international 
relations. Only a circumscribed role is allowed for the 
member states in the negotiation of treaties involving 
external t r a d e . T h e  Community is vested with the 
authority to act.
117 Local Cost Standard, Part B, 2.118 In order to resolve the problem of the member states being excluded, the Council decided to follow a special procedure in the case of international commodities agreements which seems to contravene both the relevant Treaty provisions and the Natural Rubber opinion. The PROBA 20 formula is an arrangement between the Commission and the Council arrived at in 1981 by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) concerning participation in international negotiations on raw materials. The Commission held that PROBA 20, set up as a special procedure to be followed in the negotiation and signing of commodities agreements, was a political initiative aimed at improving the Community's external image and reinforcing its cohesion and solidarity. The essential element "consists in the leaving aside of any legal or institutional considerations with regard to the respective powers of the Community and Member States." PROBA 20 called for 
joint participation of the Commission and the Member States in the form of a joint delegation who, though a single spokesman, voice a common position. See 
Arrangement between the Council and the Commission
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The foregoing detailed exegesis of the Court's widening of 
community external (and therefore sometimes foreign) 
relations powers demonstrates the strength of two forces: 
one,-the ECJ as an integrative force, with an aim to 
strengthen the institutions of the Community, and two, the 
determination of the member states in their aim to maintain 
sovereignty.
The Court has widened the interpretation of Article 113 so 
that the political aspects of the Community's trade policies 
are included in the competence of Community treaties with 
third states. However, while the the European Court of 
Justice has been instrumental in developing the external 
relations competence of the Community, the pratical 
differences that this legal expansion of powers has not been 
highly significant. Concerning the role the foreign affairs 
powers granted to the Community with the European Road 
Transport Authority decision, it has been noted that:
The Council has been extremely reluctant to apply 
that principle, although it is not in dispute as 
such.... It seems to be unclear whether in practice 
the ERTA principle leads to an exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Community in specific matters or 
whether there is divided jurisdiction between the
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Community and the Member States and to what 
extent.(119)
Yet the consistency of EPC and external relations is crucial 
to the development of an effective form of foreign policy 
decision-making and implementation. The combining of the 
Community and EPC decision-making processes creates the 
potential for an effective method of consultation and 
coordination of positions before action is taken. Community 
procedures can then support those of EPC: meetings in the 
framework of EPC leading to action under a Community 
competence.
The above discussion of Court cases, opinions and judgements 
reveals that economic decisions are not only politically 
significant, but also that a distinct set of non-political 
objectives for which Community or member states competence 
can be neatly divided is extremely difficult if not 
impossible.
Economic sanctions, discussed in chapter four, are a perfect 
example of the difficulty of separating out the political 
aspects of the Community's commercial policy. Sanctions can 
be considered a political instrument which use economic 
means to fulfil their goal, therefore they implicitly pose 
problems for the EC in terms of reconciling the division
concerning participation in international negotiations on Raw Materials, OJ L 174, 27 March 1981.119 Jochen A. Frowein, "The competences of the EuropeanCommunity in the field of external relations," op. cit., p . 32.
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between external economic and political relations. From the 
Commission' point of view, reflected in their submission to 
the Court in the Natural Rubber judgement, trade measures 
such as economic sanctions can be considered a step toward 
regulating trade, thus becoming a matter for the CCP, and 
therefore an exclusive Community competence. From the 
Council's stand-point one must regard the motivation behind 
the trade measure, its raison d'être.
The next chapter, which deals with the European Community 
and international sanctions, will show how the EC has, 
through combining competences, been able to act despite the 
tensions and difficulties in defining margins of automomous 
authority between Community and member states.
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CHAPTER 4
SANCTIONS AND THE EC
Introduction
The limited range of foreign policy instruments available to 
the Community, although potentially large as has been shown 
in the previous chapter, is most highly developed in the 
form of the imposition of sanctions. The issue of sanctions 
cuts at the heart of the crucial issues in this thesis; the 
relationship of EC to EPC, the Community to its member 
states, the legal competences available to the Community for 
the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, and the 
controversial scope not only of Article 113, but also of 
Articles 224 and 235.
While this chapter will analyse these points, it will also 
look at the objectives of sanctions other than those stated 
as the primary aim, and the implications of these objectives
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for the European Community. It is not the purpose here to 
determine only whether sanctions are useful for the European 
Community to pursue foreign policy objectives. Rather, it is 
to ascertain to what degree sanctions are a useful method 
for uniting the EC in action, pursuing foreign policy 
objectives through the guise of economic external relations, 
and strengthening the EC as an international actor.
Much of the literature on sanctions is concerned with 
determining whether they are an efficient, reliable, and 
successful method of influencing the economic and foreign 
policy of a state. In other words, do they work? This line 
of enquiry is problematical because there are many motives 
for imposing sanctions, which may or may not have to do with 
a measurable outcome. Asking whether or not sanctions work 
often relies on a narrowly defined measure of success or 
failure; did the sanctions result in a desired policy change 
in the target state.
The determinants of success for the European Community are, 
however, rather different, being based on legitimisation, 
the degree to which the Community can act coherently, and 
not only on the influence of behaviour on the target state. 
In this case the impact on the target state and its change 
(or not) of policy is less important than the signal which 
action sends to the international environment. From an
1 See G. C. Hufbauer, J. J. Schott and K. A. Elliot,
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered : History and Current Policy, 2nd edition, 2 volumes (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
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interdependence perspective, sanctions are one way of 
organising a response which not only takes advantage of 
economic ties, but also of the "multiple channels" of 
interdependent relationships. Sanctions' also buttress non­
military definitions of power.
This chapter will therefore analyse the role that sanctions 
play in providing a means with which the Community can act 
and react when international crises erupt. First, by 
providing one of the few concrete instruments at the 
Community's disposal. Second, by providing a form of 
accordant action that brings with it less chance for heated 
disagreement. Third, and most crucially, by providing an 
organised means with which to signal the actor capability of 
the Community to the international environment.
Before proceeding, however, first a review of the 
instruments available to EPC for influencing or reacting to 
the behaviour of third states other than sanctions is 
necessary and enlightening.
I. Instruments of Action Available to the EC
1. Instruments of action under EPC
The European Community is, to a large degree, bereft of 
concrete responses to international events. The instruments 
which are available to the European Community for action in 
specific situations are limited to the constitutional
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framework of the Treaties. Imposing sanctions is one method 
of applying an instrument of foreign policy to a particular 
problem or event. This method may or may not rely on EPC, as 
will be discussed below. But under the framework of EPC, 
there are means of action and instruments available other 
than those of a punitive nature.
1.1 Declarations
First, EPC has declarations, which make up the bulk of 
specifically EPC foreign policy a c t i o n s . (2) Through this 
arrangement member states agree on a unilateral position 
toward third parties by issuing a statement. While 
declarations have no legal standing, they do provide a 
concrete response. They furnish a unified European front and 
provide a means for the rest of the world to know the 
Community position on a particular issue. This outside 
awareness of the Community stance is particularly important 
in developing Community legitimation, and will be discussed 
later in this chapter.
Declarations also send a public signal to the party at which 
the statement is directed, providing a distinct and visible 
form of disapprobation. Related to declarations is the 
public support or rejection of proposals which have been
2 See Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) p. 235.
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brought forward in international fora such as the United 
Nations.(3)
EPC has been criticised for its mere "declaratory 
diplomacy", since its effects are seen as indirect and weak 
However, this "mere verbal policy," may be an effective 
means of establishing the Community in the international 
system, and enhancing legitimacy.
It should be remembered that a common declaration of 
intent, although the EC is not able to implement it 
immediately, may very well have long run effects.
Such a declaration may, for instance, lay the 
foundation for the tacit co-ordination of the 
policies of the nine in relation to some other 
international actor.(3)
1.2 National legislation
The second instrument available to the Community are the 
means available to the individual member states through
See W. Wessels, "European poolitical cooperation: a new appproach to European foreign policy," , David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel, and Wolfgang Wessels, eds. European Political Cooperation (London: Butterworths, 1982) p. 9 Pieter Jan Kuyper, The Implementation of International Sanctions : The Netherlands and Rhodesia, (Alphen aan an den Rijn: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 1978) p. 237. Another criticism of EPC declarations, according to P. Ifestos, is that they are only effective when circumstances happen to coincide with member states’ national interests. See Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) p. 234.Gunnar Sjostedt The external role of the European Community (Farnborough: Teakfield, 1977) p. 48.
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their national legislatures. If a common approach is agreed 
upon under EPC, it must often be operationalized through the 
national policy instruments of the member states. National 
policies can be coordinated and used to implement EPC 
measures. This type of collective instrument is really a 
quasi-EPC measure because it relies totally on the member 
states. However, as will be shown in chapter six, the use of 
national policies can be effective. National measures can be 
created, or passed through the legislature of the member 
state, simply to facilitate an EPC prerogative.
1.3 Diplomatic recognition
A third instrument is a diplomatic one; recognition. Whether 
the Community decides to recognise a state officially or 
not, and the timing of that recognition, is a definitive 
instrument of EPC. Recognition can be an effective 
instrument for several reasons. First, it can be a question 
of international reputation and status for a would be state 
to obtain the official recognition of another state or 
international organisation. Being a fully recognised state 
in the international environment brings with it a certain 
standing, which many former republics, territories, or 
former colonies have been eager to receive. Second, through 
the giving or withholding of recognition it is possible to 
create important political demands. One such demand which 
provides a powerful link to recognition is the establishment
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of constitutional clauses which may help to protect the 
rights of various minorities or subgroups.
A dramatic example of the power of the recognition 
instrument was seen during the Yugoslavian situation in 
1991. Here was an example when the Community most needed to 
fulfil its mandate to consult and cooperate in order to 
determine when or if the republics of Croatia and Slovenia 
should be recognised. The Federal Republic of Germany failed
to bend to the consensual politics of EPC and went on to
recognise Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991.
Germany's independent action came as a big setback to the
reflex of consultation. It also preempted the opportunity 
for the Community to use recognition as a tool for 
influencing or shaping constitutional protection clauses, or 
to use the withholding of recognition as a penalty for non- 
compliance. Thus, the inclusion of constitutional guarantees 
could have been held out as a prerequisite for the granting 
of recognition
Most instruments of action under EPC rely on and assume a 
consistency and merger with EEC mechanisms (primarily under 
the CCP). The Community can engage in formal agreements 
which involve both EC and EPC mechanism. Formal agreements 
within EPC come the closest to mirroring Community 
contractual arrangements with third states and international 
organisations. However, EPC discussions, even those which 
end up written into formal agreements, are usually in broad, 
general terms-i.e. agreements of principle-and not in the
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specific detail of the agreements reached on trade or 
commercial matters.
Unlike negotiations under the Common Commercial Policy, EPC 
agreements are negotiated by the Presidency (assisted by the 
EPC Secretariat) and instead of qualified majority voting, 
EPC decisions require consensus by the member states. 
According to the Single European Act:
The Presidency shall be responsible for initiating 
action and coordinating and representing the 
position of the Member States in relations with 
third countries in respect of European Political 
Cooperation activities(G)
Since the Presidency is held by the member state who holds 
the Presidency of the European Council, consistency between 
EPC and EC is, theoretically, maintained.
The instruments which EPC has available are weak, circuitous 
and contingent upon the action of the member states.
Measures are always subject to the veto of one of the member 
states, which operate under a variety of perceptions of 
their national interest. The instruments of EPC can be 
classified as:
unmistakenly in national hands, and their occasional 
use for the implementation of European-level foreign 
policy goals depends completely on the willingness
6 Title III, Article 30(10)(b).
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of the member states to do so, and the existence of 
an agreement among t h e m . )
2. Instruments of action under EC _
The instruments available to the Community are tenaciously 
tied to the Treaties, and a constitutional basis for any 
action must be firmly fixed. The constitutional bases of EC 
instruments are listed in Table 4.1 to show the scope of the 
Community's potential reach through the Treaty. In examining 
the the type of actions or involvements that the Treaty- 
based provisions allow, it is evident that specific mention 
of foreign policy instruments is lacking. The various 
articles discuss the opening and maintenance of relations, 
negotiating and concluding accords, and establishing 
associations. Yet these treaty-based external relations are 
the prime foundation on which much of the Community's 
foreign policy is produced. EPC provides a forum for 
discussion, but the bulk of concrete measures are taken 
under the pretext of economics. The distinction may be 
illusory, but the divide that was established to make 
progress first in the economic field has proven to be 
stalwart.
7 Panayiotis Ifestos, op. cit., p. 237
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TABLE 4.1
Constitutional bases of Community external actions
EEC Article Provi s ions
Article 110 commits member states to contribute to harmonious development of world trade, to abolition of world 
trade restrictions, to lower customs barriers
Article 113 allows Council to authorise Commission to conduct and conclude trade negotiations
Articles 131-136 provides for association agreements with non- 
European states and territories
Article 224-225 allows for consultations between member states 
regarding the functioning of the common market 
during war or other security crises
Article 228 provides base for Commission to negotiate accords 
with third states and international organisations. 
Council concludes these accords after consulting with the European Parliament
Article 229 provides for Commission to maintain relations with United Nations, GATT and other int. bodies
Article 230 authorises EC to cooperate with Council of Europe
Article 231 authorises EC to establish links with OECD
Article 234 asks member states to eliminate contrarieties 
when, before the entry of Rome Treaty, they had 
rights and obligations from accords with third 
states
Article 235 Provides for the Council, acting on a proposal 
from the Commission, to take appropriate measures 
when the Treaty has not provided the powers
Article 237 provides for European states to apply to become a 
member of the EC. Application is addressed to the 
Council, which must act unanimously after 
consulting the Commission
Article 238 provides for EC to conclude accords with third 
states establishing an association with 
reciprocal rights, obligations special procedures and common action
In addition. Treaty articles, such as those governing the Common Agricultral Policy, have external dimensions.
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The most tangible result of this divide is the foreign 
policy mechanism of sanctions. The imposition of economic 
sanctions requires not merely the blurring of the 
distinction between economic and political realms, but even 
its eradication. Therefore sanctions are a cogent 
illustration of the dichotomy between external economic 
relations and foreign poliymaking, and illuminate the 
shadowy line straddling international economics, security, 
and foreign policy.
This chapter focuses on sanctions precisely because they are 
the most concrete foreign policy mechanism that the EC can 
put into action. They are also the most cogent example of 
the relationship between EPC and EC external relations 
because sanctions are made operational through the common 
commercial policy.
The following section on the general theory and definition 
of sanctions provides the background necessary to examine 
the European Community's use of sanctions as a foreign 
policy instrument.
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II. The Definition of Sanctions
1. The terms
Many terms have been used to define the economic methods of 
influence available to policy makers. Most are concerned 
with economic instruments as a means to an end. While the 
term economic sanctions usually refers to methods of 
influence and their outcomes, it is used here to refer to 
the structure of the international environment, the nature 
of international organisation, and the legitimacy of the EC. 
Economic warfare, economic sanctions, economic coercion, 
etc.; when so many terms are used to describe a particular 
phenomenon an exercise in definition is required. This 
undertaking is useful not only to distinguish between the 
various terms that writers on the subject use, but also to 
come to a clearer understanding of what sanctions are about, 
and why specific terms have been chosen for this thesis.
Although the above terms have often been used 
interchangeably and without specific definitions, it is 
important to differentiate between them in order to come to 
a better understanding of why economic sanctions is the 
preferred expression here. Economic sanctions may seem at
Daoudi and Dajani point out in their interesting first chapter on the definition of sanctions, that the term sanctions only takes on a negative connotation when in the plural form; "sanction" in the singular means approval, or to condone. See M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions : ideals and experience (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1983) pp. 1-15.
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first to be rather a narrow term to choose for analysing the 
EC as an international actor. It has certain legalistic 
overtones; it is more concerned with economic tools for 
punishment, coercion, deterrence, and adherence to 
international law. The criticism usually levelled at the 
term sanctions is that it is more concerned with effects 
rather than methods used for achieving those effects.
Although it is precisely with effects that this study is 
centered, it is also crucial to recognise the linkages 
between methods and effects. In the case of the Community 
the link is reflected in the relationship between the 
Community, as an actor in its own right, and the member 
states resistance to Community action. Community competences 
are ostensibly reserved for economic and commercial matters 
and not foreign policy, but economic sanctions traverse the 
two realms so conspicuously that it is difficult to assess 
the effects of the sanctions, both internally and 
externally, without considering how the Community arrived at 
the necessary competences with which to impose sanctions. 
Thus, in the case of the Community, the linkages between the 
methods and the effects of those methods, discussed below, 
are crucial for any measurement of the success of sanctions. 
However, the term is useful because although it is concerned 
with methods of influence it does not limit the discussion 
in terms of outcomes.
10 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1985) p. 36.
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The term statecraft suggests techniques of foreign policy
making. Kenneth Holsti defines statecraft as "the organized
actions governments take to change the external environment
in general or the policies and actions of other states in
particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by 
( 11 )policy makers." The term sanctions, conversely, directly
refers to the methods chosen, but is not limited only to 
these tools. Rather it is a starting point for a discussion 
of the implications of using these tools.
11 K. J. Holsti, "The Study of Diplomacy", in JamesRosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd, eds..World Politics (New York: Free Press, 1976) p. 293.Other terms include, 1) foreign economic policy refers to the way states influence the international economic environment. It is concerned with influencing behaviour, therefore a narrow range of goals act as the measuring stick for success. See Benjamin Cohen, ed., American Foreign Economic Policy: Essays and Comments (New York: Harper and Row, 1968) p. 10; 2) The term economic coercion is used regularly and often interchangeably with the term economic sanctions. It implies the forceful changing of another states behavior through the use of negative sanctions to accomplish this goal. Coercion implicitly leaves no room for multiple goals: state A is forced to do what state B wants.See for example, Richard Stuart Olson, "Economic Coercion in 
World Politics: With a focus on North-South Relations", World Politics XXXI (July, 1979) pp. 471-494. See also, Klaus Knorr, Power of Nations: The Political Economy of 
International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975) pp. 4-5; 3) The term economic warfare is concerned with measures taken to weaken the target's capacity to wage war. It is usually associated with wartime activity, and the blockades, embargoes, attacks on industrial operations that occur during a military conflict. See E. Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3 (1968) p. 248; Klaus Knorr "International Economic Leverage and its Uses," in K. Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds.. Economic issues and 
National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1977) ,
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The term economic statecraft may be useful in this study
because, although it highlights means rather than ends, it
is not a narrow definition, and centers on a wide range of
goals. Economic statecraft is defined as policy influence
attempts aimed at other international actors with the goal
of influencing some dimension of the target's behavior
(including noneconomic areas such as beliefs, attitudes,
( 12 )opinions, expectations etc.). According to Baldwin "it
makes it conceptually possible the empirically undeniable
fact that policy makers sometimes use economic means to
( 13 )pursue a wide variety of noneconomic ends." However it
is still primarily concerned with influence of behavior, 
even if the term is less focused on specific outcomes.
2, The uses of sanctions
According to Renwick, a state when faced with an 
international crisis has three options available: to do 
nothing, to respond militarily, or to impose economic 
sanctions. The initial idea of the use of international 
sanctions was part of the Covenant of the League of Nations' 
attempt at substituting order, through arbitration and 
negotiation, for war. The first of four principles laid 
down in the Preamble to the Covenant states that in
12 David Baldwin,Economic Statecraft, op. cit., p. 32.13 David Baldwin,Economic Statecraft, op. cit., p. 40.14 Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1981). p. 1 .
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international relations states must accept their obligation
(15 \"not to resort to war". Of course the use of sanctions 
goes back to well before the First World War. The first use 
of sanctions which is documented is the imposition of a 
decree by Athens in 432 B.C. "that the Megarians be banished 
both from our land and from our markets and from the sea and 
from the continent.
According to a report by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, sanctions are defined as "action
taken by members of the international community against an
infringement, actual or threatened, of the law" . This
definition is broader than that given in an earlier report
which defined them as "measures for securing obedience to 
( 18 )law". The former taking into consideration the
15 This does not mean that states and their populationssuffer less as the targets of economic sanctions than they would from a military response. As Cooper points out, it took a civil war and fourteen years of sanctions before majority rule obtained in Rhodesia. see Richard Cooper, "Trade Policy as Foreign Policy", in Robert M. Stern, ed., U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy, (London: The MIT Press, 1987), p. 318.16 See Aristophanes, The Archanians in Eleven Comedies,quoted in Stephanie A. Lenway, "Between war and commerce: economic sanctions as a tool of statecraft". 
International Organization 42:1 (Spring, 1988) p.410.For an analysis of the Megarian decree see David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, op. cit., and Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, op. cit.17 International Sanctions : A Report by a Group of Membersof the Royal Institute of International Affairs,(London: Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1938) p. 16.18 See Sanctions: The Character of International Sanctionsand their Application, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1935) p. 5. These legalistic definitions of sanctions are elaborated on by Margaret Doxey, who defines sanctions as "negative measures which seek to influence conduct by threatening and, if necessary, imposing penalties for non-conformity with
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international aspect of sanctions and their nature as 
objects of collective action; the latter defining them as 
instruments of international law.
law". See M. Doxey, "International Sanctions; A framework for analysis with special reference to the UN and Southern Africa", International Organisation 26 (1972) p. 528. Doxey further limits her definition to "justifiable reaction to wrongdoing", and discounts those definitions which are "used loosely and inaccurately to describe any politically motivated injurious act of foreign policy", M. Doxey, "International Sanctions; Trials of Strength or Tests of Weakness?", Millenium 12:1 (1983) p. 82.19 Sanctions' definitions have also emphasized "deprivations or indulgences of individual and group norms for the purpose of supporting the primary norms of a public order system". See Richard Arens and Harold D. Lasswell, "Toward a General Theory of Sanctions", Iowa Law Review 49 (1964), pp. 233-4. Donald Losman defines sanctions as "penalties inflicted upon one or more states by one or more others, generally to coerce the target nation(s) to comply with certain norms that the boycott initiators deem proper or necessary". See Donald L. Losman, International Economic Sanctions : The Cases of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), p. 1. Johan Galtung's definition elaborates on this, introducing the notion of retaliatory effects: "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the senders) against one or more others (the receivers) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important." Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the case of Rhodesia", World Politics XIX (1967) p. 379. Richard Olson goes further to clarify Galtung's interpretation by introducing the word 'target' to describe the receivers of economic penalties, thus placing the emphasis on the isolation of the targeted state.Richard S. Olson, "Economic Coercion in World Politics, with a Focus on North-South Relations", World Politics XXXI (July, 1979) p. 474. Hufbauer and Schott define economic sanctions as "the deliberate government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 'customary' trade or financial relations". However, Hufbauer and Schott deliberately separate out the diplomatic and foreign policy goals of sanctions except when these aspects are "closely 
connected with economic sanctions ('carrot and stick diplomacy')".See Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott,
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In this chapter the definition of sanctions will adhere to 
the one propounded by Richard S. O l s o n w i t h  the 
inclusion of a variety of goals. Therefore sanctions in this 
discussion-are defined as:
penalties including the withdrawal or threat of 
withdrawal of usual financial, trade, or diplomatic 
relations inflicted on one or more states by one or 
more others with a multiplicy of prospective goals 
both for the receiver and the sender.
The above definition does not attempt to eliminate from the
discussion the foreign policy and political objectives of
the senders. Nor does it attempt to delineate the objectives
of the sanctions. Although the fundamental reason for the
implementation of sanctions may not be to change the
behaviour of a state, it is one factor in the catalogue of
reasons. While foreign policy includes "decisions and
actions which involve to some appreciable extent relations
(21 )between one state and others," it also includes the 
pursuit of objectives and the actions necessary to achieve 
them. Sanctions are one of the instruments with which 
states, or groups of states pursue objectives. However, this 
analysis of sanctions will concentrate on the multiple
Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985) p. 2.20 Richard S. Olson, "Economic Coercion in World Politics,"op. cit.
21 Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy: an analysis
of decision-making (New York, 1963) .
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inputs and outputs in a sanctions episode and how this 
effects the sender, the target, and also the international 
audience. As Brown-John states; "sanctions must be viewed as 
a political function".
3. The dilemma of sanctions
The use of sanctions as a method of ameliorating an 
international crisis situation does not have a particularly 
admirable record of success. According to Doxey, "one must 
concede that the deterrent and coercive force of sanctions 
is weak on almost every count". On the effectiveness of 
sanctions as an element of the United Nation's enforcement 
process, Leonard Kapungu notes that "economic sanctions 
alone are a blunt and ineffective instrument of peace 
e n f o r c e m e n t H a r r y  Strack, writing of the use of 
sanctions by Great Britain and the United Nations against 
Rhodesia, noted that; "Not only did sanctions fail to 
achieve their major goal, but they may have been a 
contributory factor to the deterioration of a situation 
which they were designed to alleviate" . Klaus Knorr 
argues that economic sanctions fail because "no matter how
22 C. Lloyd Brown-John, Multilateral Sanctions inInternational Law (New York: Praeger, 1975).23 M. Doxey, "International Sanctions: A framework foranalysis with special reference to the UN and Southern Africa", International Organisation 26 (1972) p. 547.24 Leonard T. Kapungu, The United Nations and EconomicSanctions Against Rhodesia, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973) p. 129.25 Harry Strack, Sanctions : The Case of Rhodesia, (Syracuse:Syracuse University Press, 1978) p. 237.
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dependent the target country is on its trade with the state 
attempting an economic power play, the government under 
pressure can usually turn to other p a r t n e r s . W r i t i n g  of 
the use of economic instruments as a source of power, he 
states: "collective trade and other economic sanctions have 
proved abortive."
2 6 Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p.152. Knorr also concludes that sanctions promote a sense of political solidarity in the target state: Instead of "promoting political disintegration in the target state, coercive trade sanctions tend to foster political integration." p. 154.27 Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth, op. cit., p. 156. The list of writers who have considered and subsequently discounted the effectiveness of economic coercion is long. See for example, R, Cooper "Trade Policy as Foreign Policy", in Robert M. Stern, ed., U.S. Trade 
Policies in a Changing World Economy, (London: The MIT Press, 1987); J, Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the case of Rhodesia", World Politics XIX (1967); Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked", Foreign Policy 39 (Summer, 1980). Miller writes: "while trade boycotts, embargoes and other economic sanctions are legitimate alternatives to military action they rarely work", p. 118; E. G . Cross writes, "economic sanctions are a comparatively ineffective means of exercising political leverage", "Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Policy against Rhodesia", The World Economy 4 (March, 1981) p. 74. In many cases sanctions are not only ineffective, but may have the opposite effect of those stated by the imposing state(s), militating against political change rather than quickening it. They often serve to cement the target state together, bolstering patriotism and instilling a sense of cohesion in the population.Leonard Kapungu notes that sanctions "welded together the Rhodesian conservative element in support of the survival of the regime" See Leonard T. Kapungu, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia, op. cit., p. 12 8. Further, Margaret Doxey argues that sanctions, by ostracising the target state, close channels of communication and curb diplomatic efforts adding to the sense of siege.See M. Doxey, Economic 
Sanctions and International Enforcement, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 140.
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This leaves somewhat of a paradox; sanctions are not only 
ineffective, but also may lead to the entrenchment of an 
already deleterious situation. Yet, in spite of the above 
limitations to their effectiveness, sanctions continue to be
used. <28)
Several reasons for the continued use of economic sanctions
have been put forward. First, in a world armed with nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, there is
arguably a dearth of alternatives to the use of economic
means. The military option is often unthinkable and, in
terms of proportion, may be a heavy-handed response to a
situation which demands, although more than a diplomatic
(29)effort, certainly less than a military one.
Second, whether for reasons of economic weakness or 
political disagreement, states are often not in a position 
to pursue a military option. In the case of the European 
Community, for example, it is, at the current stage of 
integration, impossible for it to agree on any form of 
action more substantial than declarations through European
28 See Christopher Hill and James Mayall, "The SanctionsProblem: International and European Perspectives", 
European University Institute Working Paper No. 59, (Florence: European University Institute, 1983).29 Further, according to Klaus Knorr there are four reasonswhy war is not as easy or reliable as it used to be in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries: 1. the restraint of nuclear powers from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states; 2. potential backing by the rival superpower; 3. the diminished legitimacy of the use of force; 4. the rapid spread of nationalism among less-developed countries and their combined will to resist superpower pressure. See Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations, (New York: Basic Books, 1975) p. 112.
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Political Cooperation, sending "monitors" to observe in 
crisis areas, or economic sanctions. Asymmetry of power may 
also be a reason for the economic option. Certainly the OPEC 
states would not have launched a military attack against the 
West to force the return of lands occupied by Israel. States 
in possession of an essential product can balance an 
asymmetry of power in one area by resorting to economic 
rather than military warfare in pursuit of their objective.
Third, quite apart from their efficacy instrumentally, 
sanctions provide a symbolic indication that a state or 
group of states is not content with the behaviour of 
another. Sanctions provide a method of displaying this 
disapproval which is relatively cheap, compared to the costs 
of engaging in an armed response, and politically and 
socially more acceptable. Thus even economically and 
militarily powerful states use sanctions. The United States 
did not attack Iraq militarily in 1980 when it was alleged 
that Iraq was involved in state-sponsored terrorism. Rather 
it used export restraints. This method of action not only 
showed the disapproval of the United States to Iraqi 
involvement in terrorism, but also provided a method of 
responding to a situation in a measured way, thus limiting 
potential political damage to the Carter government.
3 0 Sanctions did not always prove a successful method for the Carter administration. The 1980 grain embargo and Olympic games boycott resulted in tremendous political fall-out for Carter. For an analysis of the grain embargo see, Barry Carter, International Economic Sanctions, pp. 70-75; see also the report drawn up in
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Much of the literature on sanctions has, as would be 
expected, been centered on their use in the context of the 
Cold War; sanctions as an option to avoid superpower 
alliance shifts and the threat of nuclear war between the 
superpowers. In the post Cold War situation some of these 
widely held views must be replaced by a more complex and 
varied understanding of the reasons for and implications of 
using sanctions.
4. The sanctions dilemma revisited
Scepticism about the efficacy of sanctions has not deterred
states from employing them very regularly, and making every
attempt to encourage other states to follow suit. It is now
the expected reaction to an international crisis or
incident. Although there is a general consensus that
sanctions are ineffective as a coercive policy 
(31)instrument, they are often the most acceptable option, 
and indeed an option which is almost automatically part of 
the calculus of the international crisis response.
Apart from being politically and economically attractive to 
the sender, sanctions are also often used for other reasons
the United States Congress by the Sub-committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Congress, 1st Session, An Assessment of the Afghanistan Sanctions : Implications for Trade and Diplomacy in the 1980s, (1981) .31 However, this consensus does, in fact, shift over the years. See M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions : Ideals and Experience, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983).
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The goals and objectives of sanctions are often more complex 
than their primary aim of influencing the behaviour of a 
state would suggest. Placing the emphasis on the change in 
the behaviour of the target state is described by Daoudi and 
Dajani as "the 'bull's-eye fallacy,'i.e., the erroneous idea 
that unless economic sanctions succeed in achieving their 
publicly stated initial demands, they have failed.
David Baldwin incorporates this into his argument. He claims 
that most writers on economic sanctions have failed to 
differentiate between relational and property concepts, 
which he argues are crucial to assessing the effectiveness 
of economic sanctions. Property concepts are those 
attributes of a state which are fixed, such as geography, 
populations, wealth. Relational concepts can only be 
measured or understood in comparison or relation to another 
actor. These properties include such attributes as 
influence, capabilities, outcomes and results. The 
importance of these two concepts lies in the way sanctions 
episodes are viewed by the target :
Embargoes may trigger a sense of shame, impose a 
sense of isolation from the world community, signal 
a willingness to use more radical measures, or 
simply provoke a reexamination of policy stances in 
the target country. Any or all of these effects can 
occur without any economic effects whatsoever on the 
target. Economic sanctions may have diplomatic.
32 ihid, p. 168.
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psychological, political, military, or other effects
even when their economic effect is nil. Ignoring
this fact severely impairs one's ability to evaluate
the costs and effectiveness of economic sanctions as
(3 3 )instruments of foreign policy.
James Barber, refers to these ancillary goals, as 
"secondary" and "tertiary" objectives.(34) Barber concludes 
that secondary and tertiary goals are vital to the debate 
for they take the emphasis away from the primary objectives, 
where they are arguably ineffective, and place it elsewhere. 
According to Barber, secondary goals are those which 
involve :
the status, reputation and position of the 
government imposing them. In broad terms these 
objectives have positive and negative aspects, and 
they are directed to both home and international 
audiences. Positively, they are intended to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the imposing
33 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, op. cit., p. 63.34 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a PolicyInstrument", International Affairs (July, 1979) pp. 367- 384. According to Barber, the primary goals of economic sanctions are concerned with changing the behaviour of an offending state. Often, imposing states, the senders, gives these goals the most emphasis as they have an immediate and compelling nature and are directly and obviously related to the situation which demands the action taken. For example, during the prelude to the Gulf War in 1991 the primary aim of sanctions (called for by the United Nations) was to punish Iraq for its invasion and occupation of Kuwait and to bring about Iraq's retreat.
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government....The purpose of sanctions here is to 
demonstrate a willingness and capacity to act.
One example is the United States' continued embargo on Cuba. 
When the Organisation of American States lifted its 
sanctions against Cuba in 1975 the US maintained unilateral 
sanctions not necessarily with the immediate hope of 
removing Castro from power and eliminating Soviet influence 
in the western hemisphere. Rather, this policy entered "a 
'grey' area of continuing economic warfare - the use of 
foreign policy weapons which make things difficult for the 
target but are not related to specific acts of wrong­
doing" . In this case the primary objective of removing 
the Castro regime, was superseded the secondary objective; 
maintaining the reputation of the sender and sending the 
right foreign policy signals.
Symbolic signals are also an important aspect of a sanctions 
episode. David Baldwin emphasizes that sanctions can be 
effective even if the primary objective is not achieved. He 
states that compliance with the specific demands of the 
sender may not be the most important consideration. In the 
case of the continued embargo against Cuba by the United 
States, Baldwin states:
3 5 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", op. cit., p. 379-380.36 M. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary- 
Perspective, (London: Macmillan Press, 1987) p. 64
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The question of whether the government... calls
itself "Marxist" may matter less because of
immediate specific implications for United States
interests than for the symbolic challenge to
American hemispheric dominance. In such a situation
the imposition of economic sanctions may be
primarily aimed at reinforcing the image of American
resolve to resist communism and only secondarily at
(31 )compliance with specific demands.
Sanctions act as a signal to the international community 
which demonstrate resolve, disapproval, condemnation or 
willingness to act. Symbolic action may be important even if 
the economic impact on the target is minimal, or even non­
existent .
James Barber's early attempt to classify goals of sanctions 
into three categories, is refined and expanded by Baldwin 
into an analytical framework which includes multiple means 
and goals. Baldwin in fact criticises Barber for assigning 
the multiplicity of goals into distinct categories which he 
sees as impermeable. Although Baldwin acknowledges the 
importance of Barber's contribution to the analysis of 
sanctions, he states that "the relative importance of 
targets and goals should be treated an empirical matter 
rather than based on a priori assumptions embedded in a 
conceptual framework that assigns primary importance to
37 David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, op. cit., p. 108
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objectives having to do with the behavior of the immediate 
target.« ^ 38)
However one may choose to categorize or not to categorize 
the ancillary goals of sanctions, it is apparent that more 
than one type of goal exists for the senders. In his 
analysis of sanctions, Makio Miyagawa claims that the 
various goals of sanctions can be hidden, and divides these 
goals into six categories:
1. the rule making effect - to announce to the 
international community, as well as the target, 
the principles which must be observed. Offending 
those principles will result in punishment.
2. the demonstration effect - to demonstrate to 
the international community, by the taking of 
decisive public action, the firm conviction of the 
sender that justice is on its side.
3. satisfying (or placating) public opinion - to 
give the appearance of resolute action against 
transgressors of rules of the international 
community, especially for the sake of the domestic 
(voting) population.
4. satisfying international public opinion - to 
maintain support for the bloc imposing the 
sanctions. To build or maintain alliances with
3 8 ibid, p. 18.
157
friendly states so as not to lose their allegiance 
to Communism.
5. the lifting of sanctions as a bargaining 
counter - to construct an artificial bargaining 
tool, by imposing sanctions and, in the process of 
negotiation for a settlement, offering to lift 
those measures.
6. undermining the target's strategic position -
to remove or reduce the strategic threat of the
target by damaging its economic ability to build
(39 )up military forces.
This list of hidden goals, although useful for analysing 
sanctions in a multidimensional way, fails to take into full 
consideration the relational concepts of Baldwin's approach. 
These concepts can be used to understand the necessity for 
an international actor, which does not have the quality of 
statehood to lend it legitimacy, to impose economic 
sanctions as a tool for strengthening viability. Such a case 
is the European Community.
39 Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work?, (New York St. Martin's Press, 1992) pp. 91-103.
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III. Sanctions as a two-way EC instrument 
1, Sanctions and tertiary goals
Economic sanctions are one way that the EC can exert 
pressure on a third state, thus flexing its Common Market 
muscles. The EC has a strong voice and presence in the GATT 
negotiations, putting it in a bargaining position equal to 
that of the United States and Japan. Access, and the 
potential for denial, to the lucrative market which the EC 
possesses is a formidable tool of external policy. However, 
this section is not concerned with the potential for the EC 
to influence specific behaviour, but rather it is concerned 
with the use of sanctions as a tool for developing the EC as 
an international actor. For the European Community, then, 
the indirect effects of sanctions, beyond those of their 
immediate impact on the target state, are of great 
importance. To this end, sanctions are a vital tool.
It is evident that sanctions are a political instrument 
which use economic means - trade restrictions, embargoes, 
boycotts, raising tariffs - to fulfil a political end. 
Therefore their imposition, which involves the political use 
of economic instruments, by the European Community would 
appear to serve at least three functions in addition to the 
stated objective of changing the behaviour of the target 
state :
159
1. provide a strong, unified front to a target state.
2. strengthen the place of the EC in the structure of 
international relations.
3. demonstrate commitment to international involvement.
These are some of the auxiliary objectives of sanctions 
which can be applied in general to the use of sanctions as a 
policy instrument. These objectives can also be applied to 
the European Community where they are crucial to demonstrate 
its capacity as an international actor.
In his analysis of economic statecraft, David Baldwin, 
although arguing that sanctions do have a multitude of 
goals, still analyses sanctions in terms of their 
effectiveness as a foreign policy tool. In contrast, James 
Barber's analysis of tertiary goals addresses "the structure 
and behaviour of the international system generally, or 
those parts of it which affect the imposing states".
These objectives are both normative and structural, becoming 
a "means of upholding international norms by deterring those 
who might be tempted to break them and, if necessary, 
punishing those who do".^^^^ They are structural in the sense 
that they relate to the international environment, the 
conduct of diplomacy and the support for international 
organisations within that environment. Barber's tertiary
40 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a PolicyInstrument", op. cit., p. 382.41 i dem.
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framework is useful for analysing the European Community's 
attempt to utilize sanctions. According to Barber, tertiary 
goals include those which relate to the structure of the 
international system. The imposition of sanctions once"again 
is placed within a broader framework: how states relate to 
each other, to the international environment and their place 
in the international system. This includes "support for a 
particular international structure":
The form of this structure will depend on the way 
international relations are perceived. It may, for 
instance, be an attempt to defend a balance of 
power, or to ensure the coherence of a regional 
grouping.... Tertiary objectives are usually 
directed to defending or furthering existing 
structures or organisations, whether it be an 
alliance or an international body".
This type of analysis responds to the usual work on 
sanctions by turning it around to look at the senders of 
sanctions and their international audience. It is concerned 
with action as an element of legitimacy.
To develop this reflective theory of sanctions it is helpful 
to look more closely at the concepts of legitimacy and 
legitimised action, as discussed in chapter two. Legitimised 
action, as a framework for analysing third party responses 
to conflict situations, has been developed by Jabri.
42 James Barber, p. 382-383.
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According to Jabri, legitimation "implies the recognition 
and acceptance of a party as a relevant actor in the system 
of a conflict and the issues which are of concern to that 
a c t o r . H o w e v e r ,  whereas Jabrl is concerned with the 
legitimation of an actor, such as the PLO by its inclusion 
in the legitimate sphere of international relations (and 
thus taking its status out of the perimeter of international 
relations and placing squarely in the center), this chapter 
is concerned also with a non-state actor, but one whose 
legal legitimacy is not in doubt. Rather the legitimation 
which the EC seeks is not legal, but instead involves the 
perception of the international environment by the community 
of international actors. Legitimation, in this context, is 
directly applicable to the European Community for two 
reasons. First, the EC is a non-state actor and, although 
possessing legal personality, its establishment in the 
international system is dependent upon its actions in that 
system. Second, the relationship between the EC's political 
actions (EPC) and its commercial actions (EC treaty-based) 
is not clearly delineated. As Jurgen Schwarze notes: "Under
the present legal system a clear distinction especially 
between foreign commercial policy matters of the Treaty 
(Art.113) and European foreign political affairs of the EPC,
43 V. Jabri, "The European Community and Responses toRegional Conflict: The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Paper presented to the Eighth International Conference of Europeanists. The Council for European Studies, March 27-29 (1992) Chicago Illinois, p. 2.
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often seems to be i m p o s s i b l e . A c t i o n s  are therefore 
analysed as a means of attaining a multiplicity of goals, 
with a parallel number of competences used to accomplish 
them. The goals envisaged are not only changing the behavior 
of another state(s) by using either diplomatic or economic 
means, but also establishing the EC as a legitimised 
international actor.
This type of analysis is reflective because Community 
actions are first transmitted into the international arena 
and then may be reflected back as increased legitimacy. In 
this way Community actions are double-acting providing both 
the possibility of effecting the target, and receiving the 
benefits of that action itself.
The European Community can only strengthen its position in 
the structure of international relations by demonstrating 
coherence and purpose of action in its responses to 
international events. This coherence of action, although not 
completely consistent, could be seen in the Falkland Islands 
episode when the EC pulled together to impose sanctions 
against Argentina, as will be shown in chapter five.
As Paul Tsakaloyannis put it, "the EC rose almost Phoenix­
like from the ashes or the wilderness" in the 1980s to adopt 
measures aimed at political, economic and monetary
44 Jürgen Schwarze, "Towards a European Foreign Policy: Legal Aspects," in J. K. de Vrees et al, 1987, pp. 7i 79.
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u n i o n . In the European Community's role as an actor it 
is vital that it does in fact act. Imposing sanctions is one 
method of applying an instrument of foreign policy which is 
at its disposal to a particular problem or event. An example 
is the European Community's action in the former Yugoslavia. 
The European Community is acting by assisting in the 
mediation of the conflict. Initially it was the only 
international actor, and currently it is one of the troika, 
the United States and the United Nations being the other 
two.
The European Community's representative. Lord David Owen, 
acted with the representatives of the United States and the 
United Nations, to try to work out a peaceful settlement.
The United States at first, almost studiously, remained in 
the background, regarding the situation a "European" 
problem. The EC's primary goal may not be accomplished but 
this does not detract from the ancillary goals which are 
realised. First that the EC will get involved in world 
crisis events, and second and perhaps more important, that 
it will be expected to become involved. Once again these 
goals are both normative and structural, establishing 
customary patterns of behaviour and expectations for the EC 
and firmly placing it in the international order.
45 See Panos Tsakaloyannis, "The EC, EPC and the Decline of Bipolarity," in Martin Holland, ed., The Future of 
European Political Cooperation {London: Macmillan, 1991) p. 38.
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2. The implementation of sanctions
Economic sanctions are not primarily instruments of economic 
policy, but of foreign policy. Therefore they cross that 
already blurred line between EC external economic relations 
and EC political relations. For the European Community, 
whose foreign policy mechanisms may be thwarted by member 
states national interests, the major instrument of foreign 
policy action that has real bite are economic sanctions, 
European political cooperation is also a force, but is still 
primarily intergovernmental.
The EC has a wide range of legal mechanisms for imposing 
s a n c t i o n s . T h e  Community method, involving Article 113, 
is the most reliable method of imposing sanctions, but EC 
sanctions can also be implemented by the Community under 
Article 223 which provides for measures which involve 
"production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
m a t e r i a l . T h i s  was the case in the diplomatic and arms 
embargo to Iran in 1980 when the EC member states 
coordinated their individual action through Article 223 
before using the consultation mechanism under Article 
224.
46 See Pieter Jan Kuyper, "Community Sanctions AgainstArgentina: Lawfulness under Community and International law" in D. O'Keefe and Jenry Schhermers (eds) Essays in European Law and Integration (Deventer: Kluwer, 1982).47 See Bull. EC: 5-1980, p. 26; see also Barry Carter,International Economic Sanctions, op. cit., p. 228.48 See Pieter Jan Kuyper, "Community Sanctions AgainstArgentina," op. cit., p. 145.
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Article 235 provides an instrument for Community action 
which extends the legal basis of EPC. This Article gives the 
Community the ability to apply "appropriate measures" to 
attain any objective of the Treaty which includes the use of 
sanctions. Article 224 of the EEC Treaty is essentially a 
clause enabling a member state to take measures:
in the event of war or serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order 
to carry out obligations it has accepted for the 
purpose of maintaining peace and international 
security.
The choice between Article 224 and Article 113 is 
essentially a choice between the Community method and the 
intergovernmental method. Under Article 224 the member 
states are bound only to consult each other "with a view" to 
working together in order to prevent the disruption of the 
common market. Article 224 constitutes a derogation from 
Community law which protects the member states' sovereignty 
and leads to the application of national law under certain 
defined circumstances. Thus issues placed within the 
framework of this Article are considered the domaine réservé
49 The full text of Article 224 reads:Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member States may be called upon to take in the event of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March, 1957.
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of the member states, those realms of activity which the 
member states regard as theirs alone. In this case, the 
issue of sanctions is not regarded as a Community matter per 
se and does not raise issues of qualified majority voting or 
Commission initiative. However, several legal questions 
arise in relation to this Article. First, under which 
circumstances should Article 224 be used; should it be 
invoked only after disruption to the common market has 
occurred, or should consultation take place in order to 
prevent, as the Article reads, negative effects on the 
common market (ie, before negative effects have occurred)?
Considering the wording of Article 224, it would seem the 
question raised answer itself; Article 224 should be used to 
prevent negative effects on the common market. If measures 
taken by the member states are "intended to prevent ill 
effects on the Common Market", then this process naturally 
entails that consultation should take place before the 
introduction of the measures concerned. According to this 
interpretation, the possibility of harmful effects on the 
Common Market triggers the consultation mechanism of Article 
224. (50)
The sanctions imposed on Iran in 1980 for the seizure of the 
American Hostages were imposed by EC after some discussion
50 For a thorough discussion of the legal intricacies of Article 224 see, Pieter Jan Kuyper, The implementation of International Sanctions : The Netherlands and Rhodesia (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 1978) pp. 105-106.
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of the method. During the Iran hostage crisis the 
Community's choice was distinct: either Article 224 or 113. 
Disagreement among the member states about the nature of the 
Iran crisis led to the use of Article 224 as the legal basis 
for the sanctions. The situation in Iran constituted, 
according to the member states, a threat to international 
peace and security which led necessarily to the measures 
being taken under the framework of Article 224. The 
Commission was consulted by the member states after the 
Foreign Ministers decided to "apply in concert and without 
delay, the measures provided for in the draft Security
/ 51 \Council resolution..." The Commission, after analysing
the measures taken by the member states, decided to consult
under Article 224 in order to exchange "information
regarding the implementation of the various measures,
particularly in order to identify any risk of distorting the
{52 )conditions of competition in the common market"
As will be discussed further in chapter five, by the time of
Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 the
European Community was able to execute sanctions under
Regulations No. 877/82 based on Article 113 of the EEC 
( 53 )Treaty despite the foreign policy implications. This
willingness to use Article 113 was, according to some, due 
to its convenience as an "issue over which to demonstrate
51 Bull. EC: 5-1980, p. 26.52 Bull. EC: 5-1980, pp. 27-28. This comment referred toArticle 225 which involves the Commission in the consultation process.53 OJ 1982, L 102/1, 16 April 1982.
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the new-found efficiency and solidarity of EPC."^^^) 
However, action under EPC would not require Article 113 as 
its legal base.
With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Community will have another tool for economic sanctions at 
its disposal. Article 228a gives the EC a treaty base for 
imposing sanctions:
Where it is provided, in a common position or in a
joint action adopted according to the provisions of
the Treaty on European Union relating to the common
foreign and security policy, for an action by the
Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or
completely, economic relations with one or more
third countries, the Council shall take the
necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by
a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
( 55 )Commission.
This new Treaty Article is a major step in the awareness 
that the myriad competences with which a sanctions episode 
may be implemented^) obfuscate the foreign policy issues 
involved. Although not placed within the framework of the
54 Christopher Hill and James Mayall, "The SanctionsProblem: International and European Perspectives", 
European University Institute Working Paper No. 59, (Florence: European University Institute, 1983). p. 1855 Article 22 8a. Treaty on European Union. (Luxembourg,1992) .56 See P. J. Kuyper, "Community Sanctions AgainstArgentina." Op. cit.
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Common Foreign and Security Policy, the new Article boldly 
sets about filling in the political void of the Common 
Commercial Policy. In addition, it involves a proposal from 
the Commission, and a process of qualified majority voting 
in the Council on salient issues of foreign policy.
Whereas the Community had with the Falkland Islands to 
confront itself with the blurred line between external 
economic relations and political relations, it now has a 
specific Article designed to cover the use of trade measures 
to pursue its foreign and security policies. Under Article 
113 the Commission retains competences (and therefore powers 
of decision-making) in commercial relations. That power in 
relation to sanctions is taken away with the new Article 
which places the decision and mechanisms of economic 
measures squarely in the hands of the Council. However, 
although the Council can "take the necessary urgent 
measures", it must act "by qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission."
Conclusion
Economic sanctions with their inadequacies and paradoxes are 
indeed a blunt tool, but one that is not necessarily 
ineffective. If one asks the simple question, do sanctions 
work?, then the simple answer would probably be no. But if 
one moves into a more complex analysis which looks at 
multiple and less obvious goals, the case for sanctions 
strengthens.
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To be effective, international organizations require 
legitmisation by the international community. In an effort 
to achieve this legitimisation they need to act with 
purpose, and to develop coherent approaches to international 
crisis situations. Economic sanctions provide a method of 
transmitting actor capability into the international 
environment which is then reflected back on to the sender as 
increased legitimacy. The European Community can act through 
its individual member states to coordinate "separate" action 
toward third states, but more importantly, it is capable of 
implementing sanctions as "the Community". The vehicle 
chosen for the implementation of a measure is crucial. 
Article 189, which provides for Regulations, Directives, 
Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions, impacts the way 
economic sanctions are dealt with in the member states. A 
Regulation is in effect a Community and not a member state 
action.
The vaguaries of Community implementation are an interesting 
exercise in legal intricacies, but the very fact that the 
Community is acting with purpose toward an international 
situation, whether through its member states, or its Common 
Commercial Policy, demonstrates coherence.
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CHAPTER 5
EC SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
Introduction
In November 1965, Southern Rhodesia broke its colonial ties 
with Britain and illegally declared itself an independent 
state. This act, by the Prime Minister Ian Smith and his 
minority government, was seen as an attempt to retain 
exclusive power, and maintain White minority rule. Following 
this Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 
November 11, 1965 in Southern R h o d e s i a t h e  United 
Nations Security Council asked all states to do their utmost
1 This chapter will focus on the European Community'srelationship to Rhodesia and on sanctions at the time of UDI. For a more complete history of events leading up to UDI and the political events that followed see James Barber, Rhodesia : The Road to Rebellion, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Robert C. Good, U.D.I. The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973); Martin Meredith, The 
Past is Another Country, Rhodesia 1890-1979, (London: Andre Deutsch, 197 9)
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(2 )to break off economic relations with Rhodesia. The 
Security Council condemned "the illegal racist minority" and 
called upon states to "refrain from rendering any assistance 
to-this illegal regime." One year later in December 1966, 
the Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions against 
Rhodesia and listed selected exports whose importation, 
promotion, and transport were to be forbidden by United 
Nations Member States.
These trade measures against Rhodesia undoubtedly affected 
the member states of the European Community in the conduct 
of their commercial policy. Yet, due to the nature of 
sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy at that time, 
the Common Commercial Policy was never used as the 
foundation for Community sanctions against Rhodesia. How 
then did the Community implement these sanctions?
Studying the sanctions imposed upon Rhodesia is useful when 
analysing the evolution of political cooperation among the
2 United Nations Sec. Council Res. 216 of November 12, 1965.3 United Nations Sec. Council Res. 232 of December 16, 1966:"...Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter, 1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 2. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent: (a)The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;..." Sec. Council Res. 253 of May 29, 1968 brought a complete boycott of goods with Rhodesia (except medical supplies and humanitarian goods) and Sec. Council Res. 277 of March 18, 1970 broke off all official relations.
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member states of the European Community, UDI, and the UN led 
sanctions that followed, occurred before the establishment 
of the Political Cooperation machinery in 1970; therefore, 
the ability of the Community to cooperate in a decision­
making process, as well as their determination to implement 
and enforce their decisions au cormunitaire prior to the 
institutionalisation of political cooperation merits 
investigation. The case of Rhodesia provides a starting 
point for an analysis of Community actorness because it was 
really the first test of its cohesiveness in an important 
international event.
The case of Southern Rhodesia provides an illustration which 
encompasses many factors: the relationship of the EC to its 
member states, the legal framework within which the 
Community, as a separate entity, can take measures such as 
economic sanctions, the relationship between political 
cooperation and action taken by the Community outwith the
Treaties to the legal basis for action based on the
Treaties, and the relevance of informal political 
cooperation before the establishment of the Davignon 
procedure. The aim of this discussion is to analyse the 
points raised above and also to examine the unity with which 
the European Community and its member states considered the 
Rhodesian problem and took action collectively: how did the 
Community's effort, or lack of it, effect potential actor
capability? The level of actorness of the Community
influenced the methods of implementation which the Community
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used. It also highlighted the problems of reconciling the 
"Community" and the "Member States" in their disparate 
attempts at implementing sanctions.
It will be argued in this chapter that the sanctions against 
Rhodesia had the potential to be a vehicle for establishing 
the European Community in the international system, 
committing them to a firm place in the international 
environment. The member states, it will be argued, however, 
did not show their commitment from the outset to a Community 
based, systematic method of sanctions implementation, which 
would have strengthened their image both at home and abroad. 
The European Community did not, through a systematic 
imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia, demonstrate its 
ability to act cohesively. Further, although Rhodesia 
provided an opportunity for the EC to present itself as an 
international actor, its inability to act with unity 
weakened its international image.
To be seen to act on the international stage as a cohesive 
entity with a singularity of purpose was potentially a 
significant source of recognition for the Community, vital 
to the development of its role as a legitimate international 
power. In this case power includes not merely the economic 
power that comes with the Community's strength as a trading 
alliance but comprises the perception of the EC as a 
recognised performer in world affairs. The random, largely 
incoherent and uncertain, way in which the Community went 
about addressing the Rhodesian crisis did nothing to nurture
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their image as a unitary actor. It may, however, have 
provided the Community in its early years with a benchmark 
for future action or inaction. The case certainly provides a 
benchmark for students of Community foreign policy and 
actorness.
I. The Community or the Member States: the Tension
1. The use of sanctions against Rhodesia
Harry Strack writing of the use of sanctions against 
Rhodesia noted that: "Not only did sanctions fail to achieve 
their major goal, but they may have been a contributory 
factor to the deterioration of a situation which they were 
designed to alleviate." Leonard Kapungu noted that 
"economic sanctions have welded together the Rhodesian 
conservative element in support of the survival of the
( 5 \regime" Cross also points out that in the case of 
Rhodesia the political changes demanded by the international 
community and the use of sanctions to attain them "might
4 Harry Strack, Sanctions : The Case of Rhodesia, (Syracuse:Syracuse University Press, 1978) p. 237; E. G. Cross: "economic sanctions are a comparatively ineffective means of exercising political leverage. In the case of Rhodesia, the international programme of sanctions was a complete failure...," E. G. Cross, "Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Policy against Rhodesia", The World Economy 4: March, 1981, p. 76.5 Leonard Kapungu, The United Nations and Economic SanctionsAgainst Rhodesia (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books,1973) p. 128.
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well have resulted in the further entrenchment of 
recalcitrant attitudes within the Rhodesian g o v e r n m e n t ^ ^ )
Yet the dilemma of sanctions, that they are most often 
considered a weak and ineffective tool and yet are still 
used often in conflict situations, is not as important for 
this discussion as the effectiveness with which the 
Community wielded its foreign policy tool. In chapter four 
sanctions have been described as an effective method of 
providing legitimisation to the Community by providing it 
with an effective method for pursuing foreign policy 
objectives, and giving it a method. As has been noted above, 
while the primary goals of economic sanctions, those 
concerned with changing the behaviour of an offending state, 
may be given the most emphasis in the literature, they are 
not crucial to the development of the Community's 
international position. The senders of sanctions give these 
goals the most stress as they have an immediate and 
compelling nature and are directly and obviously related to 
the situation which demands the action taken. In the case of 
Rhodesia the primary goal was to induce political change, 
the establishment of a government elected by a majority of 
the people. Thus, sanctions have been regarded as a failure: 
the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia remained firmly 
entrenched for years.
6 E.G. Cross, op. cit. p. 74.
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Barber's tertiary framework is useful for analysing the
European Community's attempt at utilising sanctions against
Rhodesia. According to Barber, tertiary goals of sanctions
include those which relate to the structure of the
( 7 )international system. or "ensure the coherence of a 
regional grouping." The imposition of sanctions once 
again is placed within a broader framework: how states 
relate to each other and to the international environment, 
their place in the international system.
The important consideration for the European Community in 
the Rhodesian case was developing this support for a new 
structure of international relations. According to Barber: 
"the broader issue of how international relations are 
handled is superimposed on the particular problem.
Certainly the European Community, especially at the time of 
UDI in Rhodesia was an international body whose place in the 
international structure was not yet certain. Developing its 
position depended upon uniform acts of foreign and 
commercial policy implementation.
In the case of Rhodesia the tertiary goal of sanctions was 
the establishment of the EC in the international political 
system. As Barber notes: "when international structures and
norms are changing, the sanctions may also be used to ensure
7 J. Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument,"International Affairs (July, 1979) p. 382-383.8 J. Barber, ibid., p. 382.9 J. Barber, idem.
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that the new dispensation is a c c e p t e d . W i t h  the 
development of the EC in the latter half of this century the 
structure of international relations was indeed changing.
The EC emerged as a "new dispensation" which relied upon 
cooperation and diplomacy, and whose economic well-being was 
strengthened by interdependence and regional security.
Robert Schuman's declaration that the EC would "make war not 
merely unthinkable but materially impossible" amongst its 
members was a reflection of this change in the international 
order.
The fact that Rhodesia was not perceived as presenting any
issues which affected the particular interests of the member
states of the Community is not insignificant when analysing
the development of the European Community at that time as a
legitimate international force. As Britain was not a member
of the Community when sanctions began, it could be argued
that Rhodesia presented a situation ideally constructed to
aid the development of international recognition. The
Community could thus demonstrate its "willingness and
capacity to act" in support of international issues rather
than limiting itself to intra-EC matters, and the direct
( 1 9  )interests of the Member States.
10 J. Barber, Ibid., p. 3 83.11 Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950, Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, vol. 7., pp. 10701-2.12 Yet, France perceived the Rhodesian problem as "solelythe concern of the United Kingdom, whose colony it is". Further, France did not place its allegiance to developing a European response to a globally recognised
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2. Article 224
The EC sanctions against Rhodesia were implemented by the 
Community under Article 224 of the EEC Treaty, which is 
essentially a clause enabling a member state to take 
measures "in the event of war or serious international 
tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry 
out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of
/13 \maintaining peace and international security." Under
this Article the Member States are bound only to consult 
each other "with a view" to working together in order to 
prevent the disruption of the common market. Therefore, the 
sanctions discussion was not immediately regarded as a 
Community matter per se and did not raise issues of 
qualified majority voting or Commission initiative. However, 
several questions arise in relation to this Article. First, 
under what circumstances should Article 224 be used; should 
it be invoked only after disruption to the common market has 
occurred, or should consultation take place in order to
crisis situation, although France's position may have been a reflection of Anglo-French hostility over Britain's initial reluctance to join the EC rather than a particular aversion to implementing the UN sanctions. A.G. Mezerik, "Rhodesia and the United Nations", International Review Service, XII, 1966, p. 8.13 the full text of Article 224 reads:Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in the event of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 25 March 1957.
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prevent, as the Article reads, negative affects on the 
common market (i.e.. before negative affects have occurred). 
Considering the wording of Article 224, it would seem as 
though the question raised answers itself: Article 224 
should be used to prevent negative effects on the common 
market. According to Kuyper, if measures taken by the member 
states are
intended to prevent ill effects on the Common 
Market; this naturally entails that the consultation 
should take place before the introduction of the 
measures concerned. According to this 
interpretation, the possibility of harmful effects 
on the Common Market triggers the consultation 
mechanism of Article 224.
However, this interpretation is not the one adhered to by 
{15 )the Commission. The Commission, as can be seen below in
its response to a written question by Mr. Patjin, has taken 
Article 224 to mean that consultation is only necessary if 
distortions to the common market can be shown empirically 
after measures, such as the sanctions against Rhodesia, have 
been taken. This is often too late. Once measures have been 
put into effect it is often difficult to quantify whether 
they have indeed disrupted the functioning of the common 
market and consultation at this point may be impractical and
14 Pieter Jan Kuyper, The Implementation of InternationalSanctions : The Netherlands and Rhodesia, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and Nordhoff, 1978) pp. 105-106.15 ibid., p. 106.
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ineffectual. The consultation procedure also raises the next 
question concerning Article 224: What does the use of 
Article 224 involve and, moreover, does the use by the 
Community of Article 224 supplant Article 113 in the 
carrying out of sanctions?
These issues were raised to a certain extent in two written 
questions addressed to both the Commission and the Council 
in which the subject of sanctions implementation against 
Rhodesia was discussed. A reply was requested as to which 
Article of the EEC Treaty should provide the framework for 
the implementation of the sanctions, consultation under 
Article 224 - a loose intergovernmental approach - or 
Community action under Article 113, a legally binding, 
treaty-based course which gives the Community competence to 
act. Mr. Patjin asked:
1. Is the Community bound under Article 113 of the 
EEC Treaty by the UN Security Council decisions 
concerning sanctions against Rhodesia?
2. If the answer is in the affirmative, how is this
to reconciled with Regulation (EEC) No 2603/69 on
exports and Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 727/70 
(17)on tobacco?
16 Written questions No. 527/75 and No. 526/75, 20 Nov.1975, OJ 1976 No. C 89/6, asked by Mr. Patjin.17 Regulation (EEC) No 2603/69 lays down inter alia thatexportation shall be free. Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 727/70 prohibits any quantitative restrictions on tobacco imports.
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3. If the answer to question 1 is in the negative, 
does Article 224 of the EEC Treaty apply in this 
case?
4. If so, should it then be assumed that Article 224 
completely overrides the provisions of Community law 
mentioned in question 2, and makes unilateral 
national measures possible?
5. If Article 224 does apply, has the consultation 
between Member States referred to in that Article 
ever taken place? If so, what was the outcome? Has 
the Commission ever felt it necessary in this 
connection to use the powers conferred on it by 
Article 225?
6. In view of the fact that at the present time the 
sanctions against Rhodesia are carried out in a very 
different fashion in the different Member States, 
and for this reason evasion of the sanctions across 
the Community's internal frontiers is not 
inconceivable, does the Commission believe that it 
has a task to fulfil on the basis of Article 113 of 
the Treaty?
The Commission's reply had many facets. With regard to the 
interpretation of the consultation procedure envisaged under 
Article 224, the Commission fell back on the intent of the 
founders of the Treaty of Rome stating that Member States 
were able to invoke the Article on an individual basis;
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Member States should be free individually to "discharge 
obligations accepted in the interests of peace and 
international s e c u r i t y . I t  would not be necessary to 
act in concert because the sanctions imposed were not, 
according to the Commission, affecting the functioning of 
the Common Market,
Individually the member states were bound to implement the 
UN measures in light of Article 48 paragraph 2 of the UN 
Charter which states:
[that sanctions]... shall be carried out by the 
Members of the United Nations directly and through 
their action in the appropriate international 
agencies of which they are members."
Therefore, it could be argued that the member states of the 
European Community were bound to act not only individually 
to the UN led sanctions but, according to the wording of 
Article 48 UN, the EC could conceivably have acted in its 
role as an "appropriate international agency" through which 
UN measures could be carried out. The Commission confronted 
this possibility circuitously, obfuscating the issues 
involved. The Commission seemed to admonish the Security 
Council for failing to approach the Community as a 
legitimate body, perhaps implying that if the Security 
Council had approached it as such the Commission would have
18 Written question no, 527/75, 20 Nov. 1975, OJ 1976 No. C 89/6, asked by Mr. Patjin., op.cit.
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considered the feasibility of applying the Common Commercial 
policy, hence bringing the sanctions under the exclusive 
competence of the Community. The Commission directly refers 
to the possibility of autonomous Community action in its 
response to the question posed, declaring that the UN 
sanctions "can include the complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations (Article 41 of the UN Charter) and 
impinge on areas within the Community's jurisdiction, 
notably its common commercial policy". This statement by the 
Commission seems at least to leave open the possibility of 
Community action.
It seems the Commission was trying to have the best of both 
worlds. On one hand the Community wanted to be recognised by 
the world - including, of course, the United Nations - as a 
legitimate body; the Commission emphasised its wish for the 
Community to be an accepted presence at the UN and its 
pleasure at being granted observer status at the General 
Assembly in 1975: "with the support of the Member States 
(all of them members of the United Nations) the Community 
has endeavoured to secure acceptance of its presence in the 
United Nations, in its specialised agencies and in the 
conferences and negotiations organised under UN auspices so 
that it can participate in proceedings within the limits set 
by its particular competences and assume the attendant 
rights and obligations^^ On the other hand, the 
Commission pointed out that it was in fact up to the
19 Written question no. 527/75, op.cit.
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Security Council to check compliance with its decisions and 
since the Community "has never been approached by the 
Security Council, the Commission sees no need to consider 
the feasibility of applying in its common commercial policy 
the sanctions imposed against Rhodesia by the relevant 
Security Council r e s o l u t i o n s H e n c e ,  the Community 
placed itself in catch-22 situation. It wanted to be 
recognised as an international actor but refused to act as 
one until so acknowledged. This rather weak and somewhat 
roundabout justification for the random nature of Community 
measures weakened the Community's legitimacy and did not 
bode well for subsequent action.
With regard to Article 224, the Commission stated that
should consultation in the framework of Article 224 prove
necessary, that the application of sanctions was indeed
causing disruption to the smooth functioning of the Common
Market, the Commission would propose the appropriate action 
(21)to the Council. The Commission did not, however,
elaborate on what this would involve, in other words, in 
what type of forum member states would meet:
2 0 idem.21 The Commission, although not mentioned in Article 224, becomes involved if the measures taken by the Member States within the framework of that article effect the functioning of the Common Market. It is related in this case to Article 225(para. 1) which reads: "If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 223 and 224 have the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the common market, the Commission shall, together with the State concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down in this Treaty."
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Articles 224 and 225 of the EEC Treaty would require 
Member States and the Commission to consult each 
other on the application of the sanctions contained 
in the Security Council resolutions if these were 
having repercussions on the functioning of the 
common market.
The Commission has no evidence to suggest that
sanctions imposed by Member States have affected the
functioning of the common market or that they are
being evaded across intra-Community frontiers.
Evidence to this effect would obviously lead the
Commission to hold the consultations provided in
Articles 224 and 225 of the EEC Treaty and propose
( 22 )appropriate action to the Council.
The Commission firmly stated in its response that the chosen 
competence should be Article 224:
In drafting Article 224 of the EEC Treaty the
founders left Member States free to take whatever
action is necessary, even if this runs counter to
the Treaty, to discharge obligations accepted in the
interests of peace and international security.
Member States were therefore able to invoke this
Article on an individual basis, to impose sanctions
(23)against Rhodesia.
22 Written question No. 527/75, op. cit23 i dem.
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When asked virtually the same question vis à vis the 
possible application of Article 113 or the consultation 
within the framework of Article 224, the Council pointed out 
that although the Security Council measures did apply to the 
field of commercial policy, the sanctions taken were for 
purposes of peace and international security (this was 
mentioned three times) thus placing them outside the scope 
of Article 113:
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty lays down the 
principle of exclusive competence of the Community 
as regards the common commercial policy, i.e.., for 
all measures aimed at altering the volume or the 
structure of trade in goods and services with a non­
member country.
Although they apply to the commercial field, the 
measures decided by the United Nations Security 
Council concerning Rhodesia, mentioned by the 
Honourable Member, were taken for the purpose of 
maintaining peace and international security and 
therefore do not fall within the scope of Article
113.(24)
This sentiment goes back to the Council's requirement at the 
time that it is a measure's motivation that determines 
whether or not it is placed in the framework of the CCP. In 
its reply concerning Rhodesia, the Council remained
24 Written question No. 526/75, op. cit
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unwavering it its stance that "the Community, as a separate 
entity from the member states, is not responsible for
(25 )applying these decisions." Therefore, the Council firmly
and explicitly declared the sanctions a matter for the  ^
member states unilaterally, rejecting even the possibility 
of a role for the Community under Article 113 :
...The Council thinks that, as the measures in 
question are necessary for fulfilling commitments 
concerning the maintenance of peace and 
international security, the case in point is covered 
by Article 2 2 4 .
Implying that the member states had fulfilled their 
obligation to consult under Article 224, the Council cited 
as proof consultations taken by the member states in the 
context of political cooperation which by the time of the 
parliamentary questions had begun to function along side the 
Treaty framework as a method for discussing foreign policy 
issues.
The Council did not address the issue concerning the wording 
of Article 48 of the UN Charter that the member states of 
the EC are bound to carry out Security Council decisions 
both "directly and through their action in the appropriate 
international agencies of which they are members" which was 
addressed by the Commission in its response.
25 i dem.26 Written question No. 526/75, op. cit
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From the above, the basic and on-going relationship between 
the Commission and the Council can be gleaned. The question 
on sanctions posed by Mr. Patjin in 1975 highlighted the 
delicate matter of sovereignty, with which the member states 
continuously struggle, and its cognate, the paradoxical 
relationship of the Council to the Commission. It can be 
seen from the above that the Commission appeared uncertain, 
wanting to spare the Community's image as a strong 
international actor and, therefore, finding rationalisations 
to explain why it was not acting as one. To this end the 
Commission left open a number of possibilities, not 
committing itself to any definite, irretrievable course of 
action, while at the same time seeking to support the 
Community's chosen path. Conversely, the Council remained a 
staunch supporter of states' rights and there are no hints 
to the contrary in the text of the Council's response.
By the time of these written questions the transitional
period of the Treaty was over for the original Six members,
and obviously there was some doubt as to whether the
sanctions should have been placed under the Community's
Common Commercial Policy. As has been shown, legally the
external relations powers of the EC are concerned primarily
with Article 113 EEC dealing with the Common Commercial 
(27)Policy (CCP). Economic sanctions implicitly pose
27 Paragraph One of Article 113 reads:'After the transitional period has ended, the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the
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problems for the EC in terms of reconciling the divide 
between external economic relations and political relations. 
It is these distinctions which cause difficulty for the 
Commission and the Council. The tension between these two EC 
institutions was elucidated in their differing replies to 
the written question.
3. The UN and the EC in Rhodesia
The Charter of the United Nations proscribes violence 
between its members and can under Article 41 oblige all 
member states to impose mandatory economic sanctions against 
a state which threatens international peace and security, 
thus breaching the Charter.
The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed forces are to be employed 
to give effect to its d e c i s i o n s .
The member states of the European Community as members of 
the United Nations (except the Federal Republic of Germany 
which became a member of the United Nations in 1973) were 
obliged individually to implement these measures. Moreover, 
due to their status as a regional organisation, as defined 
under Article 52 of the Charter, the EC could legitimately
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.'2 8 It is perhaps noteworthy that the UN Charter does not use the term "sanctions", preferring to use the term "measures,"
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have acted as a unit as far as the Charter was concerned. 
Article 53 of the Charter allows the Security Council to 
"utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority". ~
So in a sense it worked both ways. The Security Council 
could have approached the Community as a regional 
organisation, and/or the Community could have acted in its 
role as a regional organisation and confronted the 
implementation of the Rhodesian sanctions as the Community.
Article 234 of the EEC Treaty provides that obligations
arising from agreements, concluded before the entry into
force of the Treaty, between member states and third parties
shall not be affected by the provisions of the EC 
(29)Treaty. The Charter of the United Nations also provides
for the supremacy of United Nations obligations in its 
Article 103: "In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present
29 The relevant text of Article 234 reads;"The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty. To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude". Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957.
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charter shall p r e v a i l . T h i s  serves to clarify the 
Treaty commitments of the member states of the EC; the 
Charter was obviously antecedent to the Rome Treaty. 
Therefore even though the obligations incurred by the EC may 
legally have come into force at a later time Security 
Council decisions prevail because the Charter prevails. The 
issue is not when obligations are incurred, the UN Charter 
supersedes any subsequent agreements that its Members may 
enter into, but which Treaty prevails. However, according to 
Kuyper "it cannot be assumed that the Community as such is 
bound by the mandatory Security Council resolutions on 
sanctions against Rhodesia, nor that the prevalence of these 
Security Council resolutions is assured by incorporation 
into Community law, nor that the Community has an exclusive
(31)right to implement these resolutions."
The EC member states did manage to come up with, on an 
individual basis, an assortment of national legislation or 
measures to implement, at least partially, the UN led 
sanctions. Implementation strategies of the UN imposed 
sanctions varied among the EC member states in timing, 
method, and according to their interpretation of the UN 
resolutions: France, Germany and the Netherlands used trade 
rules already in existence, Italy incorporated Security 
Council Resolutions 252 and 253 in their entirety into
30 Charter of the United Nations, 1948.31 See P. J. Kuyper, The Implementation of InternationalSanctions: The Netherlands and Rhodesia, op. cit., p 192 .
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domestic law while Belgium and Luxembourg used both 
methods.(^ 2)
TABLE 5.1
Imports from Southern Rhodesia, 1965-1974 in $000
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1972 1974
Belg.and 
Luxemb.
2806 3540 1998 829 477 142 10 2
Denmark 1244 1205 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 2873 1856 1059 1171 50 61 907 0
FRG 35112 30525 15966 13298 1120 572 367 479
Italy 16666 8554 259 138 27 59 9 124
Netherl. 5987 5722 2406 542 136 21 0 0
UK 33711 12809 405 215 163 117 222 247
USA 14056 9359 6463 1599 68 115 12400 19415
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics, 1965- 1974.
32 ibid., pp. 189
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TABLE 5.2
Exports to Southern Rhodesia, 1965-1974 in $000
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1972 1974
Belg. and 
Luxemb.
6832 3444 1922 1312 139 82 41 138
Denm. 667 31 37 29 29 31 37 99
France 3850 4246 3976 2380 200 286 488 186
FRG 10903 11186 12305 12914 1234 1176 2004 2615
Italy 6318 5010 1339 1295 73 63 42 252
Netherl. 7291 5748 4699 3000 57 278 261 17
UK 38808 7648 2877 1946 1958 1206 1796 1945
USA 22982 7491 3757 2024 455 514 700 853
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics, 1965- 1974.
Five years elapsed before the Netherlands passed legislation 
imposing sanctions on payments to Rhodesia. Moreover, these 
inconsistencies provided the EC with a method of escape 
through which the EC member states could evade the
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inconvenience of sanctions completely through the use of the
(33 \Community's internal market.
The interesting point about the above tables is the 
divergence in the trade figures of the various states. 
Because the sanctions were UN led, the Federal Republic of 
Germany was not bound by the resolutions. The FRG became a 
member of the UN in 1973 so not until then was it obliged by 
its UN affiliation to comply with the sanctions policy. This 
failure of the FRG to apply sanctions compounded any 
Community efforts to come up with a consistent policy.
In 1968 the government of the Netherlands ordered 
investigations into the illegal relabelling of Rhodesian 
tobacco as American. The tobacco was then shipped to 
Switzerland (however, it could have been an EC Member State 
just as easily). This accounts for a 3 00 percent increase, 
on paper, of American tobacco trade with Switzerland.(^ 4) 
However, when asked by a member of the European Parliament 
about the commercial measures adopted by the member states 
the Commission denied that the sanctions were being 
circumvented through intra-Community frontiers, saying that 
"Evidence to this effect would obviously lead the Commission
33 European Parliament, "Report drawn up on behalf of theCommittee on External Economic Relations on the significance of economic sanctions, particularly trade embargoes and boycotts, and their consequences for the EEC's relations with third countries", Mr. H. J.. Seeler, Working Documents 1982-1983, 8 April 1982, 1- 83/82, p.1934 see the Times, 8 June 1973.
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to hold the consultations provided in Articles 224 and 
225. . . . (35)
In 1968 the Community promulgated EEC Regulation 2 041/68
liberalising trade with a list of states and territories
which included Rhodesia.(^^) Thus importation of goods from
Rhodesia into the European Community was freed up in direct
contravention of Security Council Resolution 253 and in
contravention of the national laws which by this time had
(31)been adopted, however tenuously, by the member states. 
Community law should have prevailed over national law in 
this case, but adhering to Community law, which through 
Regulation 2041/68 freed up trade with Rhodesia, would have 
been a contravention of the UN Security Council Resolutions. 
This all seems to have been somewhat of a muddle; it was 
after all only six months since Resolution 253, bringing 
about a complete boycott of goods, had been adopted and it 
was much later before Rhodesia was indeed taken off the EC 
list re-establishing it as a state with which trade was 
restricted.
Compounding the EC's failure to act coherently was Article 7 
of Regulation 2041. Article 7 provided an escape clause 
under which EC member states, if required to apply trade
35 Written question No. 527/75, 20 Nov. 1975, OJ 1976 No. C89/6.36 JO 1968 L 303/137 The supremacy of EC over national law is well establishedthrough the European Court of Justice in the Van Gend en Loos case which established the doctrine of supremacy as has been shown in chapter three of this work.38 Regulation No. 1025/70
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restrictions by an international agreement as they were by 
the UN, could abide by their prior agreement - in this case 
a UN Resolution - and continue to impose sanctions.
National measures of sanctions implementation were in 
contravention of an EC Regulation (Reg. 2041 liberalised 
trade with Rhodesia), but the EC Regulation was contrary to 
the Security Council Resolution. A Regulation issued by the 
EC is, after all, binding in its entirety on all member 
states of the Community. Yet, Article 7 of Regulation 
2041/68 gave permission for member states to abide by the 
Security Council Resolution. According to Kuyper, "it is 
hardly credible to provide for the implementation of 
sanctions through an 'escape clause', while Rhodesia could
( 39 )have been struck off the list as well."
II. Political Cooperation
The varying implementation strategies of the member states, 
which were partly responsible for the breaching of 
sanctions, could have been ameliorated to some degree by a 
policy of coordination. Very early on in the Rhodesian 
crisis a written question was addressed to the Commission 
this idea was put forth. The coordination measures, promised 
by the Commission in their answer, to aid the individual 
member states in harmonising their efforts immediately after
39 P. J. Kuyper, "Sanctions Against Rhodesia. The EEC and the Implementation of General International Legal Rules", CMLR, vol. 12, 1975, p.233.
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the UDI, were not forthcoming.(40) is not clear from any
Community documents why these measures did not occur, but 
clearly some method was necessary to coordinate the various 
policies of the member states. The European Community's 
effort at implementing sanctions was muddled and certainly 
not unified. Moreover, the EC did not appear to even 
recognise that its action had not been particularly solid. 
This is highlighted in an address to the United Nations in 
1976; the representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Van der 
Stoel, spoke for the nine members of the EC. Though it was 
11 years after UDI, he praised the effectiveness of 
international concerted action and, made assurances that the 
Nine would continue to "comply strictly" with the UN imposed 
sanctions.(4^ )
European Political Cooperation was designed to deal with 
just these problems. As the situation in Rhodesia developed 
before but also endured until after the system of political 
cooperation was developed in 1970 it is appropriate to 
examine whether or not EPC made any difference to the 
handling of Rhodesia. EPC was developed as a system of 
consultation and cooperation to increase the influence of 
the EC in international affairs and to ensure a common 
European a p p r o a c h . (^^) From 1970 the Davignon Report
40 Written Question No. 68 24 Nov. 1965, OJ 1966 No. 14,25.1.1966.41 Year Book of the United Nations, vol. 30, 1976, p.152.42 The literature on European Political Cooperation isextensive and growing. See, for example, P. Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of
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advocated meetings by the Foreign Ministers of the member 
states to coordinate foreign policy and strive for a unified 
approach to actions taken toward third states. EPC led to 
attempts at European cohesion but this was not evident in 
the EC's response to Rhodesia. Coordination and consultation 
were not strengthened by EPC and no improvement in 
implementation was forthcoming; Rhodesia was not even 
discussed much in Political Cooperation.
By the time Britain became a member of the EC, Rhodesia was 
already an entrenched problem for both Britain and the 
Community. It of course had been an issue for Britain for 
years before, but it was not until the accession of the 
Labour government in 1974 that Britain realised that its 
former colony was now a Community problem as well. In fact 
being a member of the Community may have made it easier for 
Britain to maintain its facade of enthusiasm for sanctions 
having realised years before that sanctions were not having 
much success.
On June 11, 1974 the British Foreign Minister announced a 
plan to tighten up the loopholes in the Community's on-going 
trade with Rhodesia by setting up a committee of experts on 
Rhodesian sanctions. The committee consisted of experts on
Supranational Diplomacy? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987); A. E. Pijpers et al, European Political Cooperation in the 1980s: a Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe?; R. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: the Politics of Scale, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); von der Gablentz, "Luxembourg Revisited or the Importance of European Political Cooperation", 
CML Rev. vol. 16 (1979) p.685.
200
foreign trade and customs and met for the first time in 
November 1974. This committee did not meet in the framework 
of Political Cooperation however and resulted in no 
coordination of national legislation on sanctions, nor did 
it result in the blocking of legal loopholes through which 
firms were able to break sanctions. The committee seems to 
have been more a way of satisfying the Labour Party in 
Britain that something indeed was being done to keep up the 
pressure on the Rhodesian r e g i m e .
It was not until problems in Southern Africa as a whole 
began to reach a crisis level that Rhodesia was mentioned by 
the (now) Nine. The political committee that was set up by 
Foreign Secretary Callaghan in 1974 never issued any results 
and in fact, ended up meeting only on one occasion. At a 
meeting of EC Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg in February 
1976, a comprehensive statement was issued by the Nine on 
the subject of Southern Africa in which the Foreign 
Ministers backed the right of the Rhodesian people to self- 
determination and independence. The EC had been quiet on the 
subject of Rhodesia for so long that the policy statement 
marked a significant step toward a renewed effort. In April 
1976 the Foreign Ministers met again in Luxembourg and 
issued a declaration on Rhodesia reconfirming the right of 
the Rhodesian people to self-determination and appealing to 
the white minority to accept a peaceful transition to a
43 see The Economist, 22 June 1974, p.48
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majority g o v e r n m e n t . I n  Beetsterzwag, Friesland, in the 
Netherlands, the Foreign Ministers met in September 1976 to 
discuss Southern Africa, including Rhodesia.(45) Qnce again 
the right of the Rhodesian people was reconfirmed and the 
member states agreed to do everything possible to enforce 
the sanctions until a satisfactory transition of power to 
the black majority took place. By January 1977 a new 
statement was issued confirming that the Nine would not give 
any aid to Rhodesia and that their obligations concerning 
sanctions would continue. The consultation by the Foreign 
Ministers in their attempts at political cooperation can be 
seen as rather weak, issuing statements and declarations but 
not getting anywhere toward a coordinated sanctions regime.
Conclusion
It can be seen from the above that the Community possesses 
the necessary legal status, as an entity in its own right, 
to enter into legal commitments and treaties. The European 
Community, striving for both economic as well as political 
legitimacy, needed a strong, coherent sanctions policy 
within the ambit of an exclusive Community competence.(4^ ) 
However, resistance by the individual member states to a
44 Bull. EC: 5-1976, p. 94.45 Bull. EC: 9-1976, p. 82.46 The Common Commercial Policy did not become the exclusivedomain of the Community until after the transitional period of the Treaty had elapsed. Still, even after the Community gained this exclusive competence it did not attempt a sanctions policy toward Rhodesia based on Article 113.
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Community based competence under Article 113 precluded the 
enactment of a Community regulation on sanctions policy. A 
regulation of this sort would have prevented 
"-'inconsistencies, increased the effectiveness of sanctions 
and, perhaps most importantly for the Community, greatly 
advanced recognition of the European Community's place in 
the structure of international relations. In the case of the 
sanctions against Iran in 1980 the Community was becoming 
more deft in the handling of legal competences regarding 
sanctions. Some member states advocated the use of Article 
113 after a consensual, unanimous decision had been reached 
under consultation in the framework of Article 224. However 
agreement could not be reached as to the Treaty basis of the 
implementation of sanctions against Iran and the result was 
yet more variety and inconsistency in spite of many meetings 
and declarations of EPC.
After the seizure of the United States' embassy in Iran on 4 
November 1979 and the subsequent taking of US hostages, the 
United Nations attempted to impose sanctions against Iran 
with the object of freeing the hostages. The Soviet veto of 
the sanctions resolution on 13 January 1980 left the United 
States looking elsewhere for support of its proposed 
sanctions. The European Community responded less than 
wholeheartedly at first,(47) wavering on the sanctions 
issue, and instead issuing statements "requesting the
47 See Business Week, "A Limp Set of Sanctions on Iran", 2 
June 1980, p. 25.
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release of the hostages and seeking information and 
assurances from the Iranian authorities about the date and 
method of r e l e a s e . "(48) Further measures decided on by the 
Community included reduction of Embassy staffs in Tehran, 
introduction of a visa requirement for Iranian nationals and 
withholding of arms or defence related equipment. These 
measures were not strong enough for the Americans who wanted 
a more decisive effort from the EC. At a meeting in Naples 
on 17 and 18 of May 1980, by which time no decisive progress 
leading to the release of hostages had been made, the 
Foreign Ministers met and adopted a new declaration on Iran. 
In this declaration the Foreign Ministers decided to impose 
sanctions.
They therefore decided to apply, in concert and 
without delay, the measures provided for in the draft 
Security Council resolution of 10 January. In 
particular they agreed that all contracts concluded 
after 4 November 1979 would be suspended. They will 
remain in close consultation in accordance with 
Article 224 of the Treaty of R o m e ."(49)
Although the foreign ministers alleged that the measures 
were adopted purely to hasten the release of the hostages, 
there were other reasons for Community involvement. As one
48 Bull. EC: 4-1980, p. 20. This statement was made atLisbon where the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met informally on 10 April 1980 and issued a declaration on the hostage taking.49 Paragraph 3 of the statement. Bull. EC: 4-1980, p. 25.
204
member of the Irish Parliament observed: "I have
reservations in regard to out our joining in a trade boycott 
of Iran. Such a course may be ineffective and may be 
counterproductive."(50) But in spite of reservations, and as 
the Irish Foreign Minister noted: "One may agree 
wholeheartedly or disagree with particular actions, but 
within a Community context it is important to ensure that a 
formula will be worked out agreeable to all the countries 
within the Community(51) in other words, the Community 
must act together; there must be unity within its ranks to 
support the role of Europe as a collective actor in matters 
of international significance. As the Irish Foreign Minister 
observed: "We as one of the nine partners could not stand
apart."(52)
During the Iran hostage crisis the Community's choice was 
distinct: either Article 224 or 113. The recently held 
Opinion of the European Court of Justice held that Article 
113 must be "governed from a wide point of view and not only 
having regard to the administration of precise systems such
( 53 )as customs and quantitative restrictions". Moreover,
the Court was hesitant to limit the CCP to include "the use 
of instruments intended to have an effect only on the 
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of
50 O'Keeffe, Dail Debates, 322 (1980) 1818, 24 June 1980.51 Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates, 322(1980) 1829, 24 June 1980.52 ibid., p . 1830.53 Opinion of the Court 1/78 (International Agreement onNatural Rubber); (1979) ECR 2871, para. 45.
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more highly developed mechanisms" . ^ 4^) «pi^e Opinion by the
ECJ was used by the Commission to strengthen its
instrumental approach to the Common Commercial Policy;
although the trade measures against Iran were taken to
attain political ends, they were trade measures none-the-
less and therefore should have fallen under Article 113.
However, disagreement among the member states about the
nature of the Iran crisis led to the use of Article 224 as
the legal basis for the sanctions. The situation in Iran
constituted, according to the member states, a threat to
international peace and security which led necessarily to
measures being taken under the framework of Article 224. The
Commission was consulted by the member states after the
Foreign Ministers decided to "apply, in concert and without
delay, the measures provided for in the draft Security
( 55 )Council resolution...". The Commission, after analysing
the measures taken by the member states, decided to consult 
under Article 224 in order to exchange "information 
regarding the implementation of the various measures, 
particularly in order to identify any risk of distorting the 
conditions of competition in the common market."(^5) This 
refers to Article 225 which involves the Commission in the 
consultation process. Under Article 225, if national 
measures do have the effect of distorting the conditions of 
competition, "the Commission shall, together with the State
54 ibid., para. 44.55 Bull. EC: 5-1980, p. 26.56 ibid, pp. 27-28.
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concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to the 
rules laid down in the T r e a t y . "(57)
Another interesting and relevant comparison to UDI and the 
crisis in Southern Rhodesia, is the invasion of the Falkland 
Islands by A r g e n t i n a . T h i s  particular comparison is 
cogent because it has certain similarities. First, it was a 
particularly British situation.(^ 9) Britain retained 
sovereign rule over both territories, although Britain was 
not a member of the Community at the time of UDI. Second, it 
was a crisis situation which required an immediate response 
to an act of rebellion. Third, sanctions were used in both 
cases, although neither threats nor military force were used 
in Southern Rhodesia. It is also a useful comparison in 
analysing the evolution of political cooperation machinery 
in the time between the events surrounding UDI in the late 
sixties and the invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982.
The Falkland Islands episode is an example of the 
coordination of the two systems, EC and EPC which produced
57 See Article 225, Treaty of Rome. See also Bull. EC: 5-1980, p. 28.58 For a history of the Falkland Islands and the conflictbetween Britain and Argentina see, Ian J. Strange, The Falkland Islands (Newton Abbott, London: David and Charles, 1983); Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals 
of War: The Falkland Conflict of 1982 (London: Faber and Faber, 1990).59 See, for the relevant discussions in the Britishparliament. The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons, 2 April to June 1982 (London: 
HMSO, 1982).
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quick and decisive action. When on 2 April 1982 Argentine 
forces seized control of the British held Falkland Islands, 
the EEC agreed to impose sanctions for one month. The 
Council adopted Regulation 87-7/82 on 16 April 1982. This 
regulation suspended imports of products originating in 
Argentina. Quick action was possible by the European 
Community as the Political Committee, the Political 
Directors from the Foreign Ministries of the member states, 
was in session in Brussels (for another purpose) and was 
able to come out with a statement condemning Argentina for 
its military action.
The action taken by the European Community was based upon 
Article 113 and therefore taken by the Community and not by 
national legislation of the individual member states. It is 
noteworthy that sanctions although taken for reasons of 
foreign policy and security, were adopted on the basis of 
Article 113, with only a reference to Article 2 2 4 , The 
use of Article 113 strengthened the position of the 
Community both legally and politically. The Common 
Commercial Policy, based on uniform principles of external 
trade, was used for political reasons in a decisive manner. 
By the time of Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands, 
the European Community was able to execute sanctions under 
Regulation No. 877/82 based on Article 113 of the EEC
60 Article 224 enables member states to take measures "in the event of war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security."
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T r e a t y d e s p i t e  the foreign policy implications. This 
ability to act with cohesion, according to some, was due to 
its convenience as an "issue over which to demonstrate the 
new-found efficiency and solidarity of Action
under EPC would not necessarily require Article 113 as its 
legal basis however, so it seems as though the member states 
were more willing to take economic measures to pursue 
political objectives within a true Community approach rather 
than under the parallel, but at the time non Treaty-based, 
EPC system. In the case of Argentina, EPC and the Treaty of 
Rome produced a hybrid system of addressing the issue: 
sanctions were implemented after "discussions in the context 
of European political co-operation", yet "in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Community Treaties".
In Argentina, the Community was also able to act with a 
certain degree of speed. The unanticipated and sudden nature 
of the invasion, directed at one of its own, meant that the 
Community had to come up with a swift response: time for 
negotiation and deliberation was minimal, and the "reflex"
61 O.J. 1982, L 102/1, 16 April 1982. Sanctions wereapproved for a period of one month. However, contracts concluded prior to the sanctions period were exempted 
from the ban.62 Christopher Hill and James Mayall, "The SanctionsProblem: International and European Perspectives," European Working Papers 59 (Florence: European University Institute, July 1983) p. 18.63 see preamble to Council Regulation (EEC) 877/82, OJ 1982,L 102/1. For a discussion of this point see, P. J. Kuyper, "Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and International Law," in 
David O'Keeffe and Henry G. Schermers, eds., Essays in European Law and Integration (Deventer: Kluwer, 1982).
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of EPC took e f f e c t . W i t h i n  a period of fifteen days the 
Community made decisions to ban all Argentine imports, and 
all deliveries of arms sales.
These two comparisons with Rhodesia are interesting because 
they show how the development of a system of "coordination 
and consultation" worked to combine the extra Treaty 
mechanism of EPC with an internal Treaty-based competence. 
They also show, especially in the case of the Falkland 
Islands, that even though sanctions were soon to dissolve as 
the solidarity of the member states began to waiver, the 
tertiary goal of establishing the Community in the structure 
of international relations was accomplished.
The Rhodesia crisis presented a situation where the inchoate 
collective foreign relations of the member states of the 
Community could be tested; the Community could dip its toes 
into the waters of the international arena while not having 
to make the crucial decisions (already made for them by the 
UN). The response of the Community to the Rhodesian crisis 
was haphazard at best, however; as individual members of the 
United Nations, its response was found wanting, but as
64 Although the Community made its decision to ban importson April 10th, there were some difficulties to iron out. Sanctions therefore went into effect on April 17, effective for a period of one month.65 "Statement of the Ten on the Falklands (Brussels, 10April 1982)," European Political Co-operation (EPC), 5th ed. (Federal Republic of Germany: Clausen and Bosse, 1988) pp. 150-151.
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members of an organisation striving for international 
recognition it was a failure.
The European Community did not use its status and economic 
power to great effect during the course of the crisis in 
Rhodesia. In spite of being a powerful and at that time 
somewhat unified trading organisation, the European 
Community lacked recognition. It is in this area that a 
smoothly implemented sanctions policy could perhaps have 
played a vital role. The next chapter highlights a case 
which saw the Community progress from a position which 
involved virtually no unified stance, and therefore very 
limited actorness, to one of a higher level of unity and 
increased actorness.
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CHAPTER 6
ISRAEL AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Introduction
Relations between the European Community and Israel date
back to 1960 when, after the signing of the Treaty of Rome,
/1 \diplomatic links were established. In its association
with Israel, the European Community faces two opposing
objectives: first, maintaining relations with a pro-Western
state with which it has cultural and historical ties
(including a sense of guilt and obligation on the part of
the Federal Republic of Germany), and second, protecting its
relations with the Arab states on which the EC relies for
( 2 )its oil imports, and which are of strategic importance.
See European Commission, Third General Report, pt. 389, 1960.See for data on this, Robert J. Lieber, "Europe and America in the World Energy Crisis," International Affairs, vol. 55 (1979) pp. 531-545; Robert Lieber, Oil and the Middle East War, Europe in the Energy Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); L.
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These conflicting aims are exacerbated by other factors 
including the geographic proximity of the southern EC member 
states to the Middle East, economic interdependence, and the 
social and cultural links of Europe to the Middle East 
because of former colonial links and immigration.
The evolution of the relationship between the EC and the 
state of Israel cannot be evaluated outside the context of
( 3 \the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel provides the EC with 
difficult foreign policy issues, and with a case which 
highlights the tenacious links between political, security 
and economic relationships. As will be discussed below, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was the first foreign policy issue to 
be dealt with by the Six in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation following the Luxembourg Report of 
1 9 7 0 . The decision to make the Middle East its first 
political cooperation priority (along with the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)), was taken by the
Turner, "The European Community: Factors of disintegration. Politics of the Energy Crisis," International Affairs, vol. 50 (1974). For an analysis of oil's security dimension see, Gregory Treverton, ed., Energy and Security (Gower: London, 1980) pp. 40-73; William Wallace, "Europe: the changing international context," The World Today, vol. 35, (1975) pp. 188-95.The literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict is wide and encompasses many aspects. For an historical overview of the discord see, D. Ronen, The Quest for Self- Determination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979); Tossi Beilin, Israel: A Concise Political History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Mordechai Nisan, 
Toward a New Israel: the Jewish State and the Arab Question (New York: AMS Press, 1992); Deborah J. Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples: the Conflict over Palestine (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) .Luxembourg Report, Bull. EC: 11-1970.
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Community because it offered a foreign policy issue on which 
it was thought some consensus could be r e a c h e d . A t  
virtually the same time as EPC began its involvement in the 
Middle East, trade accords partially dismantling customs 
duties were signed between the EC and Israel.
Commercial factors coupled with the strategic issue of 
energy became wrapped up with the diplomatic and political 
issues of EC involvement in Israel from the outset. EPC, as 
has been discussed in previous chapters, was created to 
promote the EC's identity in world affairs, and to provide a 
united Community position in world affairs. Yet, in spite of 
the Arab-Israel conflict and the wars of 1967 and 1973 the 
EC did little to alter its trade relationship with Israel. 
The hope of a concrete political result was placed on the 
declarations of EPC, while trade patterns or relationships 
were not affected significantly, as will be shown. Israel 
was a definitive case where the trade and economic 
relationships were forced into separate categories from 
those of politics. The declarations of EPC remained in a 
fringe world separate from the realities of economic life.
It took the involvement of the European Parliament to impose 
a sanction of sorts, which tied trade to political 
rectification. Yet in spite of the tensions and lack of 
definitive competence boundaries between the Community and
5 See the Copenhagen Report, Bull. EC: 9-1973.6 See, for example, OJ L182, 16.8.1970 and OJ L183,17.8.1970.
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the member states, the Community was able to act 
significantly in Israel.
To analyse the relationship between the European Community
and Israel in light of the dichotomy between external
relations and EPC, a framework can be applied which
incorporates theories of international sanctions and actor
behaviour. The former developed from the concept of the
( 7 )tertiary objectives, the latter from legitimation. 
According to Jabri, legitimation takes three forms:
1) inclusion of the actor in international negotiations;
2) diplomatic links with the actor in the form of both 
systematic official dialogue and occasional official 
contact with that actor;
3) adoption of positions on specific issues in the 
conflict which are of salience to the actor and which 
have the effect of reinforcing the position taken by 
that actor in the conflict situation.^^^
7 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a PolicyInstrument", International Affairs, July 1979, pp. 367-384.8 See V. Jabri, "The European Community and Responses toRegional Conflict: The case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Paper presented to the Eighth International Conference of Europeanists, The Council for European Studies, March 27-29, 1992, Chicago, Illinois.
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Tertiary goals involve "the structure and behaviour of the 
international system generally, or those parts of it which 
affect the imposing states.
Legitimation and the concept of tertiary objectives are 
linked. The theory of tertiary objectives is not concerned 
with the primary objective of changing another states' 
behaviour, but rather with the reputation of the sender and 
its place in the international system. This structural 
understanding of foreign policy objectives is, therefore, 
similar to the concept of legitimation. Both legitimation 
and tertiary objectives involve the reputation of the actor, 
not necessarily its implications for the receiver.
The decision of the foreign ministers to make the Arab- 
Israeli conflict their first foreign policy issue in the 
framework of EPC, was also a decision to place themselves 
firmly in the international arena: a more contentious issue 
could hardly exist. Borrowing the concept of tertiary 
objectives from sanctions theory is a useful way of 
analysing EPC actions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. If one 
replaces the term sanctions with the term action, then the 
tertiary framework can be utilised. Action may create 
"support for a particular international structure" and may 
further "existing structures or organisations, whether it be 
an alliance or an international body."^^^^ Action may also
9 James Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a PolicyInstrument," op. cit., p. 382.10 James Barber, op. cit., p. 383.
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{11 )"ensure the coherence of a regional grouping."
Structurally, action in this sense is crucial to the 
development of the European Community as a legitimate actor 
in international affairs. If one considers action as a 
means to increase legitimacy by the Community, then the type 
of action is less relevant. The Community is responsive to 
the external environment: it does not necessarily have to be 
a proactive force in the international system to further its 
legitimacy.
The important consideration for the European Community in
the Middle East was the development of this structural
matrix; "the broader issue of how international relations
( 12 )are handled is superimposed on the particular problem" : 
in this case, the Middle East. While the handling of the 
relationship with Israel was not a model of consistent or 
consensual action-even the loosest definition of action 
cannot make up for the Community's indistinct approach-the 
Community did manage to develop a Middle east initiative, 
culminating in the Venice Declaration of 1980. The sketchy 
nature of the interaction between EC and EPC mechanisms, and 
the apparent disregard for the impact of one upon the other 
left a gap in policy which was filled by the European 
Parliament, as will be discussed below.
11 ibid, p. 382.12 James Barber, op. cit., p. 383
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This chapter will examine the evolution of the Community's 
relationship with Israel along the lines it actually 
developed; with parallel but separate political and economic 
accords. Section I thus looks briefly at the development of 
the trade relationship with Israel and some of the issues 
which surrounded the early stages of that relationship. 
Section II analyses the development of political cooperation 
and the various accords, declarations and reports which 
helped to shape a Community policy toward Israel. Section 
III then integrates the first two parts of the chapter 
through an examination of the sanction imposed by the 
European Parliament, and its effect on the actor capability 
of the Community.
I. EC-Israel: History of Trade Relationship
Israel was one of the first states to establish a mission to 
the Commission in Brussels (1959), and as early as 1960 
expressed a desire to become an associate member under 
Article 238, Part IV of the T r e a t y . D e s p i t e  the early 
attempts by Israel to establish links with the EC, a trade 
relationship was slow to evolve. A simple commercial 
agreement was signed in 1964 which was non-preferential with 
reductions in Community tariffs on some goods. It was
not until 197 0 that a preferential agreement was signed, 
allowing for reductions of up to 50 % on EC tariffs on
13 See European Commission, Third General Report, 1960.14 European Commission, Seventh General Report, 1964.
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Israeli goods. The agreement provided for a partial 
dismantling of customs duties and a provision for a further 
agreement under which trade obstacles would be removed in
(15 \accordance with GATT rules. However, the 1970 agreement
was dissipated by at least two factors. First, the EC 
established preferential agreements with many Mediterranean 
states at about the same time (Morocco and Tunisia, 1969; 
Spain, 1970; and Malta, 1971) . Second, the impending 
accession of the United Kingdom to the EC meant that 
Israel's largest European export market would be subsumed 
under the European Community's trade regime.
The United Kingdom was an extremely important outlet for
Israeli citrus fruit and British EC membership would
significantly effect Israel's ability to export. For these
reasons Israel requested a renegotiation of the 1970 accord,
f 17 )and after years of negotiations, a free trade agreement
was finally signed in 1975 under the EC's Global 
Mediterranean Policy (which sought trade liberalisation in 
both manufactured and agricultural products for all 
Mediterranean states). The 1975 EEC-Israel Agreement
15 OJ L212, 25.9.1970 and Bull. EC: 11-1970.16 Alfred Tovias, Israel and the Southern Enlargement of theEuropean Community, (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1988) p. 4.17 See OJ L6 6 , 13.3.1973; Bull. EC: 9-1974, pt. 2315; Bull.EC: 6-1974 pt. 2331; Bull. EC: 10-1974, pt.2328.18 For more on the Global Mediterranean Policy see A. Shlaimand G. M. Yannopoulos, The EEC and the Mediterranean Countries (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Loukas Tsoukalis, "The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is 'Global Policy' a misnomer?," International Affairs, (July 1977);"The European Community and the Mediterranean," European Documentation, (Luxembourg,
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superseded the 1970 agreement and stipulated complete 
elimination of tariff and quota barriers for all products.
It also carried a cooperation facet not present in the 1970 
A g r e e m e n t . T h e  1975 trade agreement and cooperation 
accord were based on Article 113 of the Rome Treaty, and 
envisaged not only a schedule of trade barrier elimination, 
but also a process of cooperation in science and technology.
Although Israel was the first Mediterranean state to benefit 
from a relationship with the European Community, trade 
agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria soon followed. 
Further, the Southern European states of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, which exported similar products to those of 
Israel, were coming up for membership in the EC. Israel 
obviously feared that Southern European enlargement would 
hurt its export market.
Following the Greek accession in 1981 and with the imminent 
accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986, the Community's 
relationship with Israel went through a process of 
adjustment. The enlargement of the Community posed a 
potentially serious threat to Israel's agricultural exports. 
In 1984, for example, 74.8% of Israel's vegetables and fruit
1985); F. de la Serre, "The Community's Mediterranean Policy after the Second Enlargement," Journal of Common Market Studies, (June, 1981); R. Pomfret, Mediterranean Policy of the EC: A Study of Discrimination in Trade (London: Macmillan, 1986),
19 OJ L136, 28.5.1975.20 See Bull. EC: 5-1975, pt. 2334.
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(21 )were for EC markets. Israel had been on equal trading
terms with its Mediterranean neighbours, but trading parity 
was to be diminished with Spain and Portugal’s accession. 
Spain, Portugal and Israel offered similar products to the 
EC, and competed, until 1986, on equal terms for EC market 
share. Israel wanted an agreement from the EC that would
offset the disruption to its export market. (22)
TABLE 6.1
Israel's Exports to Spain, Portugal and EC (in $000)
1978 1985 1988
Spain 19,029 29,978 124,136
Portugal 21,185 31,882 18,396
EC Total 1,344,692 1,979,098 3,219,731
Source: UN Commodity trade Statistics for Israel, New York, 1978, 1985, 1988.
21 United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (New York),1984.
22 It is also interesting to note the trade patterns whichwere evolving between the European Community and the Arab states. See "Trade Patterns between the European Community and the Arab League Countries," European Commission information note VIII/534/77-E, revised September 15, 1977. Cited in Alan R. Taylor, "The Euro- Arab Dialogue: Quest for an Interregional Partnership." The Middle East Journal, vol. 42, (Autumn, 1978). p.429. Arab imports from the EC accounted for 44 per cent of all Arab imports by 1977, and forty per cent of exports from the Arab states were sold to EC states. See also Stephen J. Artner, "The Middle East: A Chance for Europe?," International Affairs, vol. 56 (Summer, 1980) p. 421.
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TABLE 6.2
Israel's Imports from Spain, Portugal and EC (in $000)
1978 1985 1988
Spain 35,181 77,480 125,352
Portugal 9,391 13,924 28,026
EC Total 2,452,455 3,738,921 6,732,999
Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics for Israel, New York, 1978, 1985, 1988.
From the tables above it can be seen that although Israel 
was concerned about the prospects of EC enlargement, its 
exports did not in fact suffer in the immediate aftermath of 
enlargement. Trade between the EC and Israel in fact 
improved dramatically. Even in the vegetable and fruit 
category, in which Spain and Portugal compete very directly, 
the actual trade figures were positive for Israel. Of all 
vegetables and fruit exported by Israel in 1985, 75.4% went 
to EC markets; whereas in 1988, following enlargement, the 
percentage had increased to 78.6.
In 1987 Protocols were issued in response to Israel's 
concerns over the enlargement of the EC. The first
Protocol outlined financial cooperation to aid Israel's 
industrialisation, and two others eased adjustment for
23 See Bull. EC: 11-1988, pt.2.2.22; OJ L327 30.11.1988
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Israel to the EC enlargement; one offset the new 
agricultural competition faced by Israel, and the other 
harmonised custom's duties between Israel, Spain and 
Portugal.
Three r e p o r t s w e r e  drawn up, one for each protocol, and 
were sent to the European Parliament (EP) for ratification, 
a power the EP had only recently acquired under the Single 
European Act of 1986. As will be discussed below, 
ratification by the Parliament was not forthcoming, and the 
withholding of economic benefits from Israel was an attempt 
by the European Parliament to impose an economic sanction 
with the primary objective of changing Israeli policy 
regarding direct Palestinian exports. Israel's insistence on 
maintaining "made in Israel" labels on products originating 
in the West Bank and Gaza was contrary to the position of 
the Community, which was to encourage direct Palestinian 
exports. Direct exports was for Israel an acknowledgement
24 1) European Parliament, "Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the conclusion of the protocol on financial cooperation between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel," European Parliament Session Documents 1987-88 , Doc, A 2-0285/87, 1 February 1988; 2) European Parliament, "Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the conclusion of the protocol to the agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel consequent on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the Community," European Parliament Session 
Documents 1987-88 , Doc. A 2-0286/87, 1 February 1988;3) European Parliament, "Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on the conclusion of a fourth additional protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel," European Parliament Session Document 1987-88, Doc. A 2-0287/87, 1 February 1988.
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that Palestine existed, and "Made in Palestine" labels on 
Palestinian goods was therefore a sensitive issue. However, 
it was an issue important to the Community whose position, 
evolved over the years in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation, was to favour self-determination for 
the Palestinians.
The involvement of the European Parliament in the trade 
discussions represented a new, wider connection of trade and 
politics between Israel and the EC. It also represented the 
integration of the EP into the international political arena 
of the European Community. Perhaps most importantly however, 
the involvement of the Parliament signalled a new tension 
between the institutions of the Community and the member 
states, and with it a new method of foreign policy action.
The EC had managed to keep its political cooperation 
discussions separate from the evolving trade relationship. 
Yet by doing so it had also diminished its ability to 
establish itself as an actor of significance in the region. 
The involvement of the EP forced the issue of political 
responsibility and moved the Community to more integrated 
action. This case highlights the maturation of the Community 
in matters of international consequence, and reveals the 
internal dynamic of institutional behaviour which led not 
only to action in the form of the parliamentary sanction, 
but also to the increased legitimation which sprang from 
that action.
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II. European Political Cooperation: from the Schumann
Paper to the Madrid Declaration.
The European Community of the Six did not have a joint 
position on the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. During the 
Six Day War the Heads of State and Government, although 
meeting in Rome, were not able to agree upon a common 
position.(25) Efforts by the Community to come up with a 
declaration were not successful; the positions of the member 
states differed substantially, and each adopted separate and 
divergent responses. The Federal Republic of Germany 
remained officially neutral although tacitly supporting 
Israel; France adhered to its pro-Arab policy; Italy was 
divided, but the government took a pro-Arab stand; the 
Netherlands adopted a pro-Israeli position, and accused the 
Arab states of causing the conflict by their hostile 
actions, a view which was completely opposite to that of 
France; and Belgium wavered on the issue, yet supported UN 
resolution 2 4 2 .(2 6 )
1. The Schumann Paper
It was not until the establishment of European Political 
Cooperation that the Community was able to coordinate a
25 For a comprehensive account of the varying opinions andpositions of the member states after the 1967 war, see Ilan Greilsammer and Joseph Weiler, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; An Israeli perspective." In A. Pijpers and D. Allen, eds., European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984) pp. 131-2.26 See A. Pijpers and D. Allen, ibid., passim.
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Middle East policy. The result of that collaboration was 
the Schumann paper, a report agreed by the six Foreign 
Ministers on 13 May 1971. This document outlined the
position of the Six toward UN resolution 242, and was an 
attempt to refine the wording of the resolution, which had 
been the subject of much controversy. One part of the 
dispute surrounded the omission, in the text of the English 
translation, of the word "all" before the word 
"territories". The Israelis and the British considered this 
a deliberate omission, an opening for further negotiation. 
The British Foreign Minister told the House of Commons, "The 
omission of the word "all"... is deliberate". The Arab
states remained adamant that "territories" meant "all" 
territories, and averred that they would interpret the 
resolution a c c o r d i n g l y . U N  resolution 242 of 22 November 
1967:
1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter 
principles requires the establishment of a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East which should 
include the application of both the following 
principles:
27 Bull. EC: 6-1971.2 8 Hansard, December 9, 1969.29 Jane Moonman, "Using UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the Basis for Peace," Focus (London: Britain/Israel Public Affairs Centre, July 1991).
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-Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict;
-Termination of all claims or states of belligerency 
and respect for and acknowledgement of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their 
right to live in peace within secure and recognised 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
-For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 
international waterways in the area;
-For achieving a just settlement of the refugee 
problem;
-For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and 
political independence of every state in the area, 
through measures including the establishment of 
demilitarized zones.
The Schumann Paper was an attempt to clarify UN resolution 
242, and present a coherent European stance. As important 
as it was for the European Community to converge on a 
crucial foreign policy issue, it was equally, if not more 
so, important for Israel that the EC did not adopt a unified
3 0 Yearbook of the United Nations, (New York, 1967).
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position. For Israel a unified Community position meant a 
pro-Arab position. France, under the presidency of George 
Pompidou, held considerable sway in Community of the Six, 
and Israel knew that the Community, if unified, would unify 
toward France, a state more sympathetic to the Arab cause 
than to that of Israel. At the end of the conference of the 
Foreign Ministers, a communiqué was issued on 13 May 1971 in 
which the Six declared that they:
consider that it is of great importance for Europe 
that a just peace should be established in the 
Middle East, and they are therefore in favour of any 
efforts which may be made to bring about a peaceful 
solution of the conflict.... they confirm their 
approval of Resolution 242...which constitutes the 
basis of a settlement and they stress the need to be
(31)put into effect in all its parts.
The report on which the declaration was based was itself not 
made public. However, the details of the report were 
disclosed by the Springer Group of the German Press who were 
opposed to it.(32) The Schumann Paper proposed:
31 Bull. EC: 6-1971.
32 See, I. Greilsammer and J. Weiler, "European Political
Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: An Israeli Perspective," in A. Pijpers and D. Allen, eds., European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, op. cit., p. 54.
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- the establishment of demilitarized zones in which 
international forces would be stationed;
- an overall Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territories with minor border adjustments;
- the internationalization of Jerusalem;
-the postponement of any conclusive solution 
regarding the sovereignty of East Jerusalem;
-the choice for the "Arab refugees" of either 
returning to their home or being indemnified;
( 33 )-the approval of the Jarring mission.
Several points of interest surround the Schumann Paper. 
First, like UN resolution 242, the Schumann Paper did not 
condemn Israel, nor was it inconsistent with the UN 
resolution. Second, there was no mention of the Palestinians 
or the Palestinian homeland in the paper; the Palestinians 
were considered as part of a general refugee problem. Third, 
the Schumann paper, as a result of objections to it by 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, was not published; the 
German Foreign minister declared, while on a visit to
33 Gunnar Jarring was the United Nations specialrepresentative for the Middle East. Jarring was engaged in shuttle diplomacy between New York and the Middle East for over one year. His objective was to secure the aims of UN resolution 242. See David A. Korn, "US-Soviet Negotiation of 1969 and the Rogers Plan," Middle East Journal, vol. 44 (Winter, 1990) p. 37.
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Israel, that the Schumann paper was merely a "working 
d o c u m e n t . F o u r t h ,  while the paper was not necessarily 
a pro-Palestinian document, it did reflect, by the very 
convergence of formerly disparate positions by the member 
states, some of them previously maintaining a definite pro- 
Israeli stance, a deterioration of EC-Israel relations.
The paper was most remarkable, perhaps, for its indication 
of the status of EPC: the Six Day War brought variance of 
positions, the Schumann paper brought convergence. Despite 
the fact that certain member states remained rather tenuous 
in their support of the document, the fact remains that it 
was agreed upon unanimously under the framework of EPC.
2. Joint Declaration of 6 November 1973
It was not until immediately after the Yom Kippur War that 
the European Community again took up the issue of the Middle 
East. At a meeting on 31 October, the Foreign Ministers 
decided on a declaration that was published on 6 November. 
This statement was crucial not only as a response to the Yom 
Kippur War, but also as it was the first EPC declaration 
concerning Israel. It outlined a European Community position 
toward the War which was substantially in agreement with 
Resolution 338 of the UN; it clarified the EC view of
34 Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy? (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987) p. 421.
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Resolution 242, and marked a shift in the EC position
/35 \towards both the Arabs and Israel.
The statement goes on to declare that its members :
...consider that a peace agreement should be based 
particularly on the following points:
(i) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of 
territory by force;
(ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial 
occupation which it has maintained since the 
conflict of 1967;
(iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence of every state in the 
area and their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries;
3 5 Resolution 33 8 reads:The Security Council1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the position they now occupy :2. Calls upon all parties concerned to state immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts ;3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
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(iv) recognition that in the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace account must be taken of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinians.
This declaration was somewhat of a victory for France whose 
policies had been pro-Arab since the 1967 War. France had 
lobbied, within the EC, for a move away from the United 
States' position which was to favour Israel. The EC 
Declaration brought a negative reaction from both the United 
States and Israel. The former was concerned with 
interference in its role as Middle East peace negotiator, 
and the latter with the Community's motivations for adopting 
a pro-Arab position. The Israeli government argued that the 
Community's reaction to the Yom Kippur War was biased for at 
least two reasons. First, the Community's objective was not 
to secure peace in the Middle East, but was rather to secure 
its access to Arab oil; it did not want to be affected by 
the OPEC oil cutbacks of 5%, to which all the member states 
had been subjected except Great Britain and France, 
considered, apparently, critical enough of Israel. Second, 
the Declaration went further than either UN resolution 242 
or 338, and explicitly named "the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians", a change from the Schumann Paper which 
followed more closely the text of UN resolution 242.
36 Bull. EC: 10-1973.
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Not only is the Declaration often cited as evidence of a
shift of the Community away from Israel, but it is also
often considered as the first serious step towards a
(37 )European Community Middle East policy. The 6 November
Declaration was an important step for the Community in the 
development of EPC. The Community took on a difficult 
foreign policy issue, and managed to formulate a collective 
policy. The Community's coordinated policy, forged out of 
formerly divergent views, made clear to all parties, 
including the United States, that the Europeans were serious 
not only about their involvement in the Middle East, but 
also about their involvement in international affairs in 
general. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, British Foreign Secretary, 
saw the Middle East policy as "a new step in the process 
leading to a common attitude on the part of Europe towards 
major international problems and thus to a common foreign 
policy." (38)
The British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, viewed the 
Declaration as a first step on the way to a comprehensive 
Middle East policy by the Community. He believed that the 
Community was "entirely correct in concentrating its efforts 
on a statement of foreign policy" and that the 6 November 
Declaration was a "substantial beginning, so that Europe can
37 Ilan Greilsammer and J. Weiler, Europe's Middle East Dilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987) p. 29; P. Ifestos, 
European Political Cooperation, op. cit. p. 426.3 8 Europe, 7 November, 1973.
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make the maximum possible contribution to the restoration of 
peace in the Middle East".^^^^
3. Copenhagen Summit (December 1973)
While the European Community reaction to the Declaration was 
positive because it showed internal harmony, the Arab 
reaction was similarly favourable because of the pro-Arab 
tilt which the document contained. At the Copenhagen Summit 
of the States and Governments, held a few weeks after the 
publication of the 6 November Declaration, the proceedings 
were disrupted somewhat, however, by the rather unexpected 
arrival of the Foreign Ministers of 4 OPEC states, who were 
invited, subsequently, to meet informally with the EC 
Foreign Ministers.
The Copenhagen Summit of the Heads of State and Government 
resulted in a statement which, inter alia, reaffirmed the 
EPC declaration of 6 November. The statement in its main 
parts reads:
The Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the 
united stand of their governments on the Middle East 
question embodied in the Declaration issued on 6 
November. Recent events have strengthened them in
39 Bull. EC: 12-1973.40 Werner Feld, "West European Foreign Policies: The impactof the oil crisis," Orbis, vol. 22 (Spring 1978) pp. 6 8 70.
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their view that the security of all states in the 
area, whether it be Israel or her Arab neighbours, 
can only be based on the full implementation of 
Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts 
taking into account also the legitimate rights of 
the Palestinians.
The Heads of State and Government are convinced that 
the requirements of sovereignty and the requirements 
of security can be met by the conclusion of peace 
agreements including among other arrangements 
international guarantees and the establishment of 
demilitarized zones.
The Copenhagen Summit was centred on the oil issue.
Regarding energy the Heads of State and Government:
confirmed the importance of entering into 
negotiations with oil producing countries on 
comprehensive arrangements comprising cooperation on 
a wide scale for the economic and industrial 
development of these countries, industrial 
investments, and stable energy supplies to the 
member countries at reasonable prices.(42)
41 Copenhagen Summit Conference Declaration, Bull. EC:121973, p. 10.42 Bull. EC: 12-1973, p. 11.
235
The British Prime Minister Edward Heath provided further 
evidence for this view when he said in a speech on 3 
December 1973 in Brussels: "It is only by using all the 
resources of foreign policy that we can hope to give Europe
secure access to the oil it needs". (43)
TABLE 6.3
Dependence on Primary Fuels 1973 in percent of total energy
Oil Natural Gas Coal* Other**
Italy.. . . 78.6 1 0 . 0 8 . 1 3.2
France 72 .5 8 . 1 16.1 3.2
Belgium and Luxembourg 62.1 13.8 23.7 0.4
Netherlands 54.2 42.3 3.4 0 . 1
W . Germany 58.6 1 0 . 1 30.1 1.3
Britain 52.1 13.2 33 . 6 1 . 2
Denmark 6 8 . 2 29.4 20.4 0 .6
Ireland 60.4 1 2 . 1 28.3 0 . 8
* including lignite and brown coal.** including nuclear energy, hydroelectric power, and geothermal energy.
Source: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1973
Directly before the Summit meeting, the OPEC ministers had 
agreed not to continue cutbacks to the EC, except for the 
Netherlands which was considered pro-Israeli. The Copenhagen
43 ibid., p. 24.
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statement did not mention the need for a policy for the Nine 
as a whole regarding effective measures with which to reply 
to the Arab oil cut-backs. Instead, the statement aimed to 
keep oil flowing to the EC by placating the OPEC states. 
According to Feld, "the deep official sympathies for Israel 
held by most EC governments were abandoned as a result of 
the oil debacle and powerful pressure from the Arab oil 
producers."(44)
The year 1973 found the EC totally unprepared for the Arab 
use of the oil weapon; (45) t:he EC, like most states at the 
time of the 1973 oil crisis, had neither a specific oil 
policy, nor a general energy policy.(4^ ) Turner sees this 
failure on the part of the EC as a direct consequence of the 
EC's Coal and Steel Community f o u n d a t i o n . 4^^ ) Oil was 
perceived as a supplement to coal in the 1950s, but by the
44 Werner Feld, "West European Foreign Policies; The impactof the oil crisis," op. cit., p. 80.45 See R. Lieber, Oil and the Middle East war: Europe in theenergy crisis (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1976); N.J.D. Lucas, Energy and the European Communities (London: Europa, 1977).46 According to Turner, cheap oil was "relied on as a basefor European industrial expansion, and, since the companies seemed able to bring in unlimited amounts, there was no need to rethink [the policy]," L. Turner, "The European Community : Factors of disintegration. Politics of the Energy Crisis," International Affairs, vol. 50 (1974) p. 405. It was not until the Six Day Warof 1967 that the Commission formulated a policy ofsorts, but this only referred to the oil stocks of member states, and not to reducing dependence on Middle East oil. See OJ C 69, 4.30.64, and Supplement, Bull.EC: 12-1968. See also Werner Ungerer, "Consequences ofthe Oil Crisis," Aussenpolitik, vol. 25, (1974) pp. 213-226; Carl Ehrhardt, "Europe and Energy Policy at Top Level," Aussenpolitik, vol. 26 (1975).47 Louis Turner, "The European Community; Factors ofDisintegration, op. cit. p. 405.
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1960s was being relied upon as the basis for European 
industrial expansion. No attempt to correct this outdated, 
and even fatalistic, policy void was made by the EC until 
1964 when a protocol relating to energy was signed. (48.) „ 
More serious guide-lines were established in 1968 following 
the attempted oil embargo at the time of the Six Day 
War(4^ ), but these were not an active attempt on the part of 
the EC to reduce oil dependency.
4. London Statement
The London Statement on the Middle East issued on 30 June 
1977 was the next crucial step for political cooperation. 
This statement was a continuation of the pro-Arab stance 
which had evolved from the 1970 Schumann Paper. It resulted 
from the 1977 meeting of the European Council in which the 
Member States :
...affirmed their belief that a solution to the conflict 
in the Middle East will be possible only if the 
legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give 
effective expression to its national identity is 
translated into fact, which would take into account the 
need for a homeland for the Palestinian people. They 
consider that the representatives of the parties to the 
conflict including the Palestinian people, must
48 OJ C-69, 30.4.1964.49 Supp. Bull. EC; 12-1968.
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participate in the negotiations in an appropriate manner 
to be worked out in consultation between all the parties 
concerned. In the context of an overall settlement, 
Israel must be ready to recognize the legitimate rights 
of the Palestinian people equally, the Arab side must be 
ready to recognize the rights of Israel to live in peace 
within secure and recognized boundaries. It is not 
through the acquisition of territory by force that the 
security of the States of the region can be assured but 
it must be based on commitments to peace exchanged 
between all the parties concerned with a view to 
establishing truly peaceful relations.
The London statement reaffirmed EC commitment to UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, but also went further. Not 
only did the London Statement mention the rights of the 
Palestinians, but also it gave expression to those rights by 
stating that the solution to the problem lay in the need for 
a Palestinian homeland. Several essential points regarding 
the London statement must be mentioned. First, it 
established new parameters for the Arab-Israeli discussion; 
the Palestinian problem was now the central feature, not the 
security of Israel. For the Israelis the key issue was the 
failure of the Arab states to recognise the state of Israel. 
The Community had shifted the focus of the discussion to the
50 Bull. EC: 6-1977.
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need for a Palestinian homeland. Second, Egypt had, by the
time of the London statement, begun negotiations with
(51)Israel, and had recognised Israel's statehood. The
London statement makes no mention of Egypt. Third, the
solution to the Palestinian problem which was to be worked
out by the Camp David peace process in the ensuing months
( 52 )made no mention of a Palestinian homeland. The Israeli-
Egyptian negotiations had centred on autonomy for those
Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza, not on a
homeland. Therefore, from an Israeli perspective the London
statement was opposed to every interest of Israel and was
( 53 )blind to the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.
Arab reaction to the London statement was positive. The 
statement had put very few demands on the Arab states, other 
than to recognise the rights of Israel to live in peace 
within secure and recognised boundaries. Conversely, the 
requirements asked of Israel were extensive, implicitly 
calling for it to give up territory in order to secure the 
mandate of a Palestinian homeland.
51 See, for example, Martin Sicker, Israel *s Quest forSecurity, (New York: Praeger, 1989).52 For an interesting evaluation of the Camp David PeaceProcess, see Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, Western Europe/79/5, "The EEC and the Middle East Peace Process," (August, 1979).53 See Ilan Greilsammer and J. Weiler, Europe's Middle EastDilemma: The Quest for a Unified Stance, op. cit.; see also, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, Middle East/77/3, "European Stance on the Palestinian Issue: EEC Statement Analysed," (August, 1977).
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5. The Venice Declaration
The Camp David peace process which began a few months after 
the June 1977 London Summit, was somewhat of an 
embarrassment for the EC, which did not wish to dismiss "the 
rights and concerns of all interested p a r t i e s " . gy this 
time "all interested parties" may have been a less than 
subtle reference to the part played by the EC. The Nine 
viewed the Camp David process as exclusionary, involving 
only certain of the parties concerned, namely Israel and 
Egypt, and of course the United States, which had previously 
been the prime external mediator in the conflict. The Camp 
David process, and the United States' involvement in that 
process, left the Europeans in the background,
A significant precursor to the Venice Declaration of 1980 
was the speech delivered by Irish Foreign Minister Michael 
O'Kennedy, in his role as President of the European Council, 
to the 34th United Nations General Assembly. In his speech 
O'Kennedy redefined the "legitimate rights" of the 
Palestinians to include a homeland; mentioned the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization by name, rather than 
alluding to "representatives" as other declarations had 
done; and for the first time used the term self- 
determination. O 'Kennedy stated that a peaceful settlement 
would be endorsed by the international community and would 
need to meet the legitimate rights of all parties, including
54 Bull. EC: 9-1978.
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Israel and the Palestinian people "who are entitled, within 
the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their 
right to determine their own future as a people.
The Venice Declaration is still considered to be the 
fundamental EC position on the Middle East. It was arrived 
at on 13 June 1980 at a meeting of the European Council in 
Venice. It is important enough to reprint in full;
1. The heads of state and government and the 
ministers of foreign affairs held a comprehensive 
exchange of views on all aspects of the present 
situation in the Middle East, including the state of 
negotiations resulting form the agreements signed 
between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed 
that growing tensions affecting this region 
constitute a serious danger and render a 
comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict 
more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The nine member states of the European Community 
consider that the traditional ties and common 
interests which link Europe to the Middle East 
oblige them to play a special role and now require 
them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3 . In this regard, the nine countries of the 
Community base themselves on Security Council
55 Speech delivered by Mr. O'Kennedy at the United Nations General Assembly 26.9.79, printed in Bull. EC; 9-1979.
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resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they 
have expressed on several occasions, notably in 
their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September
1978, 28 March and 18 June 1979, as well as the
speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by 
the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the thirty- 
fourth United Nations General Assembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to 
promote the recognition and implementation of the 
two principles universally accepted by the 
international community; the right to existence and 
to security of all the states in the region, 
including Israel, and justice for all the peoples 
which implies the recognition of the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to 
live in peace within secure, recognised and 
guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a 
peace settlement should be provided by the United 
Nations by a decision of the Security Council and, 
if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed 
procedures. The Nine declared that they are prepared 
to participate within the framework for a 
comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and 
binding international guarantees, including 
(guarantees) on the ground.
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6. A just solution must finally be found to the 
Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of 
refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious 
of existing as such, must be placed in oT position, 
by an appropriate process defined within the 
framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to 
exercise fully its right to self-determination.
7. The achievement of these objectives requires the 
involvement and support of all the parties concerned 
in the peace settlement which the Nine are 
endeavouring to promote in keeping the principles 
formulated in the declaration referred to above. 
These principles apply to all the parties concerned, 
and thus the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, 
which will have to be associated with the 
negotiations.
8. The Nine recognise the special importance of the 
role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the 
parties concerned. The Nine stress they will not 
accept any unilateral initiative designed to change 
the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on 
the city's status should guarantee freedom of access 
for everyone to the holy places.
9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an 
end to the territorial occupation which it has 
maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has
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done for part of Sinai, They are deeply convinced 
that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious 
obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. 
The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as 
modifications in population and property in the 
occupied Arab territories, are illegal under 
international law.
10. Concerned as they are to put an end to 
violence, the Nine consider that only the 
renunciation of force or the threatened use of force 
by all the parties can create a climate of 
confidence in the area, and constitute a basic 
element for a comprehensive settlement of the 
conflict in the Middle East.
11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary 
contacts with all the parties concerned. The 
objective of these contacts would be to ascertain 
the position of the various parties with respect to 
the principles set out in this declaration and in 
the light of the result of this consultation process 
to determine the form which such an initiative on 
their part could take.
The Venice Declaration was met with disapproval by both 
Israel and the Arab states. The former because of its 
perceived hostility to Israel, the latter because of the
56 See, Bull. EC: 6-1980, pt. 1.1,6.
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declaration's perceived ambiguity and inadequacy. The Venice 
declaration, for the first time in a Community statement, 
mentioned self-determination for the Palestinians, and 
direct involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) in the negotiation process. These objectives were 
anathema to Israel especially in light of the Covenant of 
the PLO whose guiding principles state:
The Jews are not a nation and consequently 
possess neither the right to self-determination nor 
the right to an independent state (Article 20);
Any solution not based on the right to total 
liberation of the country must be rejected. The 
objective - the establishment of an independent 
state - cannot be achieved by political means but 
only by armed combat (Articles 9 and 21);
The struggle against Israel is legal, but the 
defence of Israeli interests is illegal (Article
18).(57)
More surprising than Israeli reaction to the Venice 
Declaration was the negative Arab response. The PLO 
leadership was irritated that it had not been given
57 (Reprinted from "Report drawn up on behalf of thePolitical Affairs Committee on the situation in the Middle East", European Parliament Working Documents 
1982-83, Doc. 1-7 86/82, 3 November 1982 (Penders Report).
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exclusive capacity to negotiate on the part of the 
Palestinians; that there had been no call for a new UN 
resolution; and that the Declaration had made no mention of 
a Palestinian state. The PLO saw the declaration as a sell 
out to the United States and to the Camp David process. The 
Europeans had, in the eyes of the Arab world, aligned 
themselves with the United States.
6. The invasion of Lebanon (1982)
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was discussed at a 
special meeting of the Ten in Bonn on 9 June 1982.
Although the chief issue under discussion at the time was 
the Falkland Islands conflict, a statement was adopted on 
the situation in Lebanon. The foreign ministers "vigorously 
condemn the new Israeli invasion...[which] constitutes a 
flagrant violation of international law." At a meeting on 21 
June in Luxembourg the President of the Council, Mr. 
Tindemans, confirmed a decision not to sign the second EEC- 
Israel Financial Protocol. It was decided to suspend the 
signing of this Protocol until the next meeting of the 
Cooperation C o u n c i l . A t  a speech given by Mr. Uffe 
Ellemann-Jensen of Denmark on behalf of the Ten at the 
United Nations General Assembly, the Ten again expressed
58 Middle East International, 18 July 1980.59 Bull. EC: 6-1982, pt. 2.2.74 and 2.2.75.60 Bull. EC: 6-1982, pt. 2.2.75. The Cooperation Councilheld its third meeting in Brussels on 20 February 1983 (Bull EC: 2-1984); The second Financial Protocol was eventually signed in June 1983 (Bull. EC: 6-1983).
247
their outrage at Israel. Still, they offered no threat of 
sanctions, instead committing themselves only to a continued 
part in promoting a peaceful settlement. "The Ten will 
maintain and expand their contacts with all parties to help 
improve conditions for such n e g o t i a t i o n s ) The second 
Financial Protocol which provided Israel with 40 million ECU 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB) was, however signed 
before the withdrawal of troops in 1985.
7. Madrid 1989
A Declaration on the Middle East in the framework of 
European Political Cooperation was made in Madrid at a 
meeting of the European Council. Although it primarily based 
its Middle East policy on the Venice Declaration of 1980, 
the Madrid Declaration went further and mentioned the need 
for elections in the Occupied Territories as a contribution 
to the peace process. Also, whereas the Venice Declaration 
mentioned only the need for a peaceful settlement to the 
problems, the Madrid Declaration gave some direction for the 
fulfilment of that need.
The Twelve consider that these objectives should be
achieved by peaceful means in the framework of an
61 Bull. EC: 9-1982.62 Also on 10 December, 1982, the Council adoptedregulations concluding Agreements concerning the import of fruit salads. Thus the political issues at hand did not overwhelm the discussion of more mundane trade matters. See OJ L 371 30.12.1982.
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international peace conference under the auspices of 
the United Nations, as the appropriate forum for the
direct negotiations between the parties
. (63)concerned.
The need for an international peace conference had, however, 
been drawn up at a meeting of EPC two years before in a 
Declaration on 23 February 1987.(^4) But at this meeting the 
fundamental framework was still the Venice Declaration of 
1980.(G5)
III. The 1987 Protocols: an Economic Sanction?
From the survey of both the trade relationship of the EC to 
Israel, and the declarations made in the framework of EPC, 
it is evident that politics and economics were virtually 
impossible to separate. The 1987 protocols, mentioned above, 
which were sent to the European Parliament for ratification 
in 1988, were vetoed.(66) has been argued that the 
parliamentary veto was an economic sanction wielded by the
63 Bull. EC: 6-1989.64 Bull. EC: 2-1987.65 At the Copenhagen meeting of the Foreign ministers on 13July 1987, the Twelve stated that "For their part, the Twelve have followed developments in the area closely and have decided to pursue, both via the Presidency and bilaterally, their contacts at all levels with all the interested parties in order to contribute to the search for a just global and lasting settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian problem, in accordance with the 1980 Venice Declaration." Bull. EC: 7/8-1987, pt. 2.4.1.66 OJ C94, 11.4.1988.
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EP in an attempt at political coercion; (^ 7) that the
withholding of the ratification by the European Parliament 
was an effective sanction which succeeded in bringing about 
a change in policy by the Israelis. In other words, the 
primary objective was satisfied.
However, it is difficult to assess whether in fact this was 
the case. The impact of the European Parliament sanction 
within Israel "was felt exclusively by the farmers. And the 
economic damage inflicted was not sufficient to unleash 
domestic political pressure that would bring a new policy 
more in accord with the norms of the Community." The 
normative aspect of sanctions was therefore not effective; 
European Parliament action did not bend Israeli policy on 
the paramount issue of repression in the occupied 
territories, even if was instrumental in allowing Gaza fruit 
growers to export their goods directly, and without "Made in 
Israel" labels.
The Parliamentary sanction did, however, accomplish a goal 
in line with legitimation and tertiary objectives. European 
Political Cooperation, which had produced a Community policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the basis of which was the 
Venice Declaration, had provided a framework within which
67 See Ilan Greilsammer, "The Non-Ratification of the EEC-Israel Protocols by the European Parliament (1988)," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 27 (April, 1991) pp. 303- 321.
68 Ilan Greilsammer, "The Non-Ratification of the EEC-IsraelProtocols," ibid. p. 32 0.
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the issue could be discussed, and gave the European 
Parliament a touchstone for its action. Without the basic 
texts of EPC, it would have been much more difficult for the 
European Parliament to debate the issue. The Community's 
position, drawn up within EPC, found its manifestation in 
the actions of the Parliament, which had just been given the 
new power of assent. Under Article 238 EEC, as amended by 
the European Single Act of 1986, an absolute majority of 260 
was needed to ratify the Protocols.
The Parliamentary debate was ostensibly about commercial 
matters, but influenced markedly by political 
considerations. The three reports, prepared by rapporteur 
Hitzigrath of the Committee for External Economic Relations, 
resulted in parliamentary debates on March 8 and 9, 19888 in 
Strasbourg.(69) Extracts from these debates provides some 
interesting insights to the politics of economic decisions. 
Typical of the arguments against approval were those of:
Mr. Arndt (Socialist, Germany):
with international agreements there are often 
political factors involved which do not stem 
directly from the actual agreements being voted on.
This of course means that the House faces a 
political question of principle concerning its 
relations with the country with which these
69 See, Bull. EC: 3-1988. For the complete debate see,
"Debates of the European Parliament" OJ C23, 8.3.1988
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agreements or protocols are to be concluded. That is 
particularly true of the protocols with Israel. They 
are a classic example,...
Were it not for the events in the occupied 
territories in Palestine and the behaviour of the 
Israeli Army, it is my guess that at least one 
protocol would have been approved without any 
debate. I refer to the protocol dealing with the 
inclusion of Spain and Portugal in the existing 
contractual arrangements with Israel.... The action 
taken by the Army and the unrest in the Israeli- 
occupied territories has given the whole thing a 
political dimension which we simply cannot ignore.
Conversely, those in favour of ratification opposed the
mixing of economics and politics. For example Mr. Blumenfeld
(European Peoples Party, Germany):
You are trying to exert unfair political pressure on 
a sovereign government, even though I share your 
concern over the behaviour of the Israeli Army, but 
that is quite another matter... we are talking here 
of financial and trade protocols which have to be 
approved and which we, as one of the three Community 
institutions, have to approve.
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Cassidy (Conservative, UK)
It is a pity that, in what is essentially a matter 
of trade, political considerations should be dragged 
in.
Pimenta (Liberal, Portugal):
We must be able to distinguish between the results 
of normal political cooperation on the one hand and 
economic relations on the other.
Oppenheim (Conservative, Denmark):
When does a matter have political character, and 
when does it not? The extreme consequence could be 
that we will always find a political reason for 
dealing with or refusing to deal with a question.
Varfis (member of the Commission):
I just want to stress that the three protocols do no 
more than adjust relations between the Community and 
Israel concerning matters of trade and financing 
cooperation. These protocols are in no way related 
to the occupied territories.
The protocols, receiving 255, 207 and 205 votes 
respectively, were not ratified in March 1988 by the 
European Parliament when they met in Strasbourg on March 8 
and 9 (260 votes were needed). The parliament had, in 
effect, imposed an economic sanction. However, two events
253
between March and October 1988, (Gaza citrus growers were 
granted direct export licenses, and Yasser Arafat went to 
the European Parliament at the invitation of the socialist 
group), led to their approval, and the European Parliament 
ratified the protocols with 314 v o t e s . (70)
Conclusion
The Parliament's measures, while not accomplishing a 
profound change in the policies of Israel, had structural 
implications for Community's international position. The 
wielding of an economic instrument by a body acting 
independently of its member states was a crucial factor in 
the measurement of this actor capacity, as was the 
recognition by the EP of its potential political power and 
the political consequences of trade measures. Before the 
issuing of this sanction, the European Parliament had hardly 
figured in the discussion of European Community competences.
The crucial question in this case is: how has the 
Community's handling of its relationship with Israel, 
considering that it chose to make the Arab-Israeli conflict 
its first foreign policy issue, strengthened or diminished 
the Community's image as an international actor? The 
examination of the period from the initial trade 
relationship which began in the 1960s to the pivotal Venice
70 Ilan Greilsammer, "The Non-Ratification of the EEC-Israel Protocols," op. cit. p. 317.
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declaration of 1980 and beyond highlights three important 
issues. First, attempts to project the EC's collective 
identity were thwarted by the concerted effort to separate 
the political and foreign policy issues from those of the 
developing trade and economic association. Unlike the 
Central and East European states (discussed in a later 
chapter), where the Community has specifically tied the 
issue of trade to political reform, with Israel a staunch 
attempt at separation was maintained up until the time of 
the Parliamentary sanction. This separation weakened the 
backbone of the declarations by providing no structural 
support. Declarations may be an effective instrument on 
their own, but their support by economic considerations 
would have increased the force of the EC's international 
image projection.
Second, approval internationally of Community involvement in 
the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict provides 
significant evidence for the thesis that the Community is 
capable of actions which increase its legitimisation even if 
mechanisms of EC and EPC are not always coordinated. While 
approval of the Community's role was not forthcoming in the 
beginning, it was gradually accepted and approved of by 
almost all parties to a greater or lesser degree. When the 
Community meeting in Madrid proposed an international peace
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conference it brought, quite remarkably, convergence of 
opinion from all s i d e s . (71)
Third, the collection of EPC declarations, reports and 
statements became a "useful reservoir of common 
reflection"(72) which established a cumulative EC position. 
This history of involvement through the means available to 
EPC, refined and adjusted over the years, became a source of 
commonalty among the member states whereby divergence was 
avoided and positions were known. In the 1980 Venice 
declaration principles that had been agreed upon 
cooperatively in a diplomatic framework produced a common 
position on an important international issue.
Along these lines, as a diplomatic instrument, EPC also 
became in effect a tool for various groups with a variety of 
interests who were eager to see EPC declarations reflect 
their particular objectives. In the case of Israel certainly 
the parties involved reacted to all pronouncements with 
hearty conviction either favourably or not. The fact that 
broad or even vague statements emerged from EPC did not 
deter either the attempts to influence their content, or the 
strength of reaction to them by the international community.
71 See Europe, no. 4497, 25 February 1987. The PLO said: "Wesupport all European efforts in this sense." The Israeli response was also favourable, seeing European Community efforts as a new step in the peace process. Europe, no. 4497, 26 February 1987.72 P. Ifestos, op. cit., p. 529.
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Israel proved a stronger case of Community actorness than 
Southern Rhodesia partly because the mechanisms which 
provided a voice for the Community were better developed.
EPC had emerged from its fledgling stages and had begun to 
fulfil its purpose, EPC began also to take unexpected turns, 
not only providing a voice for the Community position, but 
also providing a forum for others to voice approval or 
disapproval of the EC line. But the main reason that the 
Community gained from its involvement in Israel goes back to 
the original hypothesis; that the Community can act and 
obtain legitimisation in spite of limited competences and in 
spite of the frequent dichotomy and tension between the 
member states and the Community. The Community was able to 
legitimise itself because it was first, included in the 
international peace process, second, involved in systematic 
official dialogue and contact, and third, it adopted 
positions on specific issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
which were of specific interest and salience to the other 
actors involved. The Venice Declaration alone provides proof 
for the above three points as it remained a significant 
benchmark document for both Palestinians and Israelis for 
fourteen years.
As already noted in chapter two, the implications of 
economic acts are full of foreign policy consequences, and 
keeping economic decisions separate from those of foreign 
policy is virtually impossible. The concept of actorness is 
centred to a large degree on the wielding of economic power.
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In the case of Israel, it took the European Parliament not 
only to speak out on the topic, as shown in the debates, but 
also to take concrete measures.
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CHAPTER 7
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY: THREE LEVELS OF ACTORNESS
Introduction
The previous chapters on Rhodesia and Israel showed a 
certain degree of evolution in the Community's ability to 
square the tensions and interplay in the forces of its 
external relations and EPC. Rhodesia showed a muddled 
Community not sure either of its role in the whole situation 
or of its capacity or willingness to act. Little 
legitimisation was gained through the uncertain way in which 
the Community implemented and enforced UN sanctions. In the 
case of Israel the same tensions remained between the 
Community and the member states: the Community remaining 
unwilling to cede to the political realities of economic 
involvement. With Israel some headway was made in combining
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competences, but then only at the insistence of the European 
Parliament. The case of Central and Eastern Europe provides 
a prime illustration of the integrative forces of Community 
external relations and^its politicab coopreratrion mandate. 
Political and economic aspects of the Community's 
relationship with the states of Central and East Europe are 
integrated more fully than ever before, and the best example 
to date of Community actorness is established.
In April 1990 the European Community held a special summit 
in Dublin to consider the changes which were occurring in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The European Council,
applauded the continuing process of change in these
countries with whose people we share a common
heritage and culture. This process of change brings
ever closer a Europe which, having overcome the
unnatural divisions imposed by ideology and
confrontation, stands united in its commitment to
democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, full respect
of human rights, and the principles of the market 
(1)economy.
With this summit the EC began to address fully the new 
situation with its eastern neighbours. The newly
(2 )democratised states of Central and Eastern Europe in the
1 Press Release "Conclusions of the Presidency", EuropeanCouncil, Dublin, 2 8 April, 1990.2 For the purpose of this chapter. Central and EastEuropean States (CEES) will include Poland, Hungary,
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years since 1989 have been, and still are, in a state of
flux. The evolution of the changed and changing relationship
between the Central and Eastern Europe states (CEES) and the
European Community presents a case which fits precisely ar
study of the complex relationship between external economic
and political relations. The Community has offered its
reward of association, ie. with the Europe Agreements, and
perhaps eventual membership for the newly independent states
( 3 )of Czechoslovakia , Poland and Hungary symbolising for 
them a "return to E u r o p e " . F r o m  June 25 1988 when the 
"EC-COMECON Joint Declaration on the Setting Up of Official 
Relationships" was issued/^^, to the framework developed 
under the Europe Agreements, the Community has been 
extensively involved in contributing to the restructuring of 
its eastern neighbours.
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the recent 
major developments in the relationship between the states of
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider the states of the former Soviet Union.Czechoslovakia as of 1 January 1993 officially split into the Czech and Slovak Republics. At the time of writing new agreements were currently being worked out with the two new states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As the new arrangements are in the negotiating phases, the term Czechoslovakia will be used. See Bull. EC: 1/2-1993, "Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the Commission to negotiate two separate Europe Agreements between the Community and the Czech Republic and between the Community and Slovakia", p. 59.See Commission of the European Communities, "Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Background Report, 17 February 1993.Bull. EC: 6-1988; OJ 1988 L 157/35.
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Central and Eastern Europe and to examine why and how the EC 
became the major international actor in aiding the 
transition in the East. A crucial issue in this analysis is 
the role of Community involvement and its influence in 
determining the direction of the transition. The CEES 
needed/ and still need, help to overcome the structural 
difficulties of transforming their centrally planned 
political and economic systems into democratic, civil 
societies and market economies. The Community has a vested 
interest in an economically healthy neighbours. For this 
type of large scale restructuring the Community has no 
historical precedent or model of its own on which to base 
such an immense process of transition. The examples of Spain 
and Portugal, which were effectively integrated into the 
Community, provide the closest comparison. However, Spain 
and Portugal were, while cut off from the political system, 
still participants in the world economic system. The 
structures of a market economy were in place. Therefore 
these states did not provide an adequate model on which to 
base the relationship between the Community and the CEES.
The extensive literature on the Spanish-Portuguese enlargement and the role of the European Community includes, inter alia, Roy H. Ginsberg, "The European Community and the Mediterranean," in Juliet Lodge, ed., Institutions and Policies of the European Community (London: Pinter, 1988); R. Taylor, Implications for the 
Southern Mediterranean Countries of the Second Enlargement of the European Community (Brussels: Commission of the European communities, 1980); D. Seers, C. Vaisos and M-L Kiljunen, The Second Enlargement of 
the EEC: the Integration of Unequal Partners (London: Macmillan, 1982); L. Tsoukalis, The European Community
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The approach of the Community in Eastern and Central Europe 
which has been to set up rigid strictures of political 
conditionality is the chief factor on which all forms of aid 
and association are based. The Community has a lot to gain 
from system transformation in terms of trade and economic 
benefits. Equally important are its gains in terms of its 
own legitimization through its role as the chief actor in 
the region. This assertion, as will be discussed below, is 
based on three levels of actorness by the Community: The 
Community as aid provider, as role model, and as establisher 
and enforcer of political norms. Through these three levels 
of actorness the Community has secured its legitimacy in the 
region, and strengthened its position as an international 
actor.
Before analysing the actor capability of the Community in 
Eastern Europe, it is important to look briefly at the 
background of the relationship between the EC and the CEES, 
and the progressive levels of involvement between the two
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( 7 )bodies. Although some background is of course necessary 
to the discussion, this chapter will not engage in an 
historical account of the region and its special 
relationship with the states of the European Community or 
focus on the essential "Europeanness" of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Rather it will remain centred on the transitionary 
phase of the development of market economies and democratic 
institutions and the EC's involvement with this process.
I. General Background and Early Developments
The lack of contractual relations between the European 
Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon or CMEA) ended on June 25 1988 with a Joint 
Declaration signed in L u x e m b o u r g . T h i s  Declaration was 
the result of negotiations between the Community and Comecon 
which began in 1 9 8 6 and announced the opening of official
and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London; George Allen and Unwin, 1981); L. Tsoukalis, "A Community of Twelve in Search of an Identity," International Affairs, vol.54 (1978) pp. 437-451; R. Pomfret, The Mediterranean 
Policy of the European community: A Study of Discrimination in Trade (London: Macmillan, 1986); Commission of the European Communities, "General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement," COM (78) 120 final, 20.4.1978 (Brussels, 1978); Commission of the European Communities, "The Transitional Period and the Institutional Implications of Enlargement," (COM) 190 final, 24.4.1978 (Brussels, 1978).Because of the unprecedented changes which have occurred in the Central and East European states in the years since 1989, this chapter will concentrate on the limited time frame between 1988 and 1993.OJ 1988 L 157/35.Bull. EC: 9-1986.
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relations between the two b o d i e s . T h e  negotiations
leading up to the signing of the Declaration made a
breakthrough when Comecon agreed to the Community's demand
that it should be allowed to negotiate contracts with the
individual member states rather than with Comecon itself.
The European Commission then sent letters both to Comecon
and to the members states of Comecon outlining its
intentions to open negotiations for cooperation made
( 11 )possible by the flexibility of the Declaration. It was
for the most part a political document which declared the 
pursuit of cooperation in fields falling within their
10 For more on the early relationship between the European Community and Comecon see, Barbara Lippert, "EC-CMEA relations: normalisation and beyond," in Geoffrey Edwards and Elfriede Regelsberger, eds., Europe's Global Link: The European Community and Inter-regional Cooperation (London: Pinter, 1990); J. Pinder, "Integration in Western and Eastern Europe: Relations between the EC and CMEA," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 18 (1979); J. Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe (London; Pinter, 1991); K. Schneider, The Role of the European Community in East- West Economic Relations : A Pan-European Economic Space? (London: Macmillan, 1990); M. Maresceau, The Political and Legal Framework of Trade Relations between the European Community and Eastern Europe (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989); R. M. Cutler, "Harmonizing EEC- CMEA relations: Never the twain shall meet?". International Affairs vol. 63, no. 2, 1987; J. Maslen, "The European Community's Relations with the State- Trading Countries of Europe 1984-1986", in F. J. Jacob's {ed.)Yearbook of International Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1987); A. Lebahn, "Alternatives in EC- CMEA Relations", Aussenpolitik, vol.31, no.2, 1980; A. Shlaim and G.N. Yannopolous, The EEC and Eastern Europe (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978); See also H. J. Seeler, Report on the Relations between the European Community and the Council of Mutual of Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Eastern European Member States of the CMEA, European Parliament Working Documents, A 2- 187/86 (December 19, 1986).11 Bull. EC: 1/2 1986.
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individual competences and areas of common interest.
However, it opened the way for trade agreements and resulted 
in the acceptance by Comecon of bilateral trade agreements 
between the Community and the individual member states of 
Comecon. With this Declaration the original mistrust by the 
CMEA of the European Community which was published in both 
Pravda and Izvestia, in 1962 had come, officially at least, 
to an end.
The Community and the states of Comecon were quick to take
advantage of their new opportunities. On 30 June 1988
Hungary and the EC initialed a trade and cooperation 
( 13 )agreement ; Poland followed closely behind, initialing an 
agreement on 22 July 1 9 8 8 . Three months following the 
signing of the Declaration an agreement with Hungary was 
concluded, and six months later a trade and cooperation
/15 )agreement with Czechoslovakia was signed. These early
agreements, which were somewhat overtaken by the pace of 
events (including the demise of Comecon), remained a 
significant starting point for trade between the two sides.
12 See "On Imperialist Integration in Western Europe (TheCommon Market)", Pravda and Isvestia, August 26, 1992, quoted in, "EEC-CMEA Relations: The Aftermath of the Declaration of June 25, 1988", European Integration and East-West Relations, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1990); For an analysis of the attitude of CMEA towards the newly formed EEC, see Michel Mouskhely, "Le bloc communiste et la Communauté Economique Européenne", Revue d'économique politique, mai-juin, 1963, pp. 406-438.13 Bull. EC: 6-1988.14 Bull. EC: 7-8-1988.15 Twentieth General Report, point 900.
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II. Three Levels of Involvement
Before going on to discuss the further implications of the 
new relationship to Eastern and Central Europe which the 
European Community is now faced with, it is first essential 
to analyse the content of the various aid, trade and 
association agreements. These include the Phare programme, 
the 1st Generation Agreements, and the Europe Agreements. 
Trade measures have traditionally, as has been seen in the 
previous chapters, relied on the Common Commercial Policy 
for their implementation. However, the splitting up of trade 
and politics forces issues into rigid and artificial 
categories. This artifice becomes blatantly unsuitable in 
the situation of Central and Eastern Europe where the 
mandate of the Community is itself inherently political. In 
the case of the CEES, trade measures are a method of 
ingraining not only market principles, but the whole gamut 
of liberal economic and social institutions. Nevertheless, 
to cover the whole one must begin by splitting up the 
relevant parts. Therefore this chapter will first look at 
the three levels of Community involvement; the Phare 
programme, the First Generation Agreements and the Europe 
Agreements.
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Aid and restructuring
1.1 The Phare Programme
It was the Paris Summit on 14 and 15 July 1 9 8 9 of the 
seven main industrialised states (G-7) which offered 
specific and concrete measures to central Europe in the form 
of aid to Poland and Hungary. The first step in the process 
was the establishment of a coordinated aid programme which 
would help to protect the emerging states from social and 
economic hardship during their tenuous transition period. 
Thus, the programme was designed to be emergency aid to
( 17 \assist through the transition period. At the Paris
Summit the G-7 states requested that the Community act as 
the developer and coordinator of an aid programme that would 
address the needs of the CEES. In this context the
Commission presented the Phare (Poland and Hungary; aid for 
economic reconstruction) programme^^^^ which is the 
legal basis for a Community "Action Plan". The main aim of
16 Bull. EC: 7-8-1989.17 Although Phare was originally fashioned specifically forPoland and Hungary, it was in 1990 extended to include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. For a short period the German Democratic Republic was also included, but this came to an end with unification. The former Yugoslavia has now also been eliminated from the list.18 The fact that the Community was charged with this task isa significant point, and will be addressed fully below.19 It is perhaps interesting to note that Phare is theFrench word for lighthouse.20 Council Regulation 3906/89; OJ 1989 L 375/11. See alsoCommission of the EC, XXIIIrd General Report on the Activities of the European Communities, 1989, point 786.
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the Phare programme was to establish an environment in which 
the progress toward market and democratic reforms could be 
facilitated.
The Commission was quick to take up its mandate of
(2 2 )distributing aid. One week after the Paris Summit Ecu
130 million was approved, and shipments of food aid 
(23)began. This immediate aid relief would be overtaken
eventually by a more structurally based aid programme aimed 
at creating necessary social and political infrastructures 
(discussed below).
On the part of the European Community, efforts to assist the 
CEES included "improvements in agricultural production, 
training, including the training of managers, staff and 
public administrators and the promotion of foreign 
investment"  ^ The original aid was only temporary, 
conditional upon the continued efforts at reform. By May 
1990 the Commission held that "the infrastructure of 
political and reform programmes [had] largely satisfied the
21 See XXIIIrd General Report, op. ait. The original Pharelegislation was amended by EC Regulation 2698/90, OJ L 
257, 21.09.90.22 For an account of the first aid shipments and theCommissions role see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Aid for Poland and Hungary, first assessment", European Affairs, vol. 4, 1989.23 See Bull. EC: 7-8-1989, and Bull. EC: 8-1989.24 See EC Commission's Spokesman Press Release IP, 1989,
no.953, 13 December 1989.
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conditions for the extension of coordinated assistance"
( 25 )which was approved at the Paris Summit.
At the beginning of Phare's implementation, the programme
received financial means of Ecu 5.7 billion in grants from
the G-24. Of this amount the Community and its member states
provided the bulk, giving Ecu 4.1 billion in grants.
This amount made the European Community the largest
contributor to the programme (72%), Out of the money
allocated by the EC, Ecu 2.5 billion of the grants was given
from the Community's own budget, and the remaining Ecu 1.6
billion was provided by the member states. From the
contributions of the member states of the EC, Germany's was
by far the largest at 48.8% (Ecu 766 million), a figure
which demonstrates not merely the economic strength of
Germany, but its direct geographical and historical
(2 1 )relationship with the Eastern European states. Germany
25 Commission of the European Community, Action Plan:Coordinated assistance from the Group of 24 to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania and Yugoslavia, SEC (90)843, Brussels, 2 May 1990.26 For a discussion of the aid distribution see H. G.Gerstenlauer, "Der Beitrag der EC zur Restrukturierung Mittel- und Osteuropas", in J. Fischer et.al.(ed.). Die 
Transformation der osteuropàischen Lander in die Marktwirtschaft (Münster/Hamburg: Lit. Verlag, 1992), pp. 352-373. The following figures are taken from the G24 Coordination Unit, Directorate General for External Affairs, Brussels, PHARE Scoreboard, Commission of the EC, 30 January 1993. See also Commission of the European Communities, Together in Europe, Brussels, No. 14, 1.9.92. For an interesting criticism of aid distribution see. The Economist, 10 April, 1993. See also J. Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe, op. cit., p.27 Germany has been an ardent supporter of the CEES, and hascalled for accelerated integration of these states into the Community. See J. Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny",
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perhaps more than the rest of Europe "lives with the 
inescapable necessity to coexist".
The Phare programme concentrated in its first year on 
economic transformation through the support of economic 
activity in specific sectors. These focused on five main 
areas: emergency aid, agriculture, environment, training and 
education. The Commission hoped that by focusing on a small 
number of specific areas it could do the most in the short 
term. The short term was significantly different in its 
requirements than future aid would have to be. The immediate 
aim of the Community was to aid in stabilisation by 
providing food and the transportation of agricultural 
products.
For its longer term Phare plans the Commission again relied 
on a number of core areas. These areas covered the more 
structural goals of transformation to market principles.  ^
The first of these sectors was privatization, a goal not 
necessarily of liquidating state controlled industries, but 
rather of identifying potentially profitable concerns and 
aid in the process of transforming them into independent 
operations. This aid is aimed primarily at the restructuring
Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, no. 1, 1990, pp. 33-50; "Genscher Proposes States to Join EC", Financial Times, 10 February, 1992; "Kohl Backs Prague’s EC Drive, Financial Times, 2 8 February, 1992.28 Werner Weidenfeld, "The European Community and EasternEurope", Aussenpolitik, vol. 38, no. 2, 1987, p. 143.29 See Directorate General for External Relations, Operation
PHARE, 1/646/90 EN, Commission of the EC, Brussels, 29.11.90
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of business concerns, and the demonopolization of 
enterprises which had controlled entire market sectors. The 
Commission also commissioned studies into the future market 
viability of various business concerns, and helped”tO* 
determine the costs and benefits of liquidation of such 
potentially tenuous operations.
A second area identified by the Commission was banking 
services and the operation of financial institutions. This 
was considered by the Commission to be a crucial segment of 
structural reform necessary to create an economy capable of 
growth through investment. In this context the European
Commission offered not only financial contributions to the 
assets of banks, but also offered consultancy on the 
development of commercially operable financial institutions.
Third, the Commission was instrumental in the advancement of 
small companies and in entrepreneurial ventures through the 
guaranteeing of credit and loans. The Commission did not 
provide risk capital for the establishment of firms, nor did 
it engage in direct aid to firms, but it has contributed to 
equity funds set up with the purpose of facilitating such 
ventures (although these are approved on a case by case 
basis by the European Investment Bank). Here the Commission
30 See Bank for International Settlements, "RecentDevelopments in the External Payments and Financing of Central and Eastern European Countries", International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Basel, Bank for International Settlements Internal Paper, February, 1991.
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relies on providing funding to the recipient countries'
(31)programmes which are then responsible for distribution.
Fourth on the list of structural reform relates to labour 
laws, including employment, training and social security 
arrangements,
It was originally planned that the Phare Programme would 
expire at the end of 1992, but after reviewing the situation 
the EC Council decided to extend the time frame until 
1 9 9 7 . The objective for the 1993-97 period is to 
continue the economic and technical assistance, but the 
emphasis is on consolidation of existing reform measures. 
This requires;
an appropriate balance between technical 
assistance and support for investment;
support for institution building;
programming on a multi-annual basis;
the greater use of funds to support the countries' 
own sectoral and regional development programmes;
(33)cooperation between PHARE, EIB and EBRD
31 For a discussion of the above points, see J. Pinder, TheEuropean Community and Eastern Europe (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 89-90.32 See Commission of the European Communities, Together inEurope, Brussels, no. 18, 15.11.92.33 Commission of the European Communities, "Towards a Closerassociation with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Background Report, 17 February, 1993.
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1.2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
As part of the commitment by the Community to aid in the 
setting up of a thriving private sector, it was agreed to 
establish a banking institution capable of guaranteeing 
financial intermediation. Thus the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was conceived at the 
Strasbourg meeting of the European Council in December 1989 
on an initiative from President Mitterrand.Although the 
it is not part of the EC directly, the Community set up the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in April 
1991 whose sole mandate it was to provide financing for 
economic restructuring in the states of Eastern and Central 
Europe by assisting the establishment and growth of the 
private sector in the former socialist countries.  ^ The 
Bank was designed specifically to respond to the unique and 
unprecedented changes that have happened in the region, and 
it had responsibility in no other part of the world. The 
role of the Bank is to foster systemic change with a 
holistic outlook.
34 Bull. EC: 12-1989.
35 For more detailed account of the EBRD, see P. Aghion,"The Transformation of the Economies of Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development", In J. Fischer et.ai. (ed.) op. cit.; I. Shihata, The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development : A Comparative Analysis of the Constituent Agreement (London: Graham and Trotman, 1990); K. Donfried, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: An Institution of and for the New Europe, Doc. no. 91-611F (Washington: Congressional Research Service, August 15, 1991).
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Therefore, the EBRD has a "Dual Mandate" in the realms of 
both the political and the economic. While other 
international monetary institutions such the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) rely solely on macroeconomic data 
(inflation rates, and debt as a percentage of Gross National 
Product) as a gauge of a functioning economy, the EBRD 
focuses on economic and political indicators. The main task 
of the Bank is to assist in the transition of the Central 
and East European states by helping to promote private 
projects and entrepreneurial endeavours. But this assistance 
is predicated upon the political commitment to, and practice 
of, democratic principles such as free and fair elections, 
free press, and a functioning judiciary process. The Charter 
of the Bank specifically forbids it from financing projects 
in states where these democratic elements are missing.
The original capital amounted to Ecu 10 billion which was 
contributed to by 42 founders including the member states of 
the Community, the European Community as a separate entity, 
and the European Investment Bank. The EBRD has implemented a 
two sided approach which aims at both direct investment with 
the private sector-through its merchant banking operations- 
and with the development of market infrastructure-through 
its development banking programme.
3 6 P. Aghion, op. cit. p. 224,
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2. The First Generation Agreements
The pace of change in the Eastern European states meant that 
the European Community had to come up with strategies to 
manage that change, to find ways to accommodate it and to 
direct it at a rapid speed. Aid was the first step, but was 
not necessarily a dynamic force the in transformation of the 
economic system. For this reason a system of multiple 
channels had to replace the one-way approach of aid. As has 
been mentioned above, trade and cooperation agreements were 
negotiated and initialed almost immediately after the 
Declaration. These are known as the 1st Generation 
Agreements because they were signed with extreme speed, but 
were overtaken very quickly with more advanced trade and 
association agreements which will be discussed later.
While the Phare was designed initially as an aid programme, 
trade and cooperation agreements were seen as the long term 
basis on which to develop relations with the former 
socialist states. Bilateral trade agreements were signed, as 
has been mentioned above, almost immediately after the June 
25, 1988 Declaration between the Community and Comecon. 
Although Comecon was to disappear, the liberalisation of 
trade between the members of the former organization would 
remain a significant starting point for the new order.
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2.1 Canada Clause
It was these 1st Generation Agreements, however, which set 
the scene. Because of the wide variety of agreements, the 
special circumstances, and the potential political 
consequences of actions covered under the exclusive 
Community competence of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 
the Community concluded trade agreements under a similar 
approach to the so-called Canada clause, which relies on 
Article 23 5 of the EEC Treaty, permitting the Council, 
acting unanimously, to take those measures which "should 
prove necessary to attain in the course of the operation of 
the common market, one of the objectives of the Community 
[for which] this Treaty has not provided the necessary 
powers". This arrangement was devised in 1976 when the 
Community was faced with developing a progressive trade and 
cooperation with Canada. The Commercial and Economic Co­
operation Agreement between the Community and Canada was
(37)signed under Article 235 of the Treaty. The use of this
arrangement was used as a model for the trade and 
cooperation agreements that the Community signed with the 
states of eastern Europe. The reason for the insertion of 
the Canada clause was simple : the member states of the 
Community, who had concluded agreements of their own on a 
bilateral basis with individual states, did not want the 
Community acting under Article 113 to take over complete
37 OJ L 260/1 1976.
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responsibility for financing such agreements. Instead, they 
wanted to keep some autonomy over their relationships, and 
therefore insisted on Community and member state agreements 
running in parallel with each other. In the agreements 
signed with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, 
Articles 113 and 235 serve as the legal basis.
In principle, the 1st generation agreements provided a 
general framework under which trade and commercial 
relationships could develop. From the outset these 
agreements were designed to be flexible and transitional, 
allowing for a progressive development of trade and 
cooperation with the idea that, as adherence to democracy 
and market principles became established, new agreements 
would replace them.
The basic contents of the new agreements, according to some 
observers was not as important as "their very 
existence".  ^  ^ But although these agreements have been
overtaken to a large degree by events and replaced by more 
advanced arrangements, their contents still warrant a 
discussion.
38 Hungary, OJ L 327/2, 1988; Poland, OJ L 338/2, 1989;Bulgaria, OJ L 68/2, 1990.
39 D. Horovitz, "EC-Central/East European Relations: NewPrinciples for a New Era", Common Market Law Review, vol. 27, 1990, p. 269.
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2.2 Trade and commercial relations.
The agreements covered all goods and reaffirmed the 
reciprocal application of the General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade (GATT) principles to which all parties to the 
agreements were members except the Soviet Union. The 
Community was able to protect its s t e e l a n d  coal markets 
by placing off limits those dominions covered by the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In agriculture the 
Community offered limited reductions in tariffs to Poland, 
but the agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania 
were left open for future consideration. Quantitative 
restrictions on imports into the Community were applied on a 
progressive timetable of elimination relating to the
degree of "sensitivity" of these products.  ^ The Trade and
Cooperation Agreements envisaged provisions for certain 
sensitive sectors such as agricultural products textiles, 
iron and steel but the EC concessions were limited. Quota 
increases in textiles of 13 percent were provided for 
Hungary and 23 percent for Poland. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania all participate in the Multifibre 
Arrangement (MPA) which governs trade in textiles and
40 Note that the steel market is very sensitive to anyincrease in imports, however slight. See Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Together in Europe, no. 21, 1992.41 See OJ L 326/6, 1989 and OJ 362/1, 1989 whereinquantitative restrictions were eliminated or suspended for Polish and Hungarian products as of 1 January 1990.42 See OJ L 327/2, 1988; OJ L 339/2, 1989; OJ L 68/2, 1990.See also the XXIIIrd General Report, pt.787.
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clothing. Their combined share was less than 11 percent of 
EC imports of textiles and clothing from MFA states.
TABLE 7.1
Commodity composition of exports to the EC from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 1988-90, in percentages. 
Poland
1988 1989 .1990
Food and agriculture 20.0 23.2 21.0
Textiles and clothing 10.6 10.3 11.2
Iron and steel 06.8 08.9 08.9
Source: Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 28th edition (Luxembourg, 1991).
Czechoslovakia
1988 1989 1990
Food and agriculture 07.0 08.6 07.6
Textiles and clothing 10.9 09.9 10.7
Iron and steel 14.0 14.7 15.2
Source: Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 28th edition (Luxembourg, 1991).
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Hungary
1988 1989 1990Food and agriculture 28.5 29.3 23 .8
Textiles and clothing 15.8 14.7 15.5
Iron and steel 07 .5 07.2 08.3
Source: Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 28th edition (Luxembourg, 1991).
The above figures show that the "sensitive" sectors which 
the Community had designated made up a substantial 
percentage of the exports of the Central and East European 
states.
Second, on the cooperation side of the agreements, the 
Community gave rather broad outlines, what has been 
described as a "catalogue of p o s s i b i l i t i e s " . T h e  main 
emphasis of this aspect of the agreements was the emphasis 
on the promotion of trade through the establishment of a 
favourable trade environment. This would involve not only 
relatively simple aims such as the organization of 
conferences and trade fairs, but also the elimination of
43 Commission of the European Community, "European Economy:The European Community as a world trade partner". No. 52, 1993, p. 34.44 François de La Serre, "The EC and Central and EasternEurope," in The State of the European Community: Policies, Institutions and Debates in the Transitions Years, Leon Hurwitz and Christian Lequesne, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 305.
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trade frictions through measures such as consultations and 
arbitration over conflicts involving disruption of local 
market conditions, and abiding by internationally respected 
trade rules including those spelled out by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Cooperation 
was also envisaged in economic spheres such as managerial, 
and technical know-how. However, it is crucial to note that 
no financing was provided by the Community for these 
cooperation agreements.
The new agreements which the Community negotiated also 
contained a new aspect of political conditionality with 
clauses concerning elements of democracy and political 
pluralism, the rule of law, and elements of market 
principles.  ^ By incorporating requirements of adherence 
to a political regime based on liberal democratic and 
economic principles, the Community has made it economically 
highly disadvantageous for the Central and East European 
states to pursue any other forms of economic and political 
relations. These conditions have been elaborated and 
expanded upon in further agreements, which will be discussed 
below.
45 See Heinz Kramer, "The EC's Response to the New 'Eastern Europe", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no.2, 1993, p. 238.
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3. The Europe Agreements
With the fast pace of change in the CEES, the need for more 
complex and comprehensive agreements became apparent; thus 
the 1st generation agreements were supplanted by a second 
generation of relations. The Council of Ministers agreed on 
20 January 1990 that the Commission should prepare a paper 
on the possibility of association agreements for those CEE 
states which could demonstrate a significant movement toward 
economic and political reforms. This p a p e r r e s u l t e d
in the Council giving its go-ahead for negotiations to begin 
between the Commission and Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
H u n g a r y . T h e  Commission's paper led eventually to the 
signing of the Europe Agreements, the name given to these
46 Commission of the European Communities, "The Developmentof the Community's Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Communication to the Council and Parliament, Brussels, 1 February, 1990.47 Commission of the European Communities, Associationagreements with the countries of central and eastern Europe: a general outline, Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament, COM/90/398 final, Brussels, 27 August, 1990. This paper was the result of the refining of several earlier reports: Commission of the EC, Implications of recent changes in central and eastern Europe for the Community ' s relations with the countries concerned. Communication from the Commission to the Council, SEC(90)111 final, 23 January 1990; The development of the Community 's relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, SEC(90)196 final, 1 February 1990; The development of the 
Community’s relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, SEC (90)717 final, 18 April 1990,48 Negotiating Directives for Association Agreements withPoland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Council Directives 11043/90; 11044/90; 11045/90, Council of the European Communities, Brussels, 19 December, 1990.
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special association agreements, by the Community and 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland on 16 December 1991.
The Europe Agreements are a new type of association
agreement which cover not only comprehensive trade
relationships, but have at their heart the firm commitment
of the Community to eventual accession. To this end the
Europe Agreements provide sections on political dialogue and
cooperation at the highest levels, plus economic, financial,
and cultural cooperation. For its part, the Community
expects "decisive steps ...taken towards systems based on
( 51 )political and economic liberties". These measures must
be implemented to a level which guarantees to the Community
that the associates and potential new members are "pursuing
( 52 )the path of economic and political reform". While the
agreements refer to the "four freedoms" of free trade and
( 53 )free movement of labour, capital, and services it is
perhaps the political sections which are most noteworthy.
49 Bull. EC: 12-1991. In order to facilitate theimplementation of the provisions on trade and economic matters while waiting for national ratification from the member states, interim agreements were signed, OJ L 114/1, 30.4.92; OJ 1 115/1, 30.4.92; OJ L 116/1, 30.4.92 on a Council Decision of 25 February, 1992. Negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria led to signing of Europe Agreements with those states in early 1993. See Bull.EC: 3-1993 and COM(93)45.50 See Commission of the European Communities, BackgroundReport "Towards a closer association with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe," op, ait.51 See Commission of the European Communities, "TheDevelopment of the Community's Relationship with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, op. cit., p. 7.52 ibid, p. 8.53 As spelled out in the Treaty of Rome, Art. 8(a).
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According to one view, the economic effects of the Europe 
Agreements "are probably less important. Possible short-term 
trade creating effects" may result, but are not as crucial 
as the political involvement.However, in order to 
analyse the Europe Agreements fully, it is necessary first 
to look at the trade and economic aspects of the Agreements 
before looking at the political side.
3.1 Trade levels and patterns
To begin this section some figures are necessary to clarify 
trade patterns, and to see where the Community and the CEES 
may see potential opportunities or threats from the 
liberalisation of their markets. In this realm there are 
many asymmetries. While the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the synchronous dismemberment of the protected economic 
environment, provided the necessary conditions for systemic 
transformation of the CEES, it also meant that new 
dependencies have arisen. The dismantling of the CMEA 
required enormous reorientation by the CEES. However, 
economic strengthening through trade is one path which the
54 Paeter Balazs, "New Ways of Enlarging the EuropeanIntegration to East European Countries: The Case of Hungary, Paper presented at the "Impediments to Transition: The East European Countries and the Policies of the European Community" conference, Florence, Italy, 24-25 January 1992.55 As noted by Andras Koves, Central and East EuropeanEconomies in Transition, (Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press, 1992), pp. 94-95.
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CEES can follow to turn their dependence into 
interdependence.
The following table shows the share of total exports which 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Romania have 
with the European Community. It also shows how important the 
Community is as a trading partner.
TABLE 7.2
Share of total exports to the EC from CEES in percentages.
1988 1989 1990 1991
Bulgaria 17.7 18.7 28.8 37.8
Czecho­
slovakia
24.2 25.7 32.0 n. a.
Hungary 22.5 24.7 33.5 39.7
Poland 30.3 30.9 35.6 45.0
Romania 24.0 25.2 31.4 34.2
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, (New York, 1991) .
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Table 7.2 shows a significant increase in trade between the 
CEES and the Community. Between 1988 and 1991, for example, 
Poland’s share of exports destined for the Community rose 
48.5 percent from 30.3% in 1988 to 45.0% in 1991, Hungary's 
share of exports to the EC rose from 22.5% to 3 9.7%, a 
tremendous 76.4% increase in the space of only a few years. 
By 1991 the EC accounted for well over thirty percent of 
trade for each of the CEES.
TABLE 7.3
Export Destinations, pre 1990 in percent of total exports.
Czechoslovakia
1989
Hungary
1989
Poland
1988
EC 15.7 25.0 28.9
USSR 30.5 25.1 24.5
Other Eastern 
European states
23.3 15.9 16.2
Source: UN, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, (New York, 1989).
56 Note also that by 1991 about 50% of all exports from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland entered the EC without quantitative restrictions or import duty. See "European Economy; The European Community as a world trade partner", op. cit., p. 35.
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Table 7.3 shows the export destinations of three of the CEES 
in the pre-transitionary period. While trade with the EC was 
still a significant factor, it was dominated by the Soviet 
Union and the satellite statesr As competition from western 
products grew, the Soviet market collapsed, and the trade 
agreements with the EC began to take effect, trade patterns 
began to shift.
TABLE 7.4
1991-1992
Poland 13.9
Czechoslovakia 36.3
Hungary 10.0
Bulgaria 19.4
Source; Eurostat, "Basic Statistics of the Community", 30th edition (Luxembourg, 1993).
The above tables show the dynamic nature of trade between ^
the two groups, and the rates at which trade is beginning to 
flow with the economic transformation. The tables also show
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that the European Community has become and will likely 
remain the main trading partner of the CEES.
Yet, in the Europe Agreements the European Community has
been careful to protect its markets in "sensitive" products
which the Community fears will disrupt too radically its
( 57 )domestic market. While the Europe Agreements embody a
commitment by the Community to move toward, within a period 
of ten years, the removal of all trade obstacles, they also 
contain specific contingencies for protecting Community 
markets in textiles and clothing, iron and steel {ECSC 
products) and a g r i c u l t u r e . T o  this end, the Agreements 
contain safeguard provisions in case of market disruptions 
or serious injury to Community producers, although no 
mention is made of which measures are to be taken if 
disturbances do occur. These measures are known as 
contingent protection, ie. actions taken through trade 
policy as a response to import growth. The Community is
57 In this regard some argue that the Community has been tooprotective of certain markets. "Sensitive" sectors make up (and, based on economic modelling, would continue to make up) only a very small proportion of trade with the CEE states. See J. Rollo and A. Smith, "The political economy of Eastern European trade with the European Community; why so sensitive?", Economic Policy, April 1993, pp. 140-181. For an analysis of the ways in which the direction of trade toward the Community would be affected by the breakdown of the CMEA, see S. Collins and D. Rodrik, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the World Economy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1991).58 For an early analysis of export on agricultural goodsmight effect the Community market, see Center for Economic Policy Research, Monitoring European Integration: The Impact of Eastern Europe (London; CEPR,1990) .
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nervous that the sudden increase in the export potential of 
the CEES will damage markets which are important to the EC 
economy. Therefore, a complex scheme was laid down in the 
interim Europe agreements (which established ttie trade 
related areas of the Europe Agreements) for the schedule of 
trade barrier r e m o v a l . T h i s  plan keeps in place 
substantial protection even after the end of the ten year 
transition period called for by the Agreements.
The general principles involved in the trade aspects of the 
Agreements between the CEES and the Community revolve around 
the establishment of the "four freedoms" outlined in the 
Europe Agreements. These are the movement of goods, 
services, capital and people. The Community has made some 
attempts at speeding the process of economic integration.
The European Parliament "considered that the Community could 
open up its markets to most industrial products from Central 
and Eastern Europe more rapidly than envisaged, but that 
access to Community markets would none the less have to be 
restricted for certain sensitive goods". However,
59 For the specific breakdown of tariff reductions,quantitative restrictions, and import quotas see Commission of the European Communities, "European Economy: The European Community as a world trade partner". No. 53, 1993, pp. 34-36. For an analysis of the complex schedule of trade liberalization see, H.-D. Kuschel, "Die Europa-Abkommen der EC mit Polen, Ungarn und der CSFR", Wirtschaftsdienst, 1992, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 93-100; J. Langhammer, "Die Assoziierungsabkommen mit der CSFR, Polen und Ungarn: wegweisend oder abseisend?". Discussion Paper No. 182, (Kiel: Institute 
for World Economics, 1992).60 OJ C 176, 28.6.93. For more on the position of theEuropean Parliament see, Christa Randzio-Plath, Report
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Parliament also stressed that trade "be better balanced, 
and...steps be taken to encourage foreign investment in 
Central E u r o p e " . A n o t h e r  proposal by the Commission 
suggested lifting all tariffs on industrial goods by the end 
of 1994, thus shortening the period from five to three years 
in which trade in that area is liberalised. The Commission 
also suggested reducing from five to four years the period 
in which customs duties on sensitive goods such as steel and 
textiles are to be eliminated.
According to the Commission, the Community is prepared to 
take action to:
- shorten the transition periods for the Community's 
dismantling of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions for all products;
- improve market access for food products, making 
use of all possible flexibility for import quotas 
and the reduction of levies or duties, and for 
textiles, including the liberalisation of economic 
outward processing traffic;
of the Committee on External Economic Relations on a General Outline for Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, European Parliament Session Documents, A3-0055/91 (March, 1991)61 idem.62 Bull. EC: 5-1993.
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- encourage regional economic cooperation under the 
rules of origin for all products from associated 
central and east European countries and EFTA.
However, while the Community and specifically the Commission 
may have spelled out its aims at improving market access, it 
is clear that it is the member states who "should be 
encouraged to apply the provisions of the Europe Agreements 
concerning access to employment as soon as possible, notably 
through the conclusion of bilateral agreements on 
quotas",
These bilateral agreements may be hard won by the member 
states in a political environment which sees in Western 
Europe rising unemployment, increasing right-wing 
nationalism and the social effects of large populations of 
migrants, especially in Germany. Estimates of the number of 
former Soviet citizens who wish to live and work in Western 
Europe have been as high as 6 m i l l i o n . T h e  establishment 
of a true freedom of movement would have implications for 
the Community which are far-reaching. Yet, the Community 
does foresee economic advantages from greater liberalisation 
of labour movement. The benefits from economic 
reconstruction and two-way access to employment do not run 
in one direction only. And the same is true for the opening 
up of the labour market. High unemployment in the CEES
63 Background Report, op. cit., p. 4,
64 idem.65 See, for example. The Economist, 1 December, 1990
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portends destabilization of a tenuous, restructured 
political economy. Relaxing restrictions on freedom of 
movement has the potential to offset high, destabilizing 
unemployment in the CEES, and according to Finder: "migrant
workers would not only help their economies and remittances 
but would also demonstrate the Community's practical concern 
about the unemployment problem". However, the political 
problems faced by the Community and its member states are 
enormous when it comes to such sensitive issues as jobs.
This dilemma of adjustment between short term and long term 
considerations is reflected in the Commission's Report which 
in its section on movement of workers (which nowhere 
contains the word "free" in association with movement of 
workers) states that the "possibility... to improve the 
conditions for access to employment, should be 
explored".
To conclude this section on market access, it can be argued 
that while domestic political problems are faced by the 
Community, and more relevantly by its member states, the 
long term advantages may be worth waiting for. The 
Commission also stresses these advantages, stating that the
66 See J. Finder, op. cit., p. 68.67 For a discussion of Europe's labour market, and thepotential changes caused by the integration of Central and Eastern Europe see, K. Szénasi-Zborovâri, "Changes in the Labour Market in the East.and the West", European 
Integration and East-West Relation's, (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1990) pp. 101-107.68 For further commentary on the movement of labour see,Andras Koves, Central and East European Economies in Transition, op. cit. p. 96.
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"Europe Agreements considerably improve market access....
But the pace of liberalisation should be increased and trade 
obstacles in sensitive sectors removed more rapidly". The 
Commission goes on;
A more buoyant economic climate in partner countries 
will increase demand for many products which the 
Community is well placed to supply, given its 
comparative advantages, which include technology, 
proximity and familiarity with the market, A more 
attractive range of goods in the shops and brighter 
economic prospects in their own countries will 
encourage workers to pursue job opportunities at 
home without adding to migratory pressures.
As has been argued throughout this thesis, the external 
economic relations of the European Community go hand in hand 
with its external political relationships. In the aftermath 
of the post 1989 transitions of the CEES, commercial 
measures and the interests of the Community have played a 
significant role in reshaping not only the economy of the 
CEES, but also their political institutions. Trade and 
market access have provided an incentive for the CEES to 
reform, but the asymmetries which exist between the two 
groups of states have caused t e n s i o n s . T h e  awareness by 
the Community that, for its part, it must move toward
69 See Background Report, op. cit., p. 470 See A. Koves, op. cit., pp. 94-96.
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incorporating the CEES into its foreign policy
considerations, goes concurrently with the CEES attempts at
internal political reform. That economic aid and market
access is, in the opinion of the Community, dependent upon
(71)political reform, has been shown above. That political
reform has led to political involvement with its neighbours 
will now be discussed.
3.2 Political dialogue
At the Lisbon European Council Meeting of 26 and 27 June
1992, the Council stated that the "political dialogue will
be intensified and extended to include meetings at the
highest political level. Cooperation will be focused
systematically on assisting their efforts to prepare the
(72 )accession to the Union which they seek". The
stipulations in the Europe Agreements regarding political 
reform are a potent signpost of the significance of the 
symbiosis between the Community's economic and political 
relationships. Crucially for the Community, the political 
relationship which develops could have significant 
implications for its foreign policy and security. Therefore, 
the institutionalisation of political dialogue is a vital 
element of the Europe Agreements.
71 See also, I. Husain and I. Diwan, "External Debt andExpected Net Flows," in P. Marer and S. Zecchini, The Transition to a Market Economy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Vol. 2, Special Issues, (Paris: OECD, 1991).72 See Bull. EC: 6-1992.
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Therefore the Europe Agreements call for formal 
arrangements, establishing multilateral political discussion 
with the Visegrad states. The first of the
institutionalised arrangements was a meeting of the foreign 
ministers of the EC and the Visegrad states on 5 October 
1 9 9 2 . At this joint meeting it was noted "with 
satisfaction that political dialogue has started even before 
the Europe Agreements have entered into force". It was also 
suggested that "[p]olitical dialogue should foster political 
convergence, a better mutual understanding and enhanced 
security and stability throughout Europe". To further this 
process, "the parties will seek to consult each other on 
matters covered by the European Political Cooperation in
(75)harmony with the provisions of the Europe Agreements".
While in the Europe Agreements the methods for political 
dialogue remained rather vague and inconclusive, (stating 
that mechanisms should be established by "any other means 
which would contribute to consolidating, developing and 
stepping up political d i a l o g u e " ) the Commission used its 
report entitled "Towards a closer association with the 
countries of central and eastern Europe" to outline somewhat 
more specifically its proposals for how this dialogue should
73 Visegrad is the term used to define Poland, Hungary andCzechoslovakia.74 See "Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of theEuropean Community and the Visegrad countries". Bull. EC: 10-1992.75 See "Joint Statement", ibid.7 6 See Background Report, op. cit., p. 3.
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be carried out. In this context the Community, according to 
the Commission should;
- intensify the political dialogue which has begun 
with the Visegrad countries and which is being 
established with other partners;
- strengthen the multilateral character of this 
dialogue, which will become increasingly necessary 
both for practical reasons and to build a common 
European approach to pressing international issues 
of mutual concern;
- increasingly involve partner countries in the
(77 )process of European political cooperation.
Developing this political dialogue, and making arrangements 
for its incorporation into the institutions of the Community 
is another element of Commission concern. To this end it 
outlines the appropriate measures which it suggests should 
be included as a method of consolidating the necessary 
mechanisms. The measures outlined by the Commission include:
- the extension of political dialogue to the level of 
political cooperation working groups dealing with 
issues of common interest;
77 idem.
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“ participation, as observers, of partner countries at 
certain European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
meetings of common interest on an ad hoc basis;
- systematic consultation with partner countries, as 
envisaged in the Europe Agreements, on positions 
taken within international organisations.
The foreign policy dimension of the Europe Agreements means 
that after the Council's enactment and the Parliament's 
assent, the Agreements must still be ratified by the member 
states. Because they contain elements of political 
cooperation, which is not covered under Community 
competence, the agreements are considered "mixed", ie. they 
must be concluded by the Community and the member states on 
one side and the other signatories to the agreements on the 
other. ^ 9)
3.3 Accession
At the heart of the Europe Agreements, and related to the 
section on political dialogue is the commitment by the 
Community to the eventual accession of the CEES. The 
question of the CEES subsequent membership in a future
7 8 i dem.79 Because the ratification by the member states would take considerable time, the Community was able to put into force the trade and cooperation aspects of the agreements through the Interim Agreements. This allowed the speedier application of those areas covered by Community competence.
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"European architecture" is given only vague shape, however, 
and a timetable is kept off the agenda. Rather, priority is 
given to the direction and progress of the CEES in the 
transformation of their economic and political systems so 
that they are compatible with and can integrate into the 
international system. Membership is not mentioned by the 
Community as the ultimate or automatic result for the 
associated states, although the Twelve in the preamble to 
the Agreements agree to assist in the achievement of the aim 
of accession, even if it is not mentioned how this 
assistance will be carried o u t . T h e  Commission has made 
attempts at persuading the Council for a broader negotiating 
mandate which would include a firm schedule from the 
Community on a time frame for membership.
At the first joint meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 
Luxembourg it was reaffirmed that the implementation of the 
Europe Agreements;
should help the [Visegrad states] achieve their 
final objective, namely accession to the European 
Union.... The Community recognized that the Visegrad 
countries have established democratic political
80 As Pablo Benavides, a negotiator for the Community,stated, "This is not an entrance ticket. It's a kind of trial run..., quoted in Financial Times, November 23-24, 1991.81 See Committee on External Economic Relations,"Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Resolution, PE 150.654 (April 18,1991),
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systems which ensure respect for human rights, and 
made substantial progress in creating economic 
systems based on competitive markets and private 
entrepreneurship.(82)
However, the Council must confirm that it accepts the goal 
of eventual membership in the Community. This acceptance, 
according to the Council, will be based not only on the 
specific provision for membership laid down by the Treaties, 
but also on their ability "to fulfil the conditions 
required".^ ^  The conditions established are laid down in 
the Commissions "Report" which cites six considerations:
- the capacity of the country concerned to assume the 
obligations of membership (the "acquis 
communautaire");
- the stability of institutions in the candidate 
country guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for minorities;
- the existence of a functioning market economy;
- the candidate's endorsement of the objectives of 
political, economic and monetary union;
- its capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the European Union;
82 See "Joint Statement", op. cit., p. 127
83 See Background Report, op, cit., p. 2.
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- the Community's capacity to absorb new members while 
maintaining the momentum of European 
integration,
The considerations listed go far beyond the Treaty of Rome 
in its Article 237 which refers to any democratic European 
state being eligible for membership. The hesitancy of the 
Community over exactly how to handle the desired membership 
objective of the CEES is also perceptible in its Report 
which states:
It would be premature at this stage to establish a 
timetable. The Europe Agreements and the initiatives 
suggested will help to prepare partner countries for 
eventual membership, but the timing will depend on 
progress in meeting the criteria referred to above.
A process of transition would be needed both before 
and after the formal act of accession to enable them 
progressively to assume their responsibilities as 
full members of the Community and the European
u n i o n . (85)
The difficulties that the Community perceives with accession 
has resulted in its subsequent reluctance to rush into 
membership agreements with the CEES. The Community has kept 
other policy issues higher on the agenda. The development of 
the Single European Market, the Intergovernmental
84 idem.85 ihid., p . 3.
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Conferences, the Maastricht negotiations and ratification, 
and the EFTA enlargement have all occupied positions of 
importance.
III. Three Levels of Actorness
The power vacuum that has emerged as a result of the 
collapse of the old bloc has also provided a focal point. 
The Community has perceived the potential that comes with 
its economic weight in Eastern Europe and its clout as an 
actor in this area of joint foreign policy.
While a number of concerns have led to the Community 
becoming involved in the transformation of the CEES, the 
most apparent has been to build and maintain secure paths 
through which the market for its goods can remain open and 
permeable. This concern, in which trade is tightly bound to 
politics, is explicitly spelled out in the Commission's 
report on enlargement, which refers to the CEES as 
developing a "new partnership" with the Community, in which 
the "other countries of Europe are looking to us for 
guarantees of stability, peace and prosperity". This 
guarantee is "not only in their interest, but also in 
ours".^^^^ Thus, the evolving relationship between the
86 See for example, Luis Planas Puchades, Report onCommunity Enlargement and Relations with other European Countries, European Parliament Session Documents, A3- 0077/91 (March 26, 1991).87 Bull. EC; Supplement 3-1992, Europe and the Challenge ofEnlargement, p . 20.
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Community and the CEES is one of multiple interests and 
potential outcomes. The Community's interests and actorness 
in the region can be analysed in three parts. First, through 
the Community as a provider of aid, second, as a role model, 
and third, through the concept of political conditionality: 
the conditions that the Community dictates for membership, 
or for that matter, association. These three considerations 
are key factors in the development of political policies 
between the two groups of states. And all are indicators of 
the Community's role as the relevant actor in the region.
1. The Community as provider
From the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that the 
Community is faced with a new situation which it does not 
know precisely how to handle.Comparisons have been 
drawn between the restructuring of the CEES and the Marshall 
Aid plan provided by the United States after the Second
88 In terms of accession the only comparable situation is perhaps the expansion of the Community with the Mediterranean enlargement in which the aim was partially to stabilise the emerging and perhaps somewhat tenuous democracies of Spain, Greece, and Portugal. Although not much has been written on this particular comparison, many writers have commented upon it briefly. See for example, H. Kramer, "The EC's Response to the New 'Eastern Europe'", op. cit.; J. Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe, op. cit.; An interesting comparison has also been, although in a different context, between the CEES and third world development, namely the structural adjustment policies of the International Monetary Fund in Latin America and Africa. See C. Stevens and T. Killick, "Eastern Europe: Lessons on Economic Adjustment from the Third World", International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3, October, 1991.
303
World W a r . T h e  prosperous capitalist states of the West 
have had to develop new political and financial 
relationships with those of the CEES, who have emerged from 
their communist umbrella “In great need of assistance for a 
recovery programme. Moreover, the West has had a tremendous 
investment in ensuring that the transition went smoothly. 
The West won the Cold War and, as one writer put it:
Having spent trillions of dollars to contain
communism in Europe, the West would make one of the 
great mistakes in history if it refused to spend the 
several billions more needed to help countries 
through this hard period.
These comparisons with the Marshall Plan are instructive on 
one hand, but there are two fundamental differences. First, 
although the restructuring of Central and Eastern Europe is
a "grand design" along the same lines as the Marshall Plan,
the situation is different. The United States is no longer 
the benefactor. Reasons of geographic proximity, historical
89 See, for example, D. C. Stone, "Assistance to Central andEastern Europe", The Bureaucrat (Winter, 1990-91) pp. 7- 12; A. Koves, Central and East European Economies in Transition, op. cit., pp. 108-111; W. Kostrzewa, P. Nunnenkamp and H. Schmieding, "A Marshall Plan for Middle and Eastern Europe?", The World Economy, vol. 13, no. 1, 1990, pp. 27-50; E. Mortimer, "Where are you, Marshall and Monnet?", Financial Times, 10 July, 1990. For an analysis and history of the Marshall Plan itself see, H. B. Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Cornell University Press, 1955); A. S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Europe 1945-51 (London: Methuen,1984).
90 R. Horraats, "As Comecon Fades, the East Needs a Hand",
International Herald Tribune, 21 November, 1989.
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relationship, and political interest, are partly 
responsible, but the European Community has replaced the 
United States as the main actor involved also because it and 
not the United States has been perceived as the relevant 
party. Second, economic conditions in the West have meant 
that it is politically risky to become too heavily involved 
in the CEES. The Community cannot risk its own cohesion by 
overextending itself to its eastern neighbours.
The Marshall Aid plan authorised 1.3% of US gross national
product to be allocated to Western Europe in the post-war
period of 1 9 4 8 - 5 2 . The Delors plan has suggested one-
third of 1% of Community gross domestic product, amounting
( 92 )to Ecu 14 billion. As has been pointed out, if the
Community were to give the same proportion as the Marshall 
plan, it would amount to over Ecu 50 billion.
The Community has not provided aid on the massive scale of 
the Marshall Plan. However, through its Phare programme, it 
has provided, as has been discussed in the previous section, 
substantial and significant assistance. More important, the 
Community has been not only the chief provider, but also the 
coordinator of Western aid, charged by the G-7 states at the 
Paris S u m m i t w i t h  the coordination of foreign aid. The
91 See D. Stone, "Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe",op. cit.92 President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors,address to the European Parliament, 17 January 1990. See Bull. EC: 1/2-1990.93 See J. Pinder, op. cit., p. 98.94 Bull. EC: 7/8-1989.
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Paris Summit set the stage by requesting that the Commission 
of the European Community coordinate the aid from the Group 
of 2 4 (G-24) states. At the Paris Summit it was noted 
that ;
the peoples of Eastern Europe are aspiring 
increasingly vociferously to freedom and democracy, 
and that in some of the East European countries the 
leadership has set in motion a process of 
democratization and modernization.,.. Taking the view 
that other interested countries and the competent 
international institutions should also be involved in 
the endeavours of the Seven, they called for a 
meeting to be held as soon as possible to organize 
concerted and for the Commission to take the 
necessary steps to this end. (96)
This extensive involvement of the Commission in the 
organisation and coordination of foreign aid was a sign not 
only of its capabilities, but also of matters of deeper 
significance. The programme would be funded by the G-24 
states and the Community. However, the coordination of the 
programme was put solely in the hands of the Community, 
which represented a crucial signal by the industrialised
95 The Group of 24 include the 12 member states of theEuropean Community, the six European Free Trade Association member states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) plus Turkey, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.96 Bull. EC: 7/8-1989; emphasis added.
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States of the world that the CEES were within the 
Community's sphere of influence. The mandate given to the 
Commission was a clear sign of the direction of 
responsibility which the international community saw as _ 
essential. The European Commission was the body seen as the 
uniting force in bringing Central and Eastern Europe into 
the arena of open market economies, and democratic 
institutions.This authority given to the Commission 
"not only underlined the particular responsibility of the 
European Community for its East European neighbours but also 
provided a new dimension to the competence of the European 
Commission."
After looking at so many of the indirect aspects of 
actorness, the mandate by the Paris Summit and the major 
industrial states that the European Commission should take 
over responsibility for coordinating aid to the CEES 
provides the best and most direct example of Community 
actorness. Not only was the Community perceived as the 
relevant actor by the international community, but also the 
Community saw itself in that role. Thus the Community became 
assertive in taking over its responsibilities in the CEES:
97 See J. Pelkmans and A. Murphy, "Catapulted intoLeadership: The EC's Trade and Aid Policies vis-a-vis Eastern Europe", Journal of European Integration, vol. 14, no.2-3.98 Frans H.J.J. Andriessen, "Change in Central and EasternEurope. The role of the European Community." NATO Review, vol. 38, No. 1, February 1990, p. 3,
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The Commission had assessed the assistance already 
being provided, and had come to the conclusion that 
additional efforts were needed from the 
industrialised countries. It took the view that it 
should not only coordinate the operation but also 
submit its own proposals which was why it submitted 
to the 24 an action plan coordinated aid....The 24 
welcomed the broad lines and individual components of 
the plan and reaffirmed the need for action in the 
areas in question.... The 24 encouraged the 
Commission to continue with its coordination efforts, 
for which special working parties were e s s e n t i a l . ( 99)
The Community was thus not only asked to coordinate western 
aid, but took on its responsibility whole heartedly and 
assertively. This willingness on the part of the Community 
to manifest its internal strength through its actions, 
taking on the role of aid coordinator for the rest of the 
industrialised world reflected powerfully back onto its 
actor image. But most indicative was the fact that the Paris 
Summit explicitly gave the task of coordinating measures to 
the Commission; The richest and most powerful states had 
nodded in agreement that the European Community was the 
actor capable of achieving such a monumental task.
99 Bull. EC: 10-1989.
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2. The Community as a model
For the societies of the GEES, the Community offers to its 
neighbours a m o d e l a t  both the political and economic 
levels. While this view may seem to present the GEES as 
groping around in the dark for a way out of their chaos, it 
does not intend to. Rather it shows that these states have 
operated under a centrally planned economy, protected from 
the rigours of market competition, and need a model on which 
to base their restructuring. But perhaps more importantly it 
shows that the Community provides a model not only of 
economic competition, but also for the rigours of democratic 
competition through political pluralism. It also provides a 
focal point on which the governments of the GEES can 
concentrate their restructuring programmes.
First, the Community provides a secure trunk to which the 
GEES can graft themselves, an institutional infrastructure 
and nucleus which anchors the process of transformation. The 
goal of membership in the Community can act as a domestic 
policy instrument with which to make the difficulties of 
economic transformation less jarring for the society. As a 
publication of the Commission states:
100 See, for a very brief discussion of this idea.Commission of the European Communities, "The Community and its Eastern Neighbours", European File, Brussels, 1991.
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The EC is a magnet for East European reformers. It 
is the model to which they aspire in terms of 
democratic freedom and higher living standards.
Community statistics have shown that the goal of membership 
is highly sought after by the citizens of the CEES.
Over three-quarters support the idea of future membership in 
the Community. Thus the goal of membership, having so
much support in the populace, gives focus to the 
implementation of difficult domestic policies.
Second, by insisting on harmonisation of laws, standards, 
and regulations so that they come in line to those 
established by the EC, the Community deflects potential 
internal confusion and destabilizing elements by giving the 
CEES a European norm for which to aim. Thus the acquis 
communautaire plays a stabilising role. Again the focus of 
economic, political and even technical reform remains the 
potential of membership in the Community.
Third, the Community provides to the CEES a model of 
relations between states, and how to transform relations 
between states. The Community, having reached a high level
101 See, "The Community and its Eastern Neighbours", op. cit. p. 3.
102 See Commission of the European Communities, "Europe in a Changing World: the external relations of the European Community", Brussels, 1993, p. 31.103 The breakdown for percentage of support for membership in the Community in the various states is, Romania 88%, Slovakia 86%, Czech Republic 84%, Hungary 83%, Poland 80%, Bulgaria 73%. See Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer, no. 3, February 1993.
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of integration and cooperation on many levels, provides a 
model of state interaction. Quite apart from whether or not 
the CEES join, or wish to join, the Community, they are 
provided with a model of democratic interaction and 
diplomacy.
3. Political conditionality
From the early stages of Community involvement, conditions 
were set out with which the CEES had to comply. The 
recipient states did not receive aid without certain 
strings. Initially, the most significant obligation on the 
part of the CEES was to show signs both of implementing and 
of showing real progress toward political and market 
reforms. In 1989 five areas considered fundamental toward 
this progress were outlined at the Paris Summit as being 
absolute preconditions for the receipt of aid. These were:
1. the rule of law;
2. respect for human rights;
3. the establishment of multi-party systems;
4. the holding of free and fair elections;
5. economic liberalization with a view to
introducing market economies.
104 Bull. EC: 7/8-1989,
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In December 1989, at the meeting of the G-24 in Brussels, 
support was shown for the Commission's insistence at the 
prerequisite cooperation of the recipient states: the 
Declaration of the Group of 24 stressed the push "in 
political and economic terms for the progress in East Europe 
towards pluralistic democracy, the rule of law and market 
oriented economies".
However, the requirements changed throughout the period 
between 1989, when the Community first developed its 
response to the CEES, and 1993 when the Commission delivered 
its Background Report. The Paris Summit concluded that the 
preconditions for the receipt of aid included progress 
toward the rule of law, respect for human rights, the 
establishment of multi-party systems, the holding of 
elections, and economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n . T h e  Europe 
Agreements refer inter alia to the stability of institutions 
in the candidate state guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and, a completely new element from 
previous Declarations and statements, of respect for 
minorities.
That the Community's reward of membership for the CEES could 
influence the development of political institutions and 
legal structures is another crucial indicator of its
105 See EC Commission's Spokesman Press Release IP, 1989, no.953, 13 December 1989.106 Bull. EC: 7/8-1989.107 Background Report, op. cit. p. 2.
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influence in the CEES. The Community has established 
political conditionality as the foremost element of its 
Europe Agreements. These conditions help to assure, through 
clauses spelled out in the Agreements, that the CEES 
structure their economies and governments in a particular 
way. In order to reach the aim of membership in the club to 
which the states of Central and Eastern Europe aspire, they 
must meet the political criteria. These requirements 
"presuppose a functioning and competitive market economy, 
and an adequate legal and administrative framework in the 
public and private sectors".
Conclusion
The levels of actorness approach of this chapter has shown 
that the Community has gained legitimacy on three levels.
But it has also shown the extent to which it has been 
expected to become involved in the transition. The 
expectations of third states played a role in securing the 
Community's legitimacy by catapulting the EC into a 
leadership role.
This chapter has shown that the Community has been propelled 
into a powerful situation not only by its own actions, but 
also by the expectations of other states and groups of 
states. By its own accord, the Community accepted the role
108 Bull. EC: Supplement, 3-1992, p. 11
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given to it by the 1989 meeting of the G-7 states in Paris, 
developing and coordinating the extensive Phare programme.
It has opened up access for trade and taken steps to remove 
barriers-even on "sensitive" goods. Political dialogue has 
been initiated through involvement in European Political 
Cooperation. The Community has provided the focus for the 
CEES by guaranteeing multilateral involvement. The CEES have 
looked to the Community for providing linkages, through its 
institutional structure, between economic and political 
fields. Stable and reliable decision making structures and 
procedures, plus the acquis communautaire also provide a 
focus for the transition.
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CHAPTER 8
EVALUATION AND OUTLOOK
I. Evaluation of Thesis
This thesis has not discussed the success or failure of EPC; 
rather it has been concerned with the maturation of EPC as 
part of the logic of Community actorness, and the influence 
on that actorness caused by the friction between the 
competing systems of EPC, Community and the member states.
To this end it has been occupied first with the place of the 
Community in the international system, and how that place is 
influenced by actor behaviour in its various forms. Second, 
it has attempted to unravel the political from the economic 
and to show the consequences and implications of one upon 
the other. The ability of the Community to legitimise itself 
in the face of the tension between the interaction of EC and 
EPC has thus been a central theme.
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In this context, the thesis has examined the tensions that 
exist in the Community in the interplay between forces of 
integration, external relations and EPC, Reflected in the 
structure of EPC, its mechanisms and treaty language, is the 
capacity of the Community to act in the international 
environment. By wedding the concept of actorness to that of 
EPC and external relations, the issues addressed have taken 
on a wider form, and a form that presents two of EPC's 
crucial goals: to provide a forum for coherent policy 
development and to present the Community's position and its 
potential impact on international issues. Yet in order to 
achieve a single "Community" position, and to implement that 
position reconciliation is necessary between the machinery 
of EC and EPC.
Yet, it has been the purpose of this thesis not only to 
describe the relationship between EC and EPC and their 
structures, but also to expose the tension, latent and 
active, that surrounds this relationship. Further, the aim 
has been to show how this tension coloured all external 
political and economic acts of the Community, and provided a 
constant check on the development of the Community as an 
international actor.
The endeavour to formulate a common Community foreign policy 
was restricted from the beginning by a perilous fissure 
created at the Messina Conference in 1955 when the Community 
decided to make progress first in the economic field.
Because of the untenability of creating this artificial
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distinction, a myriad of complex legal and political 
gymnastics has taken place in an attempt to overcome this 
split. The complexities involved in the relationship between 
EPC-and commercial and trade policy have been unravelled by 
the preceding chapters.
It could be objected that no progress toward integration 
would have been made without this decision and that the 
failure of the EDO forced the political aspirations of the 
founders to be set aside. EPC was seen as one step toward 
mending this cleavage and beginning the process of 
connecting the political with the economic. Yet, Title III 
of the Single Act furthered the distinction. Again, it could 
be argued that EPC would never have been incorporated into 
the Treaty without its vague language and separate nature, 
and that some mechanism to cope with cooperating in the 
political sphere is better than nothing. The fact remains 
that while these objections may be true to a certain degree, 
they do not detract from the consequences of the separation 
which has been the main theme of this work.
The foregoing analysis has clearly identified the 
difficulties with the system of political cooperation as it 
has developed since its early days. It has also shown the 
attempts by the Community to overcome these difficulties and 
the various methods, contrivances and artifices that have 
supported a flawed system. In spite of its defects, however, 
EPC has not been wholly unsuccessful at aiding in the 
accomplishment of some useful foreign policy goals and at
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developing Community actorness, as has been seen in the 
previous pages. Yet certainly a more straightforward and 
systematic approach to political cooperation and to the 
political consequences of economic acts’ is required if 
political world role of the Community is to correspond with 
and support the economic world role.
Each case study in this thesis has shown the development of 
EPC and the international actor capability of the Community. 
With its involvement in the Central and East European States 
(CEES) the Community came full circle from its groping and 
rather faltering days of the Rhodesia crisis, to the 
uncertain but rather more coordinated actions and 
expectations in its relationship with Israel. In its 
relationship with the CEES, political responsibilities and 
actions were not separated from those of economics, and in 
fact were made inseparable through the conditionality 
clauses of the Europe Agreements, Certainly, the Community's 
actions in the CEES were a major contributor to both its 
actor image and its actor capability. Crucially, legitimacy 
was strengthened through this binding of economic strength 
with political restructuring. What had been ignored in 
Israel until the interference of the European Parliament, 
that economic decisions impact political actions, was 
brought right to the forefront in the Community's 
involvement in the CEES.
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II. Post-European Union Developments; Questions for 
the Future.
This thesis has dealt with the specific time period before
the implementation of the Treaty on European Union;(D have
any significant changes resulted since 1993 that resolve
some of the weaknesses of EPC, and that diminish the gap
between the economic and the political faces of the
Community? In a Parliamentary report drawn up before the
occurrence of the Maastricht intergovernmental conference
(ICC) in which the European Parliament presented its
strategy for European Union, changes regarding EPC were 
/ 2 )suggested. The SEA "should be revised in order to provide 
for matters currently dealt with under EPC to be dealt with 
in the Community framework with appropriate structures. 
Further, the report stated that:
the current division between external economic 
relations handled by the Community institutions with 
the Commission acting as the Community's external 
representative, and political cooperation handled by 
EPC with the EPC President acting as external
Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992). Hereafter the Treaty on European Union will be referred to also as TEU.European Parliament, "Second Interim Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the Intergovernmental Conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union." European Parliament Session Documents, Doc. A 3-166/90 (25 June1990).Second Interim Report, p. 7.
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representative, is increasingly difficult to 
maintain in practice.
The EP report called for prime responsibility for defining 
policy to lie with the Council, rather than the separate 
framework of foreign ministers acting in EPC, and for the 
Commission to have not only the right of initiative in 
proposing policies, but also to have a role in representing 
the Community externally. These changes would make the 
interaction of EPC or CFSP with external relations more 
consistent. Regarding the split between economics and 
politics, the EP report succinctly remarks: "any genuine
attempt 'to assure unity and coherence in the Community's 
international action' must abolish this increasingly 
artificial distinction."
The Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht Treaty as it is 
commonly known, was the result of the work carried out at 
the IGCs and came into force on 1 November 1993. It contains 
the latest list of objectives by the Twelve in their effort 
to establish a political voice, and to give that voice a 
treaty base. This base is laid out in Title V entitled 
Provisions on a Common Foreign Security Policy. But have the 
organisational changes brought about by the Maastricht 
Treaty addressed the real issues discussed by this thesis or 
are they merely cosmetic?
4 idem.5 2 dem.
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The answer is that while the Treaty on European Union has 
provided some changes to the questions raised in this 
thesis, the fundamental issues have not changed. The 
Community may have added a few new clothes to its wardrobe, 
but the wearer is still the same old, although perhaps 
slightly better adorned, institution.
The Treaty on European Union eliminates the term European 
Political Cooperation altogether and replaces it with the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. The language of the 
Single European Act, which called only for a commitment to 
endeavour to formulate and implement a European foreign 
policy, is replaced in the Maastricht Treaty by definitive 
wording; the Union and its member states shall define and 
implement a common foreign and security p o l i c y T h e  
objectives of this policy encompass five major areas:
-to safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests and independence of the Union
-to strengthen the security of the Union and its 
member states in all ways
-to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security,
-to promote international cooperation
6 Article J.l, TEU.
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-to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule
of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
(7 )freedoms.
However, once again both the Union and its member states are 
referred to in the Treaty's language, retaining the idea of 
separateness for the member states in the area of foreign 
policy. The member states:
shall inform and consult one another within the 
Council on any matter of foreign and security policy 
of general interest in order to ensure that their 
combined influence is exerted as effectively as 
possible by means of convergent action.
Although they remain free to determine their individual 
national policy stance, they are obligated in the Treaty to 
ensure that their national policies conform to the common 
position which is defined by the Council. Yet once again the 
question of enforcement of that obligation is not 
determined. Just as was the case for Title III of the Single 
European Act, (under which the member states had only to 
give due consideration to the desirability of common 
positions and give consideration to them as a "point of 
reference") Title V of the TEU is not governed by the Court 
of Justice so any explicit obligation is legally non 
existent.
7 Article J.l.2, TEU.8 Article J.2.1, TEU.
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while not mentioned in Title V, which covers the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, the Court is excluded from CFSP 
in Title VII of the TEU entitled "Final Provisions." Here it 
states that : -
the powers of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities and the exercise of those powers shall 
apply only to the following provisions of this Treaty:
(a) provisions amending the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community with a view to establishing 
the European Community, the Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community;
(b) the third subparagraph of Article K.3(2)(c);
(c) Articles L to S.
In Article L of the Final Provisions the whole of Title V is 
excluded, including Article J. The use of strong language 
such as, the member states "shall ensure that their national 
policies conform to the common positions",(10) is given no 
legal basis or procedural remedy. The only obligation is to 
carry out the foreign policy provisions in a "spirit of 
loyalty and mutual solidarity." This spirit is a quantity 
not only hard to measure, but also non-enforceable under 
Community law. The member states are encouraged to give this 
full support to the CFSP in Article J.l.4:
9 Article L, TEU.10 Article J.2.2, TEU.
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The Member States shall support the Union's external
and security policy actively and unreservedly in a
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall
refrain from any action which is contrary to the
interests of the Union or likely to impair its
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international
relations. The Council shall ensure that these
(11)principles are complied with.
As to the issues on which consultation is required under 
CFSP, the Maastricht Treaty goes further than did SEA, 
outlining the foreign policy issues within its scope. Title 
III of the SEA did not define those issues of general 
interest on which consultation would be required. The only 
reference to the scope of EPC is specific inclusion of the 
"political and economic aspects of security." Maastricht's 
Article J.2 states that the Council decides, on the basis of 
general guide-lines from the European Council, that a matter 
should be the subject of joint action. Article J.2 is 
noteworthy because it provides potentially for a system of 
qualified majority voting for matters of the CFSP, although 
in practice the decision to make an issue the subject of a 
qualified majority vote is taken by unanimity. The Council 
"defines those matters on which decisions are to be taken by 
a qualified majority" (Article J.2.2) when adopting joint 
actions and at any stage during its development. However,
11 Article J.l.4, TEU.
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implicit in the subparagraph is that the Council may also 
conclude that a decision must be unanimous.
The member states have available a derogation from the joint 
action adopted by the Council. Paragraph 6 of Article J.2 
states that:
in cases of imperative need arising from changes in 
the situation and failing a Council decision. Member 
States may take the necessary measures as a matter 
of urgency having regard to the general objectives 
of the joint action. The Member States concerned 
shall inform the Council immediately of any such 
measures.
The Single European Act went part of the way to provide a 
framework for consistency between external relations and the 
work of European Political Cooperation; but the language 
still kept the political aspects of the Community's 
relationships distinct from its economic and commercial 
relationships. The Treaty on European Union, while still 
tentative in this regard, goes further to bring the two 
together. Article J.2 of the Common Provisions pledges the 
consistency of external actions as a whole in the context of 
security, economic and development policies. The political 
role of the Community has been incorporated more fully into 
the text of the TEU. Article C states:
The Union shall be served by a single institutional 
framework which shall ensure the consistency and the
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continuity of the activities carried out in order to
attain its objectives while respecting and building
(12 )upon the acquis communautaire.
Yet once again these changes appear to have only cosmetic 
value because no real obligation exists to ensure legally 
for these provisions. In practice the changed wording can 
have no substantive effect because once again there is no 
remedy extant. The structure of the TEU is thus slightly 
less divided than was the SEA. While Title III of the SEA 
seemed almost an appendix to the rest of the Act, with its 
references to "High Contracting Parties" rather than member 
states, the TEU gives at least textual parity to the CFSP. 
However, conceptually it is not the organic whole 
represented by a solid Union tree with CFSP as one branch 
equal to all other branches. Rather, the TEU retains its 
divided structure with the CFSP standing as one pillar, 
still separated from the Union. The Commission is associated 
rather than involved with the work of the CFSP much as it 
was with EPC, having no right of initiative; as with Title 
III of the SEA, the European Court of Justice has no 
jurisdiction in CFSP and plays no role. The Treaty on 
European Union is a document full of dichotomies.
The Treaty on European Union itself provides the next phase 
of research on the interaction of Community and CFSP 
structures. While it is too early yet to see the full
12 Article C, para. 1.
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consequences of CFSP for the Union, there are signposts in 
the Treaty which will make interesting research. The first 
of these is Article 228a regarding economic sanctions. Will 
the new Treaty Article maks a difference to the process 
whereby economic sanctions are implemented and to their 
effectiveness in providing a coherent Community position? As 
noted in chapter four of this thesis. Article 22 8a is not 
placed within the CFSP, therefore it involves a proposal 
from the Commission. This separation of economic sanctions 
from the CFSP is one clear demonstration that issues 
regarding the relationship of economics to politics have not 
been fully resolved in the TEU. Further, Article 228a is not 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, 
another interesting complication to the continued attempt by 
the Community to keep politics at bay.
A second area of research based on the Treaty on European 
Union is the new language of the Treaty. This is a task of 
legal exegesis of the Treaty; the implications of the 
commitments laid out in the Treaty and the extent and nature 
of their obligation under law. An interesting point is that 
there is no equivalent in the Maastricht Treaty to Article 
210 of the Treaty of Rome which explicitly states that the 
Community shall have legal personality. To what legal extent 
are the member states required to consult, cooperate and 
inform? What are the penalties of non-compliance? This type 
of analysis would (potentially) uncover some provocative 
implications regarding competences, obligations and rights
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of member states under the new Treaty. But just as this 
thesis has attempted to confirm that the separation of the 
economic from the political is senseless, so too is the 
attempt at separating the legal from the political. 
Therefore, a research project of this nature must rest on an 
interdisciplinary foundation.
An empirical approach would aid another potential area for 
research: further investigation into the concept of 
actorness. Specifically, methodological analysis is needed 
to show how the Community and its attempts at a common 
foreign policy are viewed by third states. While assumptions 
are often made in the literature about the perceptions of 
third states about the Community, these are rarely backed up 
by evidence. Do more powerful third states view the 
Community as an international actor of significance? With 
the end of the cold war, the Community could step into the 
role of the second super-power. What implications does the 
decline of the Soviet Union have for the perceived actorness 
of the Community?
A fourth major research area involves a continuing study of 
the Central and East European states and how the effects of 
the initial Community involvement evolve in the future. Will 
the Community's manifestly normative and systemic objectives 
provide a model for future involvement in other parts of the 
world?
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Fifth, an interesting study of EPC and CFSP would involve
comparing the coordination, coherence and reactions
specifically in war or intense conflict situations. Most
studies of EPC in response to conflicts revolve around a one
case study. More comparative work is needed. The Gulf War
which erupted in 1991, the Falklands War of 1982, the
ongoing conflict in the former Yugoslavia all provide
excellent ground for a study of the similarities and
differences or the existence of a common thread of reaction
( 13 )and response when conflict erupts. A study of this sort
could proffer some interesting analysis of EPC and CFSP, and 
its complex relationship to economic and commercial policy, 
as well as provide important policy prescriptives for the 
next IGC in 1996.
13 See, for an interesting evaluation of politicalcooperation in the Gulf War and Yugoslavia, Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing times for European political cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992," International Affairs, vol. 68 (1992) pp. 233-253.14 For an interesting outline of potential research areassee, Christopher Hill, "Research into EPC: Tasks for the Future," in A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger and W. Wessels, eds., European Political Cooperation in the 1980s (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
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